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Abstract 
Arbitration is considered the preferred mechanism for settling cross-border commercial 
disputes. A court can be an unusual setting for dispute resolution for a national of 
another country due to such individual’s foreignness with the practices, applicable laws 
and attitudes of the judges. The charm of arbitration is that it upholds party autonomy 
and underpins finality and certainty in dispute resolution. Arbitration allows parties to a 
contract to provide for a procedure which is mutually agreeable. National courts which 
uphold these rights are considered to be pro-arbitration, whereas courts that limit such 
rights are either considered as interventionist or hostile to arbitration. Attitudes of courts 
have implications for parties who select a seat or the laws of a particular country to 
regulate their arbitration process.   
This thesis relates to international commercial arbitration and examines the attitudes of 
courts towards enforcement of transnational arbitral awards. The significance of 
enforcement hinges on the fact that arbitration is considered to be inconsequential if its 
award is not enforceable. The primary focus of this thesis is to evaluate the attitudes of 
the English and Nigerian courts to enforcement of international commercial arbitral 
awards: based purely on transnational principles, or annulled at the seat of arbitration. 
The thesis offers a comparative evaluation and engages the law and policy 
considerations to enforcement of international commercial arbitral awards in both 
countries under review. To this end, an examination of the English and Nigerian 
legislation, case law and practice are undertaken.  
This thesis argues that international commercial arbitration and its awards transcends 
national frontiers as such, transnational in character. It concludes that the English and 
Nigerian courts in an appropriate case are ready to enforce arbitral awards based purely 
on transnational principles or annulled at the seat of arbitration. 
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Chapter one 
General Introduction 
1. Background 
Arbitration as a private system of adjudication is premised on the consent of the parties 
to submit or refer their dispute to a neutral party, the arbitrator. By choosing arbitration, 
parties effectively waive their right to litigation.
1
 The often quoted benefits of 
international arbitration include, but are not limited to, efficiency, neutrality of the 
forum for dispute settlement, finality of arbitral decisions, and enforceability of arbitral 
awards.
2
 Arbitration also permits procedural flexibility by allowing parties the freedom 
to tailor the dispute resolution process to their needs and appoint arbitrator of their own 
choice.
3
 
Generally, the arbitrator’s duty is to oversee the reference from commencement to 
resolution. Once an award is properly rendered by the arbitrator, such award becomes 
final and binding on the parties to the arbitration. Although, a party to the arbitration 
can challenge the award, or the unsuccessful party resist enforcement, there are limited 
grounds of such challenge or resistance against an award on the merits before national 
courts. Thus, according to Born, enforceability of arbitral awards globally, and the final 
and binding nature of arbitration contributes to its attractiveness to commercial parties, 
who usually expect swift conclusion of disputes.
4
 In contrast, though in litigation 
[appellate] courts’ judgments are final and binding, parties are not permitted to tailor 
rules of court to their own dispute resolution needs. Courts use established procedures 
and do not have discretion to modify the rules subject to the circumstances of individual 
parties.  
                                                             
1. Rowley, J. W. and Swaroop, S. (2009) “The Role of Judiciary in International Arbitration- The 
Benefits of Support: Recent English Experience” Business Law International Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 
272 – 279. 
2. Born, G. B. (2015) International Arbitration: Law and Practice, 2nd edn., Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands, pp. 8 – 17; Moses, M. L. (2012) The Principles and Practice of 
International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd edn., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 2 – 
4.    
3. Blackaby, N., et al, (2015) Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 6th edn., Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, pp. 187 – 190. 
4. Born, G. B. (2015) at pp. 8 – 17. 
22 
 
Sometimes, disputes in court last for decades and parties pay the cost financially plus 
time wastage. To this end, arbitration carries real economic benefits.
5
 Like national 
arbitration laws and policies, attitudes of courts concerning enforcement of international 
commercial arbitration awards have implications for each nation’s economy.6 
Nevertheless, the interplay between national legal systems and arbitration, both 
domestic and international, differs. Some relate to arbitration in an interventionist 
manner, while others are supportive and are regarded as ‘arbitration friendly’ 
jurisdictions.
7
 This raises questions as to the policy consideration national arbitration 
laws reflect and the attitudes of the national courts towards the enforcement of arbitral 
awards.  
The need to enforce arbitral awards becomes necessary if a party to arbitration fails, or 
neglects, or refuses to honour the arbitral award. The enforcement of foreign arbitral 
award is guaranteed by international conventions such as the New York Convention of 
1958 (NYC).
8
 The right to resist enforcement, on limited grounds, are also guaranteed 
under such conventions. Though, arbitral awards have the same status as a binding and 
final court’s judgment, a party still needs the support of a national court when enforcing 
against the unsuccessful party that has failed to comply with the terms of the arbitral 
award. Likewise, a party challenging or resisting the enforcement of the award needs 
the support of the court either at the seat of arbitration or at the enforcing state, as the 
case may be.  
According to Asouzu, although, cross-border parties depend upon international 
conventions or treaties and national arbitration laws for enforcement of arbitral awards, 
                                                             
5. Rowley, J. W. and Swaroop, S. (2009) p. 275.  
6. Dietz, T. (2014) “Does International Commercial Arbitration Provide Efficient Contract 
Enforcement Institutions for International Trade?” in Mattli, W. and Dietz, T. (eds.) 
International Arbitration and Global Governance: Contending Theories and Evidence, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, pp. 168 – 195; Hale, T. (2014) “What is the Effect of Commercial 
Arbitration on Trade?”  ?” in Mattli, W. and Dietz, T. (eds.) International Arbitration and 
Global Governance: Contending Theories and Evidence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 
196 – 213; McConnaughay, P. J. (2013) “The Role of Arbitration in Economic Development and 
Creation of Transnational Legal Principles” Peking University Transnational Law Review, No. 
1, pp. 9 – 31. 
7. Lew, J. D. M. (2009) “Does National Court Involvement Undermine the International 
Arbitration Processes?” American University International Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 489 
– 537; Ball, M. (2006) “The Essential Judge: The Role of the Courts in a System of National and 
International Commercial Arbitration” Arbitration International, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 73 – 94.  
8. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 10 
June 1958. 
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the efficacy of the arbitration processes is contingent on the pro-arbitration approaches 
of national courts.
9
 In addition, the continued use of arbitration as a mechanism of 
private adjudication will diminish without the availability of a reliable, fair and effective 
method of enforcing the arbitral award.
10
 Thus, the fashion in which courts set aside or 
enforce awards affects the popularity of the jurisdiction as a seat for arbitration. 
This thesis comparatively examines the attitudes of the courts in England
11
 and Nigeria 
towards the enforcement of transnational commercial arbitral awards under the NYC. 
An objective of this thesis is to offer a comparative analysis and consider the principles 
of enforcing, challenging and resisting arbitral awards as applied by the courts under 
review. The investigation pursued in the following chapters finds that national courts 
play a key role in assisting parties to arbitration to achieve their legitimate expectations. 
The national courts of both jurisdictions exercise maximum pro-arbitration discretion 
towards the enforcement of arbitral awards. These courts only set aside or refuse the 
enforcement of arbitral awards if there is a serious defect in the process of rendering the 
award. 
2. The significance of the thesis 
The crucial test of any arbitration process, whether domestic or international, is its 
capability to produce an award which, if necessary, will be recognised and enforced in 
relevant national courts. While on the one hand, the recognition of arbitral awards 
generally means giving preclusive effect to the award, usually in an effort to foreclose 
re-litigation or re-arbitration of the claims already arbitrated conversely, enforcement is 
the invocation of coercive judicial remedies to accomplish the terms of an arbitral 
award.
12
 This thesis concerns enforcement rather than recognition though the 
requirements for legal proceedings for both are the same. 
Generally, the purpose of this thesis is to understand the manner in which national 
courts respond to the enforcement of transnational commercial arbitral awards. 
Particularly, it evaluates the efficacy of international commercial arbitration regimes in 
England and Nigeria, and the validity and enforceability of arbitral awards based purely 
                                                             
9. Asouzu, A. A., (1999), “The Adoption of the UNICITRAL Model Law in Nigeria: Implications 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards”, Journal of Business Law, 185. 
10. Hu, L., (2004), “Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Court Intervention in the People’s 
Republic of China”, Arbitration International, Vol., 20, No., 2, p. 167. 
11. Reference to England in this thesis means ‘England and Wales.’ 
12. Blackaby, N., et al, (2015) pp. 610 – 612. 
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on transnational principles by both countries’ national courts. Hence, the significance of 
this thesis lies in the conduct of a comparative and contextual examination of judicial 
approaches to the enforcement of transnational arbitral awards, and the consequential 
conclusions which have been arrived at independently. 
The legislative frameworks in both countries cannot function without the support and 
cooperation of their national courts. The manner in which these courts interpret and 
apply the legislations constitutes a major source of authority and impact on the 
effectiveness of the regimes on the enforcement of transnational arbitral awards. All the 
more so, a test whether the regimes are fit for purpose or accord with the enforcement 
bias of the NYC. A detailed examination of the relevant provisions of the laws and the 
courts’ decisions are analysed comparatively. On areas where divergent interpretations 
exist, attempt is made to offer an amenable approach, not losing sight of the peculiar 
circumstances of each country under examination. 
3. Research questions 
The research questions examined in this thesis are: 
i) Whether the same standards are applied in determining the validity of the 
enforcement of transnational commercial arbitral awards by the English and 
Nigerian courts.  
ii) Whether the juridical theory of arbitration the law and attitude of the national 
courts of England and Nigeria reflect in enforcing transnational commercial 
arbitral awards are the same. 
iii) Whether arbitral awards based purely on transnational rules are enforceable in 
England and Nigeria; and whether the procedures for the enforcement of such 
arbitral awards in England and Nigeria are effective. 
iv) Whether the English and Nigerian courts apply the same conditions in setting 
aside transnational commercial arbitral awards. 
v) Whether the English and Nigerian courts apply the same conditions in refusing 
enforcement of transnational commercial arbitral awards; and whether the 
conditions for the refusal of such awards in England and Nigeria are effective. 
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4. Research methodology 
This research is library-based and draws from a combination of qualitative legal 
research methodologies in collating and analysing primary and secondary sources of 
law in both jurisdictions. The key legal research methodology used in this regard is 
comparative black letter or doctrinal analysis of arbitration legislations and case laws 
from both countries and other jurisdictions. The choice of this methodology is premised 
on the fact that earlier scholarships have shown that comparative doctrinal analysis can 
be used as a research methodology and an effective vehicle of law reform.
13
 According 
to Watson, comparative law is the study of the relationship between legal systems or 
between rules of more than one legal system in the context of a history.
14
 Thus, this 
thesis utilises some fundamental insights from comparative arbitration legislations and 
case laws from both jurisdictions. Arbitration legislations and case laws from other 
jurisdictions assist in exploring best practices and also provide a basis for the evaluation 
of contemporary legal principles. 
Again, the choice of a comparative methodology is influenced by the subject matter, 
examination of the research questions and the significance of the thesis. This thesis does 
not test a proposition as may be expected in the examination or deflating of a theory. 
According to Copi and Cohen, a proposition usually states something that is either true 
or false, however when a question is asked or a problem is posed, it is neither an 
assertion nor a denial and hence cannot be judged to be true or false.
15
 A comprehensive 
study of a question or problem [whether legal, social, economic or clinical] in pursuit of 
an answer is therefore a valid academic exercise and process that is capable to 
contribute to knowledge, which is a core requirement of a PhD.
16
  It is also useful to 
employ the comparative research method where the approach to a particular issue in two 
                                                             
13. Smiths, J. M. (2007) “Comparative Law and its Influence on National Legal Systems” in 
Reimann, M. and Zimmermann, R., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, pp. 513 – 538; Michaels, R. (2007) “The Functional Method of 
Comparative Law” in Reimann, M. and Zimmermann, R., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 339 – 382; Nelken, D. (2007) 
“Comparative Law and Comparative Legal Studies” in Orucu, E. and Nelken, D. (eds.) 
Comparative Law:  A Handbook, Hart Publishing, Portland, pp. 3 – 42; Glenn, H. P. (2007) 
“Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions” in Reimann, M. and 
Zimmermann, R., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford,  pp. 421 – 440. 
14. Watson, A. (1993) Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2nd edn.,The  
University of Georgia Press, Athens, p. 6. 
15. Copi, I. M. and Cohen, C. (1994) Introduction to Logic, 9th edn., Macmillan, New York, p. 2. 
16. Copi, I. M. and Cohen, C. (1994) at pp. 2 – 6. 
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or more legal systems is considered. The approaches of national courts, particularly that 
of England and Nigeria, is contrasted to discover similarities, dissimilarities, strengths 
and weakness, in order to determine the optimal approach to enforcement of arbitral 
awards in common law jurisdictions.
17
 
Theoretically, this thesis examines various contributions offered by commentators, 
research reports projects, and soft laws principles advanced by both public and private 
international organisations. The analysis is selective and only covers issues on the 
enforcement of transnational arbitral awards. To this end, reference is made to 
international conventions, including multilateral and bilateral treaties, national laws, 
arbitration rules, guidelines and notes. 
5. Choice of selected jurisdiction: England and Nigeria 
The choice of two common law jurisdictions, England and Nigeria, was made for 
various reasons. Arguably, arbitration law and practice in England has a major impact 
on the development of arbitration globally.
18
 In addition, England provides a model for 
the common law approach to arbitration law and has influenced African and Asian 
legislations, particularly those of common law jurisdictions.
19
 
Another reason for choosing both countries is similarity of legal tradition.
20
 Nigeria was 
a colony of Great Britain. By statute, Nigeria received her first arbitration legislation, 
the Arbitration Act 1889, from England in 1914, the Arbitration Ordinance 1914. The 
Arbitration Ordinance applied to the whole country and was re-acted verbatim as 
Arbitration Act 1963 when Nigeria became a Federal Republic. From 1889 to 1996, 
                                                             
17. Dannemann, G. (2007) “Comparative Law: Study of Similarities and Differences?” in Reimann, 
M. and Zimmermann, R., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, pp. 383 – 419. 
18. Sayre, P. L. (1928) “Development of Commercial Arbitration Law”, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 
37, No. 5, pp. 595 – 617; Wolaver, E. S. (1934) “The Historical Background of Commercial 
Arbitration”, University of Pennsyvania Law Review, No. 83, pp. 132 – 146; Macassey, L. 
(1938) “International Commercial Arbitration, - Its Origin, Development and Importance”, 
American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 24, No. 7, pp. 518 – 582; Jones, W. C. (1958) “Inquiry 
into the History of Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in Great Britain and the United States”, 
The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 445 – 464. 
19. Joireman, S. F. (2001) “Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa and the 
Colonial Legacy”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 571 – 596; 
Joireman, S. F. (2006) “The Evolution of the Common Law: Legal Development in Kenya and 
India”, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 190 – 210. 
20. Cotterrell, R. (2007) “Is it so Bad to be Different? Comparative Law and the Appreciation of 
Diversity” in Orucu, E. and Nelken, D. (eds.) Comparative Law:  A Handbook, Hart Publishing, 
Portland, pp. 133 – 154.   
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both years inclusive, England amended the Arbitration Act 1889 notably five times.
21
 
However, Nigeria in 1988 completely departed from the provisions of the Arbitration 
Act 1889.
22
 Therefore, notwithstanding their common law origins, England and Nigeria 
have discernible differences respecting their arbitration legislations. While the Nigerian 
Arbitration and Conciliation Degree 1988 (ACA) substantially adopts the UNCITRAL 
Model Law 1985, same cannot be said of the English Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996), 
though also influenced by the Model Law. In addition, both jurisdictions are parties to 
the NYC. 
6. Chapter synopsis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. This chapter one gives a general introduction 
to the thesis. Chapter two introduces both jurisdictions through a discussion of the 
history of commercial arbitration in England and Nigeria. It provides an understanding 
of the laws governing international commercial arbitration in both countries. Chapter 
three analyses the juridical theories of arbitration. This chapter gives a theoretical 
background of the arguments advanced in the thesis and also examines the policy 
consideration the law and courts England and Nigeria reflect. The juridical theories are 
applied in the next three chapters to various aspects of enforcement of awards in the two 
jurisdictions. Chapter four evaluates the approaches of the courts in the two jurisdictions 
towards the requirements for the enforcement of arbitral awards. It analyses the notion 
of ‘transnational rules’ or lex mercatoria and examines whether awards based purely on 
such rules are enforceable in both jurisdictions. Chapter five assesses the attitude of the 
courts in both jurisdictions towards the challenge of arbitral awards. It also examines 
how the courts of the two jurisdictions treat the role of the seat of arbitration for 
purposes of annulling an award. Chapter six analyses the grounds for resisting the 
enforcement of an award in the two jurisdictions. In chapter seven, a conclusion of the 
thesis is drawn. 
                                                             
21. The Arbitration Act 1889 Act was amended by the Arbitration Act 1934 and thereafter 
consolidated by the Arbitration Act 1950. Part 1 of the 1950 Act was later amended by the 
Arbitration Act 1979 and the Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act 1988. Part II of the 1950 
Act which was amended by the Arbitration Act 1975 concerned itself with international 
arbitration under the Geneva Convention. The Arbitration Act 1996 which was passed on June 
17, 1996 came into force January 31, 1997, save sections 85 to 87 which relates to domestic 
arbitration agreements.  
22. The Arbitration and Conciliation Decree 1988, (ACA), copiously mirrors the UNCITRAL 
Model Law 1985, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and incorporates the NYC which is set out as 
the Second Schedule to the Act. 
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Every chapter begins with a brief introduction highlighting the research question 
examined therein, provides an outline of its various sections and subsections, and 
concludes with a summary.
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Chapter two 
Historical overview of arbitration in England and Nigeria 
2.0.  Introduction 
The likelihood of disputes arising in any human interaction is generally high. This has 
led to the creation of different methods for the resolution of such disputes. Arbitration is 
one of such methods of dispute resolution and is as old as human communities.
1
 
According to Bales, arbitration was used as a means of resolving differences before the 
use of litigation.
2
 To support his assertion, Bales points to the records of ancient 
Egyptians, Greeks and Romans. Arguably, these records show that in early times, the 
arbitrator was generally a person known and trusted by the disputants and the better 
known the arbitrator the more confidence the disputants had in the arbitrator’s decision.  
For example, in 337 BC Philip of Macedon, father of Alexander the Great, is 
documented to have used arbitration to resolve territorial disputes arising from a peace 
treaty with some of the Greek States.
3
 
In its simplest sense, arbitration is a procedure that can be used to resolve disputes 
between disputants without going through litigation. Within the business community, 
arbitration as a means of alternative dispute is not novel. It has a long standing record 
and has developed from its infancy to the present state.
4
 According to Lord Mustill: 
Commercial arbitration must have existed since the dawn 
of commerce. All trade potentially involves disputes, and 
successful trade must have a means of dispute resolution 
other than force.
5
 
This chapter discusses the historical background of arbitration in England and Nigeria. 
Before that, it examines the concept of transnational law (2.1). In discussing the 
historical background of arbitration in England, it examines the development of 
commercial arbitration from the common law period to its present day statutory regime 
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(2.2). For Nigeria, the chapter discusses the use of arbitration prior to British 
colonisation, during and after colonisation (2.3). The chapter then discusses the 
application of the NYC to transnational commercial arbitration in England and Nigeria 
(2.4). 
2.1. The concept of transnational law 
The idea of transnational laws, rules or policies have been addressed in a plethora of 
articles, conference reports and papers, monographs and lectures on international law 
and arbitration with different measures of analysis and depth. Sometimes, the concept is 
referred to as lex mercatoria or the new lex mercatoria – ‘the law merchant.’ The 
subject took centre stage following Philip C. Jessup’s Seminal Storrs lectures on 
‘Transnational Law’ at Yale Law School in 1956. In his lecture, Jessup postulated that: 
I shall use instead of ‘international law’, the term 
‘transnational law’ to include all law which regulates 
actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both 
public and international law are included, as are other 
rules which do not wholly fit into such standard 
categories… 6 
From a robust standpoint, Jessup’s concept of transnational law can be classified as a 
practical approach of grouping all laws, rules and policies which control all 
circumstances and events that exist outside national boundaries, arbitration inclusive. 
Lalive in a discourse on transnational public policy stated that transnational laws are a 
corrective mechanism and an important component of the body of rules beyond a nation 
state’s rules which a tribunal is called upon to apply in a dispute.7 For Lalive, the 
function of national and transnational laws does not differ in substance. While national 
laws safeguard the fundamental concerns of a country, transnational laws protect the 
fundamental concerns of the international community. Consequently, transnational law 
operates in the realm of cross-border interactions as a distinct and independent legal 
phenomenon.  
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In an inquiry on the procedural category of transnational public policy, Mantilla-Serrano 
examined the term ‘transnational’, which implies ‘among’ or ‘between’ nations. He 
further remarked that since there is no universally acceptable definition of 
‘transnational’, the meaning that attaches in a context remains consensual.8 Thus, for 
Mantilla-Serrano, ‘transnational’ denotes circumstances or events among or between 
nation states, including but not limited to individuals. 
Cotterrell in an academic discourse on ‘what is transnational law’ conceptualised 
‘transnational law’ as law ‘spilled out’ beyond the borders of  nation states.9 Cotterrell’s 
dissertation on ‘transnational law’ has three limbs; an extension of jurisdiction across 
nation states, rules not originated by nation states or international instruments, and 
proposed rule(s) that addresses across border transaction(s). From the viewpoint of his 
thesis, transnational law creates a situation where individuals, merchant communities, 
public and private agencies that operate across national boundaries make rules that bind 
them as law in their various interactions. 
Oduntan in his exposition on the origins of lex mercatoria, sees transnational law as part 
of lex mercatoria and thus remarked that:  
Lex mercatoria is global and beyond the state. It includes 
the concept of transnational law… The lex mercatoria is a 
tool of justice… A contract is poorer for not including lex 
mercatoria as an applicable regime and not richer or safer 
for excluding it.
10
  
Menkel-Meadow in analysing why and how to study ‘transnational law’ defines 
transnational law as the study of legal phenomena; law making processes, rules and 
legal institutions inclusive, that impact or have the power to impact behaviours beyond 
a nation state border.
11
 According to Menkel-Meadow, these legal phenomena may not 
be formally enacted by a nation state yet they regulate interactions, private and public, 
across borders. Menkel-Meadow’s definition contemplates transnational law as a form 
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of informal legal phenomena that transcends national borders and affect or have the 
power to affect interactions.  
In a philosophical examination of transnational law, Mendenhall writes: 
… it is the pluralistic order of various principles and rules 
from divergent customs, cultures, and communities that 
draws its lexicon from competing philosophical 
discourses and not from top-down coercive commands of 
states or sovereigns … it is an unsettling of borders and 
boundaries and a turn towards compromise and 
competition as means by which to settle disputes.
12
  
Mendenhall sees transnational law as a body of law emanating from different customs, 
cultures and communities, and agreed upon by individuals (corporate, private and public 
institutions inclusive) to regulate their interactions, not necessarily handed down by the 
state yet transcends state boundaries. He concluded that the beauty of transnational 
regulation lies in its dual service of supposed ‘liberal’ interest of pluralism and assumed 
‘conservative’ interest of minimising and circumventing government bureaucracy.13 
For Calliess,
14
 transnational law refers to an institutional framework for cross-border 
transaction beyond the nation state. In contrast to territorially organised national and 
international law, it is structured as a variety of practically specialised cross-border 
frameworks, which in a utilitarian approach synthesise different regulatory instruments 
of private (norms, alternative dispute resolution, social sanctions) and public (laws, 
courts, enforcement) origin, where the latter are disintegrated from the national 
framework.
15
 
Similarly, Calliess and Zumbansen see transnational law as a third category of 
autonomous legal system beyond the traditional dichotomy of municipal law and 
(public) international law created and developed by the law making apparatus of a 
global civil society.
16
 Reasoned in this context, transnational law is hinged on four 
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interconnected lines; firstly, it is anchored on general principles of law, (derived from a 
practical comparative analysis of the “common core” of municipal legal systems) and 
usages and customs of international business community as evidenced in standard 
contract forms and general business requirements; secondly, it is administered and 
developed by private organisations of alternative dispute resolution; thirdly, it is 
recognised and executed predominantly by reason of social sanctions (such as 
reputation and exclusion), and fourthly, its rules are systematised.
17
 
Gaillard, an advocate of transnational arbitration sees international arbitration as a 
transnational phenomenon in which specific arbitration principles are synthesised. 
These synthesised arbitral principles are from the collective approach of a variety of 
nation states creating a distinct legal regime that surpasses national legal regimes.
18
 
de Lima Pinheiro conceives transnational arbitration in a broad sense. According to 
him, transnational law of arbitration is a set of standards, rules and principles, which are 
applied by the arbitral tribunal, elected by the parties to the arbitration, and are 
developed independently from the action of national and supranational institutions of 
authorities.
19
 He explained that supranational authorities are international conventions 
which perhaps are of universal or regional scope.
20
 
Bonell in a learned article on “The UNIDROIT Principles and Transnational Law”21 
sees transnational law as all kinds of principles and rules of non-national or a-national 
character used in international business practice as an alternative to domestic law. 
Bonell’s definition is broad in contrast to a narrow definition whereby transnational law 
is limited to generally recognised principles of law and trade usages.
22
 
According to Blackaby, et al, transnational law is a blend of national and public 
international laws, or an assemblage of international trade rules or laws elected by 
                                                             
17. Calliess, G-P. and Zumbansen, P. (2010), pp. 1 – 10.  
18. Gaillard, E., (2010) Legal Theory of International Arbitration, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden & Boston, pp. 13 – 60. 
19. de Lima Pinheiro, L., “The Confluence of Transnational Rules and National Directives as the 
Legal Framework of Transnational Arbitration”, available at: http://arbitrgem.pt/estudos/legal-
framework-of-arbitration.pdf [accessed on 27/09/2016] 
20. de Lima Pinheiro, L.,  
21. Bonell, M. J., (2000-2), “The UNIDROIT Principles and Transnational Law”, Rev. dr. Unif, pp. 
199 – 218.  
22. Goode, R. (1997), “Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law”, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 46, pp. 1 – 36.  
34 
 
parties to a dispute to govern substantive matters in issue between them.
23
 However, 
Redfern, Hunter, Blackaby and Partasides have observed that while the dichotomy 
between municipal, international and transnational is helpful and well settled, the exact 
definitions remain to be widely acknowledged.
24
  
Regardless of the position one may take on the ‘narrow and broad’ definition of 
transnational law, arguably, what really matters is not the theoretical definition. But the 
extent transnational laws are applied in practice in lieu of or in addition to municipal 
laws, and the validity and enforceability of awards based on transnational law. 
However, from the array of literature reviewed above, ‘transnational law’ is non-state 
law. It is a law applied in lieu of or in addition to a relevant national law to relationships 
among or between persons and organisations, public or private, natural or juristic. It is 
in this context that transnational arbitral award is examined in this section. 
2.1.1. The concept of transnational arbitral award 
Different commentators have given transnational arbitral award different names. It has 
been called a-national award, de-localised award, de-nationalised award, expatriate 
award, floating award, lex mercatoria award and stateless award.
25
 In this thesis, it is 
referred to as ‘transnational award.’ Regardless of the name called and for the purposes 
of this study, a transnational arbitral award is defined as an award which results from 
arbitration that is disconnected, by virtue of parties’ arbitration agreement, from the 
sphere of any national law.
26
 Arguably, the concept of transnational arbitration is 
anchored on two core pillars, the detachment of the arbitration (and its resultant award) 
from the ambit of any legal system and the agreement by the parties to do so.   
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Flowing from the examination of transnational law under 2.1 above, transnational 
arbitration (which results in transnational award) serves the interests of the parties’ 
autonomy in international contracts. Party autonomy enables the parties to willingly 
stipulate in their arbitration agreement not to subject the arbitration to any procedural, 
substantive or conflict of law rules of any particular country or legal system.
27
 In the 
absence of any express agreement by the parties to the contrary, the arbitral tribunal 
may decide issues in dispute and or conduct the arbitration according to transnational 
rules. Under the AA 1996, the ACA and the NYC there is no mention or definition of 
the concept of transnational arbitral award. However, these laws allow parties to agree 
or their arbitrators in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, to decide issues 
in dispute between the parties and or conduct arbitration according to transnational 
rules.
28
 
2.2.  Historical overview of arbitration in England 
In England, dispute resolution via arbitration has been in existence for centuries. The 
existence and practice of arbitration in England can be divided into two regimes: the 
common law (2.2.1) and statutes (2.2.2). 
2.2.1.  Common law arbitration   
Opinion is divided as to the exact period in time when the common law developed. 
Holdsworth documented that the common law emerged in the 12
th
 century from the fast 
expansion of institutions which existed in an undeveloped form before 1066.
29
 Baker 
writing in support stated that, “the foundation of common law has commonly been 
traced to the reign of Henry II (1154 to 1189), who succeeded in restoring the firm 
government of Henry I’s days”.30 However, Kiralfy differed when he wrote that the 
development of the common law in England is traceable to the reign of Edward I in 
1485.
31
 Nonetheless, the common ground in the different accounts is that, judicial 
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powers were vested in the Royal courts with jurisdiction only on land matters and 
behaviours detrimental to the King’s peace.32  
Issues of cross-border disputes such as, contracts, commercial credits and debts incurred 
in another country owed by and to foreigners, were outside the jurisdictions of the 
Royal courts.
33
 Traders who came to England to do business were not protected by these 
courts. The traders were seen as men who engaged in transnational business, travelling 
from fair to fair all over continental Europe without a permanent residence in England.
34
 
Consequently, these merchants resorted to resolving their disputes by agreement to 
submit or refer their disputes to special institutions such as, the courts of the fair and 
markets and, the maritime courts of seaport towns, ‘sitting on the seashore from tide to 
tide.’35  
These institutions lacked powers to enforce their decisions when compared with the 
formal legal systems in force at the time. Compliance with their decisions was achieved 
by isolating individuals, who refused or failed to honour an award, from their trade. 
Accordingly, Lord Mustill remarked that “a merchant who fell out with his guild was 
finished. In other contexts, failure to honour a decision could have grave social or 
business consequences.”36 According to Noussia, the courts of the fair and markets 
“were the predecessors of today’s modern arbitration tribunals in that a predominant 
feature of their character was that law should be speedily administered in commercial 
causes”.37 
By the 15
th
 century onward, arbitration had become a reliable method of resolving 
commercial disputes
38
. As proof of this development, an arbitral award was found in the 
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library of the Mayor’s court of the City of London in 1424.39 At that time, enforcing 
cross-border arbitral awards in England was outside the jurisdiction of the English 
courts.  It was only from 1927, as evidenced from reported cases, that English courts 
started enforcing cross-border arbitral awards under the common law.
40
 The 
enforcement of arbitral awards was only possible by an action for the breach of the 
arbitration agreement.
41
 The right of parties to directly seek enforcement of 
transnational commercial arbitral awards before the courts are granted under the AA 
1996. 
2.2.2. Statutes of arbitration 
The first English arbitration legislation is the Arbitration Act 1697-8. The Act made 
written arbitration agreement enforceable against a party that holds such arbitration 
agreement in contempt. Hence, the Act declared inter alia in its recital that it: 
…shall and may be lawful for all Merchants and Traders, 
and others desiring to end any controversy… (for which 
there is no other Remedy but by Personal Action or Suit 
in Equity), by Arbitration to agree that their Submission 
of their Suit to the Award or Umpirage of any person or 
persons should be made a Rule of any of His Majesty’s 
Courts of Record, which the Parties shall choose, and to 
insert such Agreement in their Submissions… 
Before 1697-8, English courts lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of arbitral 
awards. Not even on issues of law and facts or where the fundamental questions of 
natural justice were raised.
42
 Thus, the need to have the English judiciary exercise some 
degree of control over the arbitration process became the crux of the first Arbitration 
Act in 1697-8.
43
 The Act empowered the courts of record to set aside arbitral awards if 
an error of law and or fact appeared on the face of the award or the award was procured 
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by fraud or undue means. In Corneforth v Geer,
44
 the issue before the court was whether 
the court had jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act 1697-8 to annul the arbitral award 
on the grounds of error of law and or of fact on the face of the award. The court stated 
that: 
if it appears that the arbitrators went upon a plain mistake, 
either as to the law, or in a matter of fact; the same is an 
error appearing in the body of the award, and sufficient to 
set it aside.
45
  
Similarly, in Anderson v Coxeter,
46
 the issue was whether the court can set aside an 
award procured by fraud or undue means. The court of the King’s Bench held inter alia 
that manifest corruption in the arbitrators is sufficient within the provisions of the 
Arbitration Act 1697-8 to set aside an award.  
Nonetheless, the Arbitration Act 1697-8 was not flawless. It did not permit the courts to 
look beyond the arbitral award in setting aside an award on grounds of error which did 
not appear on the face of the award. Put differently, the court might or might not enforce 
the arbitral award on the ground that corruption or an error had or had not appeared on 
the face of the award. In Auriol v Smith,
47
 though a case on the setting aside of a trust 
arbitral award, yet relevant on point, the main issue before the court was whether the 
arbitral award which had been made the decision of the court by consent of the parties 
could be set aside after the statute of limitation had lapsed. In issue also, was the effect 
on the arbitral award of the trustee’s fraudulent concealment of some facts from the 
arbitrator. The court declared inter alia that:   
…had they (the plaintiffs) in proper time applied to the 
Court, they might on the ground of fraud have impeached 
part of it (the award), and that would have had the effect 
of impeaching it (the award) in toto: but it is impossible 
to separate such an award, to make it good in part, and 
bad in part, when it is entire upon the face of it.
48
 
[Emphases added] 
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By the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, arbitration had been firmly entrenched as a vehicle for the 
resolution of private commercial disputes. This resulted in increased judicial 
intervention in the arbitration process. Primarily, according to Lord Mustill, such 
interventions were deliberate submission of parties seeking interim orders or seeking the 
assistance of the court to enforce arbitral awards against unsuccessful parties; while on 
the other hand, it was propelled by the courts to keep all adjudications within its 
jurisdiction, or for the fear of the growth of a new legal order.
49
 Thus, the need to have 
the English judiciary exercise more control over arbitration processes necessitated the 
adoption of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854.
50
 
The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854 was enacted to deal with the rising prospects 
and challenges of the commercial industry at that time.
51
 It was the first English 
arbitration law to statutorily regulate the arbitral processes. The Act created new powers 
for the courts, arbitrators and parties. Under section 8 of the Act, courts were 
empowered to remit arbitral awards back to the arbitrators or parties, to state a question 
of law or fact for the court to determine.
52
 The Act also gave parties the power to apply 
for a stay of proceedings where an action is brought in court in breach of a prior 
arbitration agreement or clause. This power to apply for a stay has been contended as 
one of the cardinal principles of contemporary arbitration.
53
 Though, Mustill and Boyd 
are of the view that the Act was chiefly concerned with reforms in the administration of 
justice rather than arbitration in particular.
54
 The Act can be argued to be the foundation 
of modern law of arbitration in England. 
Towards the end of the 19
th
 century, the English Parliament enacted the Arbitration Act 
of 1889
55
 which, unlike the Common Law Procedure Act, focused on the conduct and 
judicial control of the arbitral process. The 1889 Act consolidated previous principles 
and practices of arbitration into a systematic code and increased the regulatory powers 
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of the court over arbitration process.
56
 Under the Act, arbitration agreements were 
irrevocable, save otherwise provided in the arbitration agreement, and courts were 
vested with powers to either stay actions brought in breach of an agreement to arbitrate  
or to proceed with the hearing (depending on the merit of each case).
57
 In effect, the Act 
permitted courts to order specific performance of the agreement to arbitrate disputes 
validly concluded by the parties. The Act was in force in England until 1934 and, 
according to Samuel, was widely adopted by commonwealth countries as their 
arbitration laws.
58
 
The Arbitration Act 1889 was amended by the Arbitration Act 1934.
59
 Between 1889 
and 1934, two arbitration Acts were enacted
60
 in response to the English courts’ failings 
to effectively deal with cross- border commercial disputes.
61
 In Butcher, Wetherly and 
Co. Ltd v Norman,
62
 Lord Justice Scrutton of the Court of Appeal stated these failings 
thus: 
One of the objects of justice is to satisfy litigants that their 
cases are properly and adequately heard, but certain 
commercial cases are so complex that judges unfamiliar 
with that class of business require many explanations in 
the course of the hearing… Owing to the fact that a 
number of cases had come before judges not conversant 
with commercial matters a good deal of dissatisfaction 
was felt in commercial circles…  63 
Determined to reform and consolidate commercial arbitration regimes, Parliament in 
1950 repealed the 1889, 1924, 1930 and 1934 Arbitration Acts and enacted the 
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Arbitration Act 1950.
64
  One of the major criticisms of the 1950 Act was its incoherent 
arrangement.
65
 For example, section 1 of the Act dealt with the issue of irrevocability of 
the arbitrator’s authority, while section 32 dealt with the meaning of an agreement to 
arbitrate. 
In 1966, the Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act was enacted to give 
legal effect to the ICSID Convention 1965. Nine years thereafter, the Arbitration Act 
1975 was enacted to implement the New York Convention, and amend Part II of the 
Arbitration Act 1950. Part I of the Arbitration Act 1950 was later amended by section 7 
of the Arbitration Act 1979 and the Consumer Arbitration Agreement Act 1988.
66
 The 
1979 Act abolished the ‘question of law stated’ or ‘case stated’ procedure and in its 
stead provided a structure under which errors of fact could not be the basis of an appeal 
but only errors of law with stringent conditions.
67
   
The English arbitration regime has a long standing record of piecemeal development 
with a huge body of case law which broaden the meaning and scope of most of the 
sections. Prior to 1996, the result was a confused and uncertain arbitration regime 
hence, the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law conceded that there 
were many uncertainties and confusion in English arbitration law.
68
  Saville LJ also 
expressed the same view when he stated that:  
Our law has built up over a very long time indeed. In the 
main, the developments have come from cases, but in 
addition, from as early as 1698, Parliament has passed 
legislation dealing with the law of arbitration. To a large 
degree this legislation has been reactive in nature, putting 
right perceived defects and deficiencies in the case law. 
Thus it is not easy for someone new to English arbitration 
to discover the law, which is spread around a hotchpotch 
of statutes and countless cases.
69
  
 
                                                             
64. The provisions of Part III (3) of the Arbitration Act 1950 provided inter alia “The Arbitration 
Act 1889, the Arbitration Clauses (Protocol) Act 1924 and the Arbitration Act 1934 are hereby 
repealed ... the Arbitration (Foreign Award) Act 1930 is hereby repealed …” 
65. Tweeddale, A. and Tweeddale, K. (1999) p. 487 
66. Consumer agreement is outside the scope of this research. 
67. Sections 1, 2 and 8 (3) (b) of the Arbitration Act 1979. 
68. Para. 108 of the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law Report, June 1989. 
69. Saville LJ, the Arbitration Act 1996. Keynote Address, IBC Conference, July 4th, 1996. 
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2.2.2.1. The Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996) 
Tweeddale and Tweeddale are of the view that prior to the AA 1996, England as a seat 
for arbitration was not the first choice for many parties who elected to resolve 
transnational commercial dispute by arbitration.
70
 Writing in support, Russell, et al 
stated succinctly that: 
There is no single source of English arbitration law. Prior 
to Arbitration Act 1996, there was not even a partial 
statutory code for the conduct of arbitrations. The 
Arbitration Acts 1950 – 1979 were more concerned with 
filing the gaps in an incomplete arbitration agreement and 
specifying the powers of the High Court.
71
 
The law that currently governs arbitration in England is the AA 1996. The English 
Parliament in 1996 repealed the 1979 and 1975 Acts and enacted the Arbitration Act 
1996.
72
 The Act is an amalgamation of legal principles contained in the previous 
arbitration Acts, the consumer Arbitration Agreement Act 1988 and the common law 
doctrines.
73
 According to some commentators, the AA 1996 is completely novel and 
                                                             
70. Tweeddale, A. and Tweeddale, K. (1999) p. 486. 
71. Sutton, D. St. J., Gill, J. (1997) Russell on Arbitration, 21st ed., Sweet and Maxwell, London, p. 
17.  
72. Schedule 4 of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
73. Merkin, R. and Flannery, L. (2008) Arbitration Act 1996, 4th ed., Informa Law, London p. 1; 
The Arbitration Act 1996 has 110 sections divided into four parts. Part I (sections 1 to 84) 
stipulates the general provisions concerning arbitration. Part II (sections 85 to 98) provides for 
domestic arbitration agreements, consumer arbitration agreement, small claim arbitration in the 
County Courts, etc. Part III (sections 99 to 104) makes provisions for the recognition and 
enforcement of certain foreign arbitral awards. Under section 99 of the Act, Part II of the 
Arbitration Act 1950 remains in force. It relates to the recognition and enforcement of certain 
arbitral awards that are not NYC award. The Act also has four schedules. Schedule 1 sets out 
the mandatory provisions of Part I by virtue of section 4 (1) of the Act. The provisions of 
Schedule I have effect notwithstanding any agreement by the parties to the contrary. Schedule 2 
makes provisions that modify Part I in relation to judge-arbitrators. In effect, section 93 of the 
Act provides for appointment of judges as arbitrators, while section 93(6) provides that the 
provisions of Part I apply to arbitration before a person appointed under the section with 
modifications specified in Schedule 2. Schedule 3 enumerates the respective amendments made 
to other Acts consequent upon the Arbitration Act 1996 being in force. Hence, the 
consequential amendment affected 62 Acts ranging from the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 to the 
Industrial Tribunal Act 1996. Some of the amendments are extensive; e.g. The Insolvency Act 
1986, where an amendment is made regarding arbitration agreements to which a bankrupt is a 
party. Others are minor; e.g. Part I of the Arbitration Act 1996 substitutes the Arbitration Act 
(Northern Ireland) 1937. Schedule 4 itemises different Acts, Parts of Acts and orders which are 
repealed by the Arbitration Act 1996. A total of 47 Acts and Orders are repealed in whole or in 
part by the Arbitration Act 1996. They range from the Military Lands Act 1892 to the Private 
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. 
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probably the most radical piece of arbitration legislation in the history of English 
statutory arbitration regime.
74
 
2.2.2.2. The scope of application of the Act 
Section 2(1) states that the provisions of Part I apply where the seat of arbitration is in 
England and Wales or Northern Ireland. Thus, the scope of Part I of the Act is hinged 
on the concept of the ‘seat’ of arbitration.75  
As a general rule, English courts will decline jurisdiction to exercise their supervisory 
power if the juridical seat of the arbitration is not in England, or Wales or Northern 
Ireland, or the arbitration is not subject to English law.
76
 The seat concept takes into 
consideration that arbitration, especially transnational arbitration, occurs in a number of 
different countries. This is usually for the convenience of the arbitrators or the witnesses 
or to facilitate the inspection of any relevant property.
77
 Thus, as exception to the 
general rule, an award from an arbitration seated in England would be recognised and 
enforced as being within the jurisdiction of the English court, even though some parts of 
the arbitration were conducted outside England or Wales or Northern Ireland.
78
 
Other exceptions are created by virtue of section 2(2), (3), (4) and (5). Under section 
2(2) those sections in Part I which will apply even though the juridical seat of the 
arbitration is not in England or Wales or Northern Ireland, or where a seat has not been 
designated or determined are clearly defined.
79
 The provisions of these four sections 
will apply in any arbitration regulated by English law no matter the seat of arbitration. 
The effect of section 2(2) is to ensure that the UK’s obligations under the NYC are 
                                                             
74. Merkin, R. (2000) Arbitration Act 1996, 2nd ed., LLP, London, pp. 1 – 10; Tweeddale, A. and 
Tweeddale, K. (1999), p. 492; Mustill, M. J. and Boyd, S. C. (1989), p. 3 
75. Part I apply to arbitration where the seat of the arbitration is in England, Wales or Northern 
Ireland. Section 3 of the Arbitration Act 1996 defines the seat as “the juridical seat of the 
arbitration”. The seat is designated either by the parties to the arbitration agreement, or by an 
institution or third party with such authority to do so, or by the arbitral tribunal if given the 
power to do so by the parties, or in the absence of a designation by the court. The seat theory is 
examined in detail in chapter five. 
76. In Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. V Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd. [1992] A C 334, the House 
of Lords ruled that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with arbitration held outside 
England or Wales or Northern Ireland and not regulated by English law. This, the law Lords 
reasoned, would be to confer extra-territorial effect on English arbitration statutory law. 
77. Merkin, R. and Flannery, L. (2008) pp. 21 – 22.  
78. Bay Hotel and Resort Ltd. v Cavalier Construction Company Ltd. [2001] UKPC 34 
79. These sections are sections 9 to 11 and section 66 (relating to stay of legal proceedings and 
enforcement of arbitral awards respectively brought in England or Wales or Northern Ireland) 
of the Act. 
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fulfilled.
80
 English courts under section 2(3) of the AA 1996 have the discretion to 
secure the attendance of witnesses
81
 and support arbitral proceedings
82
 notwithstanding 
that the seat of the arbitration is not within its jurisdiction or a seat has not been 
designated or determined. However, the exercise of these powers is subject to a proviso 
that the court may: 
refuse to exercise any such power if, in the opinion of the 
court, the fact that the seat of the arbitration is outside 
England and Wales or Northern Ireland, or that when 
designated or determined the seat is likely to be outside 
England and Wales or Northern Ireland, makes it 
inappropriate to do so.
83
 
Section 2(4) empowers the court to apply the provisions of Part I of the Act to arbitral 
proceedings other than those particularly mentioned in sections 2(2) or 2(3). Such 
power can only be exercised before the seat of the arbitration is designated or 
determined, and where the court deems it fit to do so, by virtue of a connection with its 
jurisdiction.
84
 Under section 2(5) English courts may apply sections 7 and 8
85
 where the 
law applicable to the arbitration agreement is English law, even if the seat of arbitration 
is outside England and regardless of whether or not a seat has been designated or 
determined. In effect, it is noteworthy to highlight that what is relevant by virtue of 
section 2(5) is the applicable law to the arbitration agreement. This may be different 
from the applicable law to the main contract. 
The effect of this section is that the provisions of Part I apply in its entirety in any 
arbitration seated in England. The court will enforce an arbitration agreement and its 
eventual award, subject to the relevant provisions of the 1996 Act, wherever the seat of 
the arbitration may be. It may refuse to exercise its power in support of arbitral 
proceedings if the fact that the seat is or likely to be outside its jurisdiction, makes it 
inappropriate for it to do so. It may exercise any other discretion vested on it by virtue 
of Part I where the seat has not been identified and where it is satisfied that any nexus of 
                                                             
80. Harris, B., et al (2007) The Arbitration Act 1996: A commentary, 4th ed., Blackwell Publishing, 
pp. 34 – 35.  
81. Section 43 of the AA 1996. 
82. Section 44 of the AA 1996. 
83. Section 2 (3) of the AA 1996.  
84. Merkin, R. and Flannery, L. (2008) supra at p. 24; Harris, B., et al (2007) supra at pp. 36 – 37. 
85. Separability of an arbitration agreement from the contract containing it and the effect of the 
death of a party to an arbitration agreement, respectively. 
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the proceedings within its jurisdiction makes it appropriate for it to do so. The 
provisions of Part I regarding the separability of the arbitration agreement from the 
main contract and the consequence of the death of a party will apply provided that 
English law regulates the arbitration agreement. In such case, a party may be required to 
satisfy the arbitrator or the court that the arbitration agreement is regulated by English 
law in order to show that the provisions in question apply.
86
 
2.3. Historical overview of arbitration in Nigeria 
Arbitration as a means of resolving disputes pre-dates the colonial era and is rooted in 
the justice system of traditional societies of Nigeria.
87
 Before the enactment of the first 
indigenous arbitration law, the ACA (2.3.3), arbitration in Nigeria had two sources: 
under customary law (2.3.1) and the common law (2.3.2).  
2.3.1. Customary law arbitration 
Before Nigeria became a colony of Great Britain, her traditional societies had recourse 
to customary arbitration for settlement of all manner of disputes.
88
 For example, most 
disputes relating to land, divorce, and chieftaincy were resolved through customary 
arbitration. Arbitration and other forms of private dispute resolution are still relied on in 
various communities in Nigeria.
89
   
Referral of a dispute to customary arbitration by members of the community or of a 
trade was and still remains popular and valid among rural dwellers.
90
 Such referrals are 
usually to a trusted third party, the elders, chiefs, family head, village or clan head or 
                                                             
86. Rutherford, M., and Sims, J. H. M. (1996) Arbitration Act 1996: A Practical Guide, F T Law 
and Tax, London, pp. 45 – 46. 
87. Ezejiofor, G. (1992 - 1993) “The Pre-requisites of Customary Arbitration”, Journal of Private 
and Property Law, Vol. 16, pp. 32 – 47; Oluduro, O. (2011) “Customary Arbitration in Nigeria: 
Development and Prospects” African Journal of International Comparative Law, Vol. 19, No. 
2. pp.  307 – 330; Ajogwu, F. (2009) Commercial Arbitration in Nigeria: Law and Practice, 
Mbeyi & Associates, Lagos, pp. 9 – 15.  
88. Chukwuemerie, A. I. (2006) “Salient Issues in the Law and Practice of Arbitration in Nigeria”, 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1; Chukwuemerie, A. I. 
(2006) “The Internationalisation of African Customary Law Arbitration” RADIC, Vol. 14, No. 
2, 143; Chukwuemerie, A. I. (2002) Studies and Materials in International Commercial 
Arbitration, Lawhouse Books, Port Harcourt, pp. 210 – 227.  
89. Mmuozoba, C. U. (2002) “The Law Courts and Arbitral Tribunals under the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act, 1990: Some Neglected Questions and Suggested Answers” Nigeria Law and 
Practice Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, 96. Other forms of customary private dispute resolution are: 
mediation, conciliation and negotiation. 
90. Ajogwu, F. (2009); Ehiribe, I. (1996) “The Validity of Customary Law Arbitration in Nigeria”, 
in Campbell, D. and Cotter, (eds.) Comparative Law Yearbook of International Business Law, 
Vol. 18, Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands,  pp. 131 – 154.  
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friends, with the objective that the outcome (the award) will be final and binding.
91
 In 
Agu v Ikewibe,
92
 one of the issues was the existence of customary arbitration as an 
“existing law” under the Constitution. The Supreme Court affirming the existence of 
customary arbitration law stated through Karibi-Whyte JSC, thus: 
I venture to regard customary law arbitration as an 
arbitration in dispute founded on the voluntary submission 
of the parties to the decision of the arbitrators who are 
either the chiefs or elders of their community, and 
agreement to be bound by such decision…93 
However, in Okpuruwu v Okpokam, Uwaifo JCA, stated that:  
No community in Nigeria regard the settlement by 
arbitration between disputing parties as part of native law 
and custom … there is no concept known as customary or 
native arbitration in our jurisprudence.
94
   
Uwaifo JCA missed the point regarding the existence and validity of the law concerning 
customary arbitration in Nigeria. It is beyond doubt from the Supreme Court case of 
Agu v Ikewibe and practice that customary arbitration was and is still part of Nigerian 
native law and custom.
95
 Accordingly, Ezediaro is of the view and, this thesis share the 
same view, that:  
Arbitration as a method of settling disputes is a tradition 
of long standing in Nigeria. Referral of a dispute to one or 
more layman for decision has deep roots in the customary 
law of many Nigerian communities.
96
 
Also, Oguntade JCA, who dissented from the lead judgement in Okpuruwu v Okpokam, 
respecting customary arbitration, came to the correct position of the law when he stated:  
I find myself unable to accept the proposition that there is 
no concept known as customary or native arbitration in 
our jurisprudence. The regular courts in the early stages 
                                                             
91. Amucheazi, O. D. (2003) “Validity of Customary Arbitration in Nigeria: A Review of 
Egesimba v. Onuzuruike,” Nigerian Bar Journal, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 515 – 225. 
92. [1991] 3NWLR (Pt. 180) 385. 
93. Agu v Ikewibe (1991) p. 407. 
94. Okpuruwu v Okpokam (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 90) 554 at 572. 
95. Asouzu, A. A. (1994) “The Legal Framework for Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in 
Nigeria”, ICSID Rev-FILJ, Vol. 9, p. 214. 
96. Ezediaro, S. O. (1971) “Guarantee and Incentive for Foreign Investment in Nigeria” 
International Law, Vol. 5, No. 4, 770 at p. 775. 
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were reluctant to accord recognition to the decisions or 
awards of arbitration … if parties to a dispute voluntarily 
submit their dispute to a third party as arbitrator, and 
agreed to be bound by the decision of such arbitration 
then the court must cloth such decision with the garb of 
estoppel per rem judicatam. I do not share the view that 
natives in their own communities cannot have customs 
which operate on the same basis of voluntary submission. 
The right to freely choose an arbitrator to adjudicate with 
binding effect is not one beyond our native 
communities…97 
As with consensual arbitration, the legal validity of customary arbitration flows from 
the parties’ agreement to submit an existing dispute to a trusted third party, the 
arbitrator, and to be bound by the final decision of the arbitrator, the award.
98
 Where 
issues in dispute between the parties are voluntarily submitted or referred to customary 
arbitration and such issues are determined by arbitrators at a meeting held pursuant to 
native law, the award will be binding on the parties.
99
 The unsuccessful party in the 
arbitration cannot resile from the proceedings midway or reject the award. This is 
because a party who led another to take steps in arbitral proceedings will not be allowed 
to withdraw at the expense of the other party who had acted in good faith and with the 
honest belief that their dispute would be resolved by the arbitration. This is evident in 
the case of in Onyenge & 2 ors. v Ebere & 2 ors.,
100
 where the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria stated inter alia that: 
where two parties to a dispute voluntarily submit the issue 
in controversy between them to an arbitration according 
to customary law and agree expressly or by implication 
that the decision of such arbitration would be accepted as 
final and binding, then once the arbitrators reach a 
decision, it would no longer be open to either party to 
                                                             
97. Okpuruwu v Okpokam (1988) at p. 585. 
98. Ikeyi, N. and Maduka, T. (2014) “The Binding Effect of Customary Arbitration Award: 
Exorcizing the Ghost of Agu v Ikewibe”, Journal of African Law, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 328 – 349; 
Akanbi, M. M., Abdulrauf, L. A. and Daibu, A. A. (2016) “”Customary Arbitration in Nigeria: 
A Review of Extant Judicial Parameters and the Need for Paradigm Shift”, Journal of 
Sustainable Development Law and Policy (The), Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 199 – 201.  
99. Agu v Ikewibe (1991); Nwakoby, G. C. (2004) The Law and Practice of Commercial 
Arbitration in Nigeria, Iyke Ventures Production, Enugu, pp. 8 – 17. 
100. [2004] 11 MJSC 184. 
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subsequently back out or resile from the decision so 
pronounced.
101
 [Emphases added]  
Similarly, in the Ghanaian case of Larbi v Kwasi,
102
 one of the issues was whether 
parties are bound by the award of the customary arbitrators. The Privy Council in 
holding that parties are bound by their voluntary agreement to submit to customary 
arbitration, stated the law thus: 
Since it is established that the parties gave their consent to 
the submission of the dispute to the elders without any 
express reservation of a right to resile and since there is 
certainly no right to resile after the award is made, it is for 
the appellants to satisfy the board that a right so contrary 
to the basic conception of arbitration is recognised by 
native customary law.
103
 
The effect of the foregoing is that where parties voluntarily elect to settle their dispute 
by customary arbitration, the award thereof is binding on them if the condition 
precedent, which is the consent to arbitrate the dispute, is established. To establish 
consent, parties must directly or indirectly submit to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators. 
The agreement to arbitrate under customary arbitration law is usually oral, making it 
difficult, if not impossible, to come within the purview of the ACA.
104
 This is because 
section 1 of the ACA requires the arbitration agreement to be in writing.  
2.3.2. Common law arbitration 
According to Orojo and Ajomo, the ‘common law’ refers to Nigerian case law and 
principles of English common law together with doctrines of equity as are still 
enforceable in Nigeria.
105
 In effect as a general rule, the common law of England and its 
doctrines of equity apply in Nigeria save where they have been rejected or modified 
either by a court of competent authority in Nigeria or by legislation.  
                                                             
101. Onyenge & 2 ors. v Ebere & 2 ors. [2004] 188. 
102. [1952] 13 WACA 76. 
103. Larbi v Kwasi [1952] at p.80. 
104. Ezejiofor, G. (1993) “The Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act: A Challenge to the 
Courts”, Journal of Business Law, pp. 82 – 98. 
105. Orojo, J. O. and Ajomo, M. A. (1999) Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation in 
Nigeria, Mbeyi & Associates (Nigeria) Ltd., Lagos, p. 12. 
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Lagos was the first colonial entity in Nigeria that came under British rule by virtue of 
the Treaty of Cession of 6
th
 of August, 1861.
106
 On becoming a British colony, a court 
was established and English laws were introduced in the Colony from 1862.
107
 In 1863, 
Ordinance No.3 was enacted enabling the English common law, doctrines of equity and 
statutes of general application to directly apply in the Colony of Lagos and all English 
settlements.
 108
  
In 1874, the Colony of Lagos was amalgamated with the settlements in the Gold Coast, 
and the two were called the Gold Coast Colony. A Supreme Court was established for 
the Gold Coast Colony by virtue of Ordinance No. 4.
109
 By Section 14 of Ordinance No. 
4, the common law, the doctrines of equity and the Statutes of general application which 
were in force in England on the 24
th
 of July, 1874, when the Colony obtained local 
legislative powers, were also declared to be in force within the jurisdiction of the Gold 
Coast Colony.
110
 One of the effects of both Ordinances on arbitration was that English 
arbitration laws became applicable within the colony. However, the Ordinances were 
only to be applicable where local jurisdiction and circumstances permitted.
111
 In effect, 
two sets of arbitration regimes became applicable within the Colony: customary and 
English common law.   
Like customary arbitration, an agreement to arbitrate under the common law is usually 
oral. Consequently, the question that arises is: which of the two regimes, customary law 
or common law, will apply to a given situation? The general rule is as held in Labinjoh 
v Abake.
112
 In Labinjoh, both parties were natives and the defendant, a young girl under 
21 years living with her parents, was sued for the goods sold and delivered to her for 
trading purposes. The issue before the court was the capacity of the defendant to enter 
into a contract and whether it was English or customary law that should be applied to 
                                                             
106. Smith, R. S. (1979) The Lagos Consulate: 1851-1861, University of California Press, 
California, p. 140. 
107. The first English Laws that were introduced in the Colony of Lagos were: Customs Duties 
Ordinance No. 1 of 1862; Harbour Regulations Ordinance No. 2 of 1862; Harbour Sanitary 
Regulations Ordinance No. 3 of 1862; Currency Ordinance No. 4 of 1862; and Use of Official 
Seal Ordinance No. 5 of 1862. 
108. The Settlement Ordinance No. 3 of 1863. 
109. The Supreme Court Ordinance (No. 4) of 1876. 
110. Section 4 Supreme Court Ordinance (No. 4) of 1876. 
111. Section 17 of the Supreme Court Ordinance (No. 4) 1876. 
112. [1924] 5 NLR 3. 
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determine her capacity. The court held, relying on an earlier decision in Cole v Cole,
113
 
that where both parties are natives customary law will apply to their transaction.  
However, one of the exceptions to this rule is that if the transaction is of a nature alien 
to customary law, English common law will apply.
114
 Furthermore, if the parties have 
expressly or by necessary implication agreed that English law should regulate their 
relationship, then English law will apply.
115
 Another exception is where parties are 
Nigerian and non-Nigerian then, English Law will apply.
116
 However, if the court is 
satisfied that the application of English law will occasion injustice to either of the 
parties, customary law will apply.
117
 Therefore where all the parties are non-Nigerians, 
English law will govern their relationship.
118
 Still, for customary law to be enforced 
under the colonial regime, the court must be satisfied that such customary law was not 
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience or incompatible directly or 
indirectly with any existing law.
119
 
Some commentators have posited that it seems that the Arbitration Act 1889   is not a 
statute of general application.
120
 Their suggestion is hinged on the premise that there is 
no Nigerian decided case based on the Act. Admittedly, as far as records can show, 
there is no Nigerian decided case based on the Arbitration Act 1889, nonetheless, the 
Arbitration Act 1889, applied in Nigeria as a Statute of general application by virtue of 
Ordinance No. 3 of 1863 and Ordinance No. 4 of 1876. Even so, it is difficult to 
determine which English statutes are those of general application because of the 
speculative nature of what qualify as ‘Statute of general application.’ In Attorney 
General v John Holt & Co.
121
 the court as per Osborne, CJ ventured to state factors that 
may determine which English statutes are those of general application, thus: 
No definition has been attempted of what is a statute of 
general application … each case has to be decided on the 
merits of the particular statute sought to be enforced. Two 
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preliminary questions can, however, be put by way of a 
rough, but not infallible test, viz: (i) by what courts is the 
statute applied in England and (ii) to what classes of 
community in England does it apply? If, on January 1, 
1900, an Act of Parliament were applied by all civil or 
criminal courts, as the case may be, to all classes of the 
community, there is a strong likelihood that it is in force 
within the jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, it were 
applied only by certain courts, (e.g. a statute regulating 
procedure), only to certain classes of the community (e.g. 
an Act regulating a particular trade), the probability is that 
it would not be held to be locally applicable.
122
  
This thesis argue that since the Arbitration Act 1889 was applied at that material time 
by all civil courts in England to all classes of the community and was also a pre January 
1, 1900 statute, it constitutes a statute of general application.  
Upon the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates, now Nigeria, the 
Arbitration Act 1889 was re-enacted verbatim as Arbitration Ordinance 1914. The 
Ordinance came into effect on 31
st
 December 1914 and applied to the whole country 
which was then governed as a single unit. In 1954 when Nigeria was regionalised (and 
later became a federal state in 1963) the Ordinance continued to apply in the various 
regions and federating states.
123
 
2.3.3. The ACA 
As at the time Nigeria became politically independent in 1960, the Arbitration 
Ordinance 1914 was the only legislation on arbitration in Nigeria.
124
 In 1963 when 
Nigeria became a Republic, the 1914 Ordinance was re-enacted verbatim as the 
Arbitration Act 1958 and was in force until 1988.
125
 This Act applied to Lagos as the 
then Federal Capital Territory and each region had its own statutory arbitration law.
126
 
The Arbitration Act 1958 had 19 sections which only regulated domestic arbitration. 
Recognition and enforcement of non-domestic arbitral awards in Nigeria before 1988 
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124. Idornigie, P. O. (2015) Commercial Arbitration Law and Practice in Nigeria, LawLords 
Publications, Abuja, pp. 20 – 22. 
125. Arbitration Act, Cap. 13, LFN and Lagos 1958. 
126. The regional arbitration statutes which were also a re-enactment of the Arbitration Ordinance 
1914 were:  Arbitration Law of Eastern Nigeria 1963; Arbitration Law of Northern Nigeria 
1963, and Arbitration Law of Western Nigeria 1958. 
52 
 
was by virtue of sections 2 and 4 of the Foreign Judgment (Reciprocal Enforcement) 
Act.
127
  
Nigeria acceded to the NYC on 17
th
 March 1970 and made the reciprocal and 
commercial reservations. In effect, only awards from Contracting States with reciprocal 
legislation that implements Nigerian awards will be recognised in Nigeria. Secondly, 
only disputes that fall within the statutory definition of “commercial” are enforceable 
under the NYC in Nigeria. In 1988, the NYC was expressly made applicable in Nigeria 
by virtue of the ACA.
128
  
The ACA regulates domestic and international commercial arbitration throughout the 
country.
129
 Though, the ACA did not expressly repeal or save the previous arbitration 
statutes, the effect of its section 58 which stipulates that, “This Act … shall apply 
throughout the Federation,” amounts to an implied repeal of any arbitration legislation 
before it.
130
  
2.3.3.1. The scope of application of the Act 
It seems the ACA does not delimit disputes which are incapable of reference to 
arbitration. However, a community reading of the long title and section 57 (1) definition 
of arbitration reference suggests that the ACA applies only to commercial disputes 
which arise from contractual relationships. The long title states:  
                                                             
127. Foreign Judgement (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, LFN, No 31 of 1960. For a non-domestic 
arbitral award to be enforced in Nigeria under this Act, such award must be registered in the 
High Court within the relevant region. 
128. The Preamble and section 54 of the ACA. 
129. The combined effect of the Preamble and section 54 of the ACA is that the Act will apply to 
matters relating to domestic and international commercial arbitration throughout the country. 
The Act has four Parts and three Schedules. Part I (sections 1 to 36) deals with arbitration 
generally. Part II concerns conciliation. Part III relates to additional provisions relating to 
international commercial arbitration and conciliation. Part IV is the miscellaneous provisions of 
the Act. There are three Schedules in the Act. The First Schedule makes provisions for the 
applicable arbitration rules under the Act. The Second Schedule reproduces the text of the 
NYC. The Third Schedule relates to conciliation rules. 
130. In Leadway Assurance v Jombo United Co. Ltd. [2005] 5 NWLR (Pt. 919) 539 at pp. 556 – 557, 
the Court of Appeal relying on Uwaifo v Attorney-General of Bendel State [1983] 4 NCLR, 1 
(SC) stated that, “where the provisions of two statutes are plainly inconsistent that effect cannot 
be given to both at the same time, a repeal of the provisions of the earlier statute by implication 
is inevitable. In other words, the latter statute will be read as having impliedly repealed the 
former”. On the effect of a repealed statute, the Court of Appeal at page 559 further stated, 
“when a statute is repealed, it is considered, except as to transactions past and closed, as if it had 
never existed. In other words, the effect of the repealed statute is to obliterate it completely 
from the records as if it never existed for the purpose of those actions which were commenced, 
prosecuted and concluded whilst it was in existence.”; Asouzu, A. A. (1994) “Developing and 
Using Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria”, Lawyer Bi-Annual, Vol. 1, No. 1.  
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An Act to provide a unified legal framework for the fair 
and efficient settlement of commercial disputes by 
arbitration and conciliation; and to make applicable the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) to any award 
made in Nigeria or in any Contracting State arising out of 
international commercial arbitration. 
The term “commercial” as contained in the long title is defined under section 57(1) of 
the Act as: 
… all relationships of commercial nature including any 
trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods and 
services, distribution agreement, commercial 
representation or agency, factoring, leasing, construction 
works, consulting, engineering, licensing, investment, 
financing, banking, insurance, exploitation agreement or 
concession, joint venture and other forms of industrial or 
business co-operation, carriage of goods or passengers by 
air, sea, rail or road; 
Though, the ACA implements the NYC in Nigeria, by virtue of its section 54 (1) (b), it 
does not apply to NYC awards which arose out of non-contractual relationships.
131
 The 
provisions section 54 (1) (b) of the ACA contradict the declaration made by the Federal 
Government of Nigeria when it acceded to the Convention. The declaration states that:  
In accordance with paragraph 3 of article I of the 
Convention, the Federal Military Government of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria declares that it will apply the 
Convention on the basis of reciprocity to the recognition 
and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of a 
State party to this Convention and to differences arising 
out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, 
which are considered as commercial under the laws of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria.
132
 
Accordingly, Idornigie argued that the non-application of the ACA to non-contractual 
disputes is a breach of Nigerian treaty obligation under article I (3) of the NYC.
133
 This 
is so because the Federal Government of Nigeria’s declaration referred to differences 
                                                             
131. By virtue of Article II (1) of the NYC, the Convention applies to legal relationships, whether 
contractual or not. 
132. http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries [accessed 20/09/2016]. 
133. Idornigie, P. O. (2004) “The Principle of Arbitrability in Nigeria Re-visited”, Journal of 
International Arbitration, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 279 – 288. 
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arising out of legal relationships whether contractual or not, which are considered as 
commercial under the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria whereas, section 54 (1) 
(b) of the ACA stipulates otherwise. Idornigie notes that:  
 …in international law, a state cannot plead that its 
domestic law exonerated it from performing 
obligations imposed by an international treaty, 
unless in giving its consent to the treaty, a 
fundamental rule of domestic law concerning 
constitutional competence to conclude the treaty 
concerned was broken, and this breach of domestic 
constitutional law was manifest. There is no such 
breach of any fundamental rule of domestic law in 
this case. Even before an international tribunal, a 
respondent state cannot plead that its domestic law 
(not even its Constitution) contains rules which 
conflict with international law, nor can it plead the 
absence of any legislative provision or of a rule of 
internal law as a defence to a charge that it has 
broken international law.
134
 
Consequently, commercial transactions under the ACA refer to those arising from 
contractual relationships only. However, despite the general application of the ACA to 
the resolution of commercial disputes, some disputes are precluded from arbitration 
under the Act.
135
 Nonetheless, the provision of section 35 that the ACA will not affect 
any law by which specific disputes may not be subject to arbitration opens the gate for 
the application of customary arbitration or common law to such disputes.  
The ACA does not mention any particular subject matter that cannot be referred to 
arbitration. However, the effect of section 35 of the ACA is that certain disputes will not 
be referred or submitted to arbitration if any law so provides.
136
 
 
                                                             
134. Idornigie, P. O. (2004) at p. 280; Idornigie, P. O. (2003) “The 1988 Nigerian Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act: Need for Review?”, International Arbitration Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 
49 – 61; Idornigie, P. O. (2002) “The Relationship Between Arbitral and Court Proceedings in 
Nigeria”, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 19, No. 5, pp. 443 – 457. 
135. By implication, tortious relationships, criminal and matrimonial disputes (especially dissolution 
of marriage) are deemed non-arbitrable under the ACA. 
136. In Arab Republic v Ogunwale [2002] 9 NWLR (Pt. 771) 127, the court of Appeal stated that the 
test for the determination of whether a dispute is arbitrable or not is that the dispute or 
difference must necessarily arise from the clause contained in the agreement. Hence, the 
question of whether or not a dispute is resolvable by arbitration under the Act is at the discretion 
of the court. 
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2.3.3.2. Applicability of the ACA in Nigeria 
Prior to May 29, 1999, the constitutionality or otherwise of the ACA was not an issue 
because the Act was a product of a military regime.
137
 With the return to democratic 
government on May 29, 1999, the Constitution changed the legal status of the decrees 
and became the grundnorm in Nigeria.
138
 As the highest law underlying and establishing 
the basis of the entire system of governance in Nigeria, the Constitution prevails over 
any law that is in conflict with it.
139
  
This sub-section examines whether the ACA is applicable in all the states of the 
Federation and the constitutionality or otherwise of its application as a federal 
legislation in all the states of the Federation. It analyses the distribution of legislative 
jurisdictions under the Constitution (i), the preservation of laws that were in force prior 
to May 29, 1999 by the Constitution (ii) and, the doctrine of ‘covering the field’ (iii). 
(i) Distribution of legislative authorities under the 1999 Constitution 
Under the Constitution, legislative powers are shared between the Federal and State 
legislatures. The Federal Government through the National Assembly has exclusive 
legislative powers on any matter contained in the exclusive legislative list or as may be 
specifically allowed by the Constitution.
140
 The Federal and State Governments
141
 have 
concurrent legislative authorities on matters contained in the Concurrent Legislative 
List.
142
 Nevertheless, the legislative competence of a House of Assembly to legislate on 
                                                             
137. During the then military administration, Nigeria had a government akin to a unitary system of 
government. Federal decrees (laws) were held supreme over and above the constitution and 
state edicts. Any law (including the Constitution) that was in conflict with a federal decree was 
declared null and void to the extent of its inconsistency with such decree. The Federal Military 
Government promulgated the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree (No. 1 of 
1984), the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree (No. 
13 of 1984) and the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree (No. 107 of 1993) to 
allow itself to modify and suspend any provision of the 1979 Constitution that challenged its 
operations. The decrees also gave the Federal Military Government power to make laws (by 
way of decrees) territorially and procedurally for the federating states of Nigeria. 
138. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). 
139. Sections 1(1) and 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides that: (1) “This 
Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all authorities and 
persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (2) … (3) if any other law is inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall 
to the extent of the inconsistency be void.”  
140. Section 4(3) and the Second Schedule, Part I of the 1999 Constitution. 
141. The State Government exercises its legislative functions through the House of Assembly of the 
State. 
142. Section 4(4) (a), (7) (a) and the Second Schedule, Part II of the 1999 Constitution; Attorney 
General of Ogun State v Aberuagba [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 395. 
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a matter listed in the concurrent legislative list is restricted by the condition that such 
law shall only operate subject to its conformity with existing federal law on that 
matter.
143
  
Matters not specifically listed either in the exclusive or concurrent legislative lists are 
generally regarded as residual matters.
144
 Such residual matters are within the exclusive 
domain of the House of Assembly of each Federating state to legislate on, and of all the 
items listed in the exclusive and concurrent legislative lists, arbitration is not mentioned. 
Thus, it is arguable that arbitration falls into the residual legislative list, which is within 
the exclusive legislative competence of states.
145
 Arbitration generally not been listed as 
an item within the legislative competence of the National Assembly raises the question 
of the constitutionality of the ACA. It is even more complicated considering the 
provisions of section 58 of the ACA.
146
 
However, it can be argued that the combined stipulations of items 62(a), 31 and 68 of 
the exclusive legislative list imply that the National Assembly is constitutionally 
competent to legislate on commercial arbitration matters.
147
 Under item 62(a) the 
National Assembly is empowered to legislate on trade and commerce between Nigeria 
and other countries, and between Federating states. Item 31 deals with the 
implementation of international treaties on matters contained in the exclusive legislative 
list. Item 68 empower the National Assembly to legislate on any matter incidental or 
supplementary to the matters listed in the exclusive legislative list.  
Therefore, it is contended that since the ACA: (i) only applies to commercial 
arbitration,
148
 (ii) implements the NYC in Nigeria
149
 and, (iii) is incidental to trade and 
                                                             
143. Ikeyi, N. and Amucheazi, O. (2013) “Applicability of Nigeria’s Arbitration and Conciliation 
Act: Which Field Does the Act Cover?” Journal of African Law, Vol. 57, No. 1, p. 126. 
144. Niki Tobi, JSC expounding on the existence of the residual list in Attorney General of Abia 
State v Attorney General of the Federation [2006] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1005) 265 at 380 stated inter 
alia: “The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, like most constitutions, does 
not provide for residual list. And that is what makes the list residual. The expression emanates 
largely from the judiciary, that is, it is largely a coinage of the judiciary to enable it exercise its 
interpretative jurisdiction as it relates to the constitution. Etymologically, ‘residual; merely 
meaning that which remains. In legislative or parliamentary language, residual matters are those 
that are neither in the exclusive or concurrent legislative list.” 
145. Rhodes-Vivour, A. (2010) “Recent Arbitration Related Development in Nigeria” Arbitration, 
Vol. 76, No. 1, pp. 130 – 135.  
146. Section 58 of the ACA provides: “This Act may be cited as Arbitration and Conciliation Act … 
and shall apply throughout the Federation.” 
147. Asouzu, A. A. (2001) “Arbitration and Judicial Powers in Nigeria” Journal of International 
Arbitration, Vol. 18, No. 6, 617 – 640.  
148. Which is under item 62(a) of the exclusive legislative list “trade and commerce.” 
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commerce,
150
 it is by necessary inference within the legislative competence of the 
National Assembly. Adaralegbe argued in support, though differently, that the ACA 
falls within the legislative jurisdiction of the National Assembly of Nigeria.
151
 He 
further argued that, the community effect of sections 12(2)
152
 and 4(4)
153
 of the 1999 
Constitution on the one hand, and section 10(2) of the Interpretation Act
154
 on the other 
hand, gives the National Assembly the constitutional competence to legislate on the 
ACA.
155
 Also, Ikeyi and Amucheazi argued that item 62 of the exclusive legislative list 
gives the National Assembly power to legislate only on matters relating to international 
and intra-state trade and commerce, and not on settlement of disputes arising out of 
intra-state trade and commerce.
156
  
The above views pose the question whether federating states can validly legislate on 
matters relating to arbitration. Giving regard to the fact that the ACA did not either 
repeal or save the existing state laws on arbitration, apart from stating that the Act will 
apply to commercial arbitration throughout the federation,
157
 are state laws on 
arbitration still applicable or have they been impliedly repealed.
158
 A discussion on the 
doctrine of covering the field may provide answers to this question. 
(ii) The doctrine of ‘covering the field’ 
Another way of testing the constitutionality of the ACA is by applying the doctrine of 
‘covering the field.’ The doctrine is to the effect that, where the National Assembly has 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
149. Item 31, implementation of a treaty (New York Convention) on a matter (trade and commerce) 
contained in the exclusive legislative list. 
150. Item 68 of the exclusive legislative list. 
151. Adaralegbe, A. G. (2006) “Challenges in Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Capital Importing 
States: The Nigerian Experience”, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 23, No. 5, 401 – 
426. 
152. Section 12 (2) of the 1999 Constitution (As Amended) provides: “The National Assembly may 
make laws for the Federation or any part thereof with respect to matters not included in the 
Exclusive Legislative List for the purposes of implementing a treaty.”  
153. Section 4 (4) of the 1999 Constitution (As Amended) provides: “In addition and without 
prejudice to the powers conferred by subsection (2) of this section, the National Assembly shall 
have power to make laws with respect to the following matters, that is to say; (a) any matter in 
the Concurrent Legislative List … (b) any other matter with respect to which it is empowered to 
make laws in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.” 
154. Section 10 (2) of the Interpretation Act, Cap. 123, LFN, 2004 provides that: “An enactment 
which offers powers to do any act shall be construed as also conferring all such other powers as 
are reasonably necessary to enable that act to be done or are incidental to the doing of it” 
155. Adaralegbe, A. G. (2006), p. 401. 
156. Ikeyi, N. and Amucheazi, O. (2013) pp. 132 – 133. 
157. Section 57 and 58 of the ACA. 
158. For example, Arbitration Law of Northern Nigeria, 1963, applicable to Kano State; the 
Arbitration Law, Cap 12, Laws of Cross River State, 1981, the Lagos State Arbitration Law 
(No. 10) 2009.  
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validly legislated on a matter, the House of Assembly of the federating states will be 
incompetent to legislate on the same matter.
159
 Applying this doctrine to the 
applicability of the ACA throughout the Federation, section 57 provides that the Act 
applies only to commercial arbitration, whilst section 58 provides that the Act shall 
apply throughout the country. These sections therefore suggest that, with regard to 
commercial arbitration, the ACA precludes any federating state law on commercial 
arbitration and conciliation.
160
 
In Comagnie Generale De Geophysique v Etuk,
161
 one of the issues for determination 
before the Court of Appeal, as framed by Ekpe JCA, was the applicable law to the 
dispute between the parties. The respondent contended that the applicable law was the 
Arbitration Law of Cross River State, while the appellant argued that the applicable law 
was the ACA. The court held that by the operation of the doctrine of covering the field, 
the ACA was the applicable law to the dispute to the preclusion of the Arbitration Law 
of Cross River State. The Court further stated that since the aim of the ACA is to apply 
throughout the country by virtue of section 58, the Act will apply even though it did not 
expressly repeal the Arbitration Laws of the federating states. Thus, Ekpe JCA stated:  
Where under a federal set up both the federal and the state 
legislatures, each being empowered by the constitution to 
do so, legislate on the same subject, then if it appears 
from the provisions of the federal law on the subject that 
the federal legislature intends to cover the entire field of 
the subject matter and thus provide what the law on the 
subject matter should be for the entire federation, then the 
state law on the subject is invalid…162 
However, opinion is divided on the real effect of the doctrine on state commercial 
arbitration laws. Orojo and Ajomo argue that the effect is that the ACA is deemed to 
have impliedly repealed or kept in abeyance the states’ laws on arbitration, except in the 
areas not expressly, exclusively and comprehensively covered by the Act.
163
 Idornigie 
                                                             
159. Lakanmi v Attorney General Western Nigeria [1971] 1 UILR 201; Attorney General Ogun State 
& ors v Attorney General Federation [1982] 13 NSCC 1; Okocha, O. C. J. (2003) “The 
Doctrine of Covering the Field and the Limits of Legislative Powers of the National Assembly 
vis-à-vis the State and Local Governments Legislatures in Nigeria” Nigerian Bar Journal, Vol. 
2, No. 1, 117. 
160. Orojo, J. O. and Ajomo, M. A. (1999) supra pp. 25 – 27.   
161. [2004] FWLR (Pt. 235) p. 86. 
162. Comagnie Generale De Geophysique v Etuk [2004] pp. 88 – 89.  
163. Orojo, J. O. and Ajomo, M. A. (1999) p. 25. 
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on the other hand contended that the ACA by the effect of the doctrine did not repeal 
but kept the states’ arbitration laws in abeyance.164 Nevertheless, a better view is that 
the doctrine renders state laws on commercial arbitration inoperative to the extent of 
any inconsistency.
165
 
(iii) The position prior to the 1999 Constitution 
In order to preserve the existence of the decrees and edicts promulgated under the 
military regime, section 315 of the 1999 Constitution provides that, laws that existed 
prior to the Constitution will continue to be in force as ‘existing law’. An existing law 
would remain in force either as an Act of the National Assembly or as a law of the 
House of Assembly of the federating states, subject to the legislative competence of the 
legislature under the 1999 Constitution to legislate on the subject of such existing 
law.
166
 If an existing law is not in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution, 
then an ‘appropriate authority’ can ‘modify’ it to bring it into conformity with the 
Constitution.
167
 The ACA being a law that was in force prior to May 29, 1999 qualifies 
as an existing law under the Constitution. 
The question whether the ACA should continue to be in force as an Act of the National 
Assembly or a law of a House of Assembly depends on the legislature with the 
competence to legislate on commercial arbitration. By an earlier review of the exclusive 
and concurrent legislative lists, neither the National Assembly nor a House of Assembly 
has the express legislative power to legislate on commercial arbitration. However, since 
the National Assembly has already covered the field, state laws on commercial 
arbitration that conflicts with the ACA will be declared invalid. 
                                                             
164. Idornigie, P. O. (2000) “The doctrine of ‘covering the field’ and Arbitration Laws in Nigeria” 
Arbitration, Vol. 66, No. 3, p. 193 
165. Ikeyi, N. and Amucheazi, O. (2013), p. 126; Idornigie, P. O. (2000), p. 193; Akintoye, A. 
(2002) “The Doctrine of Covering the Field and the Blue Pencil Rule in Legislative 
Enactments: A Judicial Revisitation”, a publication of the Nigerian Bar Association, Ilorin 
Branch, p. 189.  
166. Section 315(4) of the 1999 Constitution provides: “an existing law means any law and includes 
any rule of law or any enactment or instrument whatsoever which is in force immediately before 
the date when this section comes into force or which having been passed or made before that 
date comes into force after that date.” 
167. Section 315(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides: “subject to the provisions of this Constitution, 
an existing law shall have effect with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into 
conformity with the provisions of this Constitution and shall be deemed to be: (a) an Act of the 
National Assembly to the extent that it is a law with respect to any matter on which the National 
Assembly is empowered by this Constitution to make laws; and (b) a Law made by the House 
of Assembly to the extent that it is a law with respect to which a House of Assembly is 
empowered by this Constitution to make laws.” 
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2.4.  The NYC 
The NYC is one of the efforts of the international business community to establish the 
transnationality of international commercial arbitral awards.
168
 Starting with the Geneva 
Protocol of 1923 on Arbitration Clauses and the Geneva Convention of 1927 on the 
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, these efforts target the promotion of 
international trade and non-litigation approach of resolving disputes arising out of such 
international commercial transactions. Arguably, these efforts culminate in promoting 
the merits of international commercial arbitration over litigation as a method of 
resolving transnational commercial disputes with a certainty that an award will be 
recognised and enforced almost anywhere in the world.
169
 Accordingly, Briner asserts 
that, “International commercial arbitration is the servant of international business and 
trade.”170  
Several international instruments on arbitration, such as the 1923 Geneva Protocol and 
the 1927 Geneva Convention, contain provisions for the enforcement of arbitral 
awards.
171
 Arguably, these two instruments, established (or at the least attempted to 
establish) a legal framework for the recognition of transnational commercial arbitration. 
One of the apparent deficiencies of the 1923 Geneva Protocol was its circumscription of 
the enforcement of cross-border arbitral awards to the seat of the arbitration only.
172
  
With respect to the 1927 Geneva Convention, its foremost deficiencies were the double 
exequatur requirement and the onus of proof on the party seeking recognition and 
enforcement of the award to show that the award had become final.
173
 In effect, the 
Convention required confirmation of finality of the arbitral award in the country of 
origin before the enforcing court could perhaps recognise and enforce it. In essence, the 
                                                             
168. Mistelis, L. A. and Di Pietro, D. (2010) “Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), 1958”, in Mistelis, L. A., (ed.), Concise 
International Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, pp. 1 – 32. 
169. Kronke, H. (2010) “The New York Convention Fifty Years On: Overview and Assessment”, in 
Kronke, H., el at, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global 
Commentary on the New York Convention, Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, pp. 1 – 
18. 
170. Briner, R. (1998) “Philosophy and Objectives of the Convention” a paper presented at ‘New 
York Convention Day’ held in the Trusteeship Council Chamber of the United Nations 
Headquarters, New York on the 10 June 1998 to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958.  
171. Article 3 of the Geneva Protocol; article 1 of the Geneva Convention. 
172. Redfred, A. et al, (2004) Law and Practice of international Commercial Arbitration, 4th edn., 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, pp. 67 – 68.  
173. Redfern, A., et al, (2004) at p. 68. 
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party seeking enforcement was required to obtain leave for enforcement from a 
competent authority at the seat of arbitration. In addition to the leave from the seat, the 
enforcing party was also required to obtain leave in the country where enforcement was 
sought.  
The idea to replace the 1923 Geneva Protocol and the 1927 Geneva Convention was 
first conceived by the ICC which issued a preliminary draft Convention in 1953.
174
 In 
1955, the UN Economic and Social Council took over the ICC initiative and produced 
an amended draft Convention.
175
 Between May and June 1958, the said draft was 
subject to discussions and on June 10, 1958 at a Conference of the UN in New York, the 
NYC was adopted.
176
 Since its adoption by the UN, the NYC has remained the principal 
convention and legal cornerstone for enforcing international arbitral awards in 157 
countries.
177
 The NYC obliges a Contracting State’s court, to refer parties to arbitration 
where there is a valid arbitration agreement between parties in an international dispute 
and, to enforce the award therefrom.
178
 England and Nigeria are Contracting States to 
the NYC. 
2.4.1. The scope of application of the NYC 
The title of the NYC suggests that it regulates the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. The two terms, recognition and enforcement, are distinct, 
though, it is possible to seek for both remedies in court jointly and severally.
179
 
According to Born, the NYC is more generally applicable to a vast spectrum of 
arbitration agreements and is not circumscribed by the Convention’s application to an 
itemised group of foreign or non-domestic arbitral awards.
180
 To this end, the NYC 
would apply either to all agreements to arbitrate dispute, or more specifically, all 
                                                             
174. ECOSOC Official Records, Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 
Summary Record of the first meeting held March 1955, document F/AC.42/SR.1, p 3. The first 
meeting was held at the UN Headquarters, New York; .Lynch, K. (2003) The Forces of 
Economic Globalization: Challenges to the Regime of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, pp. 128 – 140. 
175. Mistelis, L. A. and Di Pietro, D. (2010), pp. 1 – 32. 
176. http://www.newyorkconvention.org/travaux+preparatoires/history+1923+-+1958 [accessed on 
20/09/2016]. 
177. http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries [accessed on 20/09/2016]. 
178. Article II and III of the NYC. 
179. Rubino-Sammartano, M. (2001) International Arbitration Law and Practice, 2nd edn., Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague, p. 936. 
180. Born, G. B. (2009) International Commercial Arbitration, Vol. 1, Kluwer Law International, p. 
277. 
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international agreements to arbitrate dispute.
181
 With regard to what may amount to 
non-domestic award, article I (1) of the NYC provides:  
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a 
State other than the State where the recognition and 
enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of 
difference between persons, whether physical or legal. It 
shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as 
domestic awards in the State where their recognition and 
enforcement are sought. 
The effect of the text of article I (1) of the NYC is that, the Convention will apply where 
the arbitral award is made in the jurisdiction of another country other than the country 
where the arbitral award is sought to be enforced. Also it will apply where the enforcing 
court considers the arbitral award non-domestic.   
However, it has been noted by van den Berg that a “non-domestic” arbitral award may 
result in three types of awards.
182
 The first is an award rendered in the enforcing country 
under the arbitration law of another country. The second is an arbitral award rendered in 
the enforcing country involving a foreign element under the arbitration law of that 
country. The third is an award that is termed “a-national” because it is not regulated by 
any national arbitration law. Instances under the first would be where parties elect to 
arbitrate in one country under the arbitration law of another country. The second is 
where an arbitral award was rendered under foreign law or involved parties that are 
domiciled or have their principal place of business outside the enforcing country.
183
 As 
regard the last, van den Berg argued that in case of enforcement of an ‘a-national’ award 
under the NYC, the place where the award is rendered is immaterial.
184
 However, he 
queried whether ‘de-nationalised’ arbitration and the attendant ‘a-national’ award are 
                                                             
181. Born, G. B. (2009), p. 277. 
182. van den Berg, A. J. (2008) “The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview”, in Gaillard, E. 
and Di Pietro, D., (eds.), Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral 
Awards: the New York Convention in Practice, Cameron May, London, pp. 39 – 68. 
183. Bergesen v Muller (1983) (US No. 54, reported in Yearbook Vol. IX p. 487) where the US 
Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit in 1983 stated inter alia that: “awards ‘not considered as 
domestic’ means awards which are subject to the Convention not because made abroad, but 
because made within the legal framework of another country, e.g. pronounced in accordance 
with a foreign law or involving parties domiciled or having their principal place of business 
outside the enforcing jurisdiction.” 
184. van den Berg, A. J. (2008), pp. 39 – 68. 
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legal reality and if so, whether the NYC can be applied to them.
185
  The issues raised by 
van den Berg are examined under the concept of the seat in chapter four of the thesis. 
2.5.  Summary 
This chapter sets out the legal framework that governs the enforcement of arbitral 
awards in England and Nigeria. The historical development of arbitration in both 
countries demonstrates that arbitration emerged as a result of party autonomy. The next 
chapter will analyse the juridical theory adopted in both jurisdictions. 
                                                             
185. van den Berg, A. J. (2008), p. 65. 
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Chapter three 
The nature and theories of arbitration 
3.0   Introduction  
There is no universally acceptable legal definition of transnational commercial 
arbitration. Indeed, the definition of arbitration as a private dispute resolution 
mechanism differs according to international conventions and treaties, international 
and national practice and national laws
1
. Generally, laws on arbitration do not define 
arbitration but define the agreement to arbitrate. However, descriptions of arbitration 
have been offered by national courts, arbitrators and commentators. Born describes 
transnational arbitration as a process by which disputes arising out of cross-border 
transactions are settled pursuant to parties voluntary agreement by a method other 
than litigation.
2 The process is based on the consent of parties to resolve their 
disputes by non-governmental decision maker selected by or for the parties. The 
consent to arbitrate disputes arising out of their legal relationship is either expressed 
in a submission agreement or arbitration clause.
3
 
This chapter examines the nature of arbitration generally (3.1) and specifically under 
the NYC, English AA, and the Nigerian ACA (3.2). It then discusses the juridical 
theories and applies these to test the regimes in England and Nigeria (3.3) following 
which the policy considerations adopted in both jurisdictions in enforcing arbitral 
awards is examined (3.4). 
3.1 The nature of arbitration 
Dispute resolution is an essential feature of any legal system and one of the primary 
conditions of a peaceful community or society is the resolution of disputes by 
processes which are non-violent in nature.
4
 Although the judiciary is the official 
                                                             
1. Steingruber, A. M. (2012) “The Mutable and Evolving Concept of  ‘Consent’ in International 
Arbitration - Comparing rules, laws, treaties and types of arbitration for a better 
understanding of the concept of ‘Consent’” Oxford U Comparative L Forum 2 at 
ouclf.iuscomp.org [accessed on 20/09/2016]  
2. Born, G. B. (2012) International Arbitration: Law and Practice, Kluwer Law International 
BV, The Netherlands, pp. 4 – 5.  
3. Lyons, J. (1985) Arbitration: “The slower, More Expensive Alternative?” The American 
Lawyer, Jan.-Feb, 107. 
4. Genn, H. (2012) "What Is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice," Yale 
Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 24, No. 1, Art. 18, pp. 397 – 417. 
65 
 
organ known for that purpose, many disputes are resolved by methods other than 
court action. Methods of dispute resolution can be either of compromise or of 
decision.
5
 Under compromise, disputes are resolved either directly between the 
disputants through the aid and intervention of an agreed or volunteer third party 
(mediation or conciliation). Mediation and conciliation are most informal and their 
essence lies in the fact that the settlement achieved may be acceptable to the parties 
to the dispute.
6
 This is because in mediation or conciliation, disputants may be 
offered less than what they originally desired or felt was their due respectively. Thus, 
mediation, conciliation and negotiation are means of compromising disputes on a 
give-and-take basis. Though as informal processes, they are distinct and well 
recognised methods of dispute resolution. Nonetheless, when the method of 
resolving disputes shifts from compromise to decision-making, litigation is generally 
thought of disregarding the prominence of arbitration. Hence, arbitration most times 
is dismissed as another type of compromise mechanism. This section argues that in 
so doing the significance and generative power of the arbitration process is not 
identified. This section highlights three distinctive elements of commercial 
arbitration, namely, its private (3.1.1), consensual (3.1.2) and final and binding 
(3.1.3) nature. 
3.1.1 Private and confidential 
Generally, arbitration is considered to be inherently a private and confidential 
dispute resolution mechanism for settling disputes arising out of a legal relationship.
7
 
It is private because unlike litigation, only the parties to the arbitration agreement, 
their legal representatives (lawyers) and their witnesses, if any, can attend hearings 
and take part in the arbitral proceedings. Thus, proceedings are conducted in private 
                                                             
5. According to Mentschikoff, “The importance of determining whether a particular method is 
essentially one of compromise or of decision lies in the psychological attitude which 
accompanies resort to it. In the one context, ‘bargain’ and the emotive connotations of that 
word are evoked; in the other, ‘judgment’ and the emotive connotations of that come into 
play. This distinction is of peculiar significance in evaluating the arbitration process and in 
attempting to place it in the general machinery of … legal institutions.” Mentschikoff, S. 
(1952) "The Significance of Arbitration--A Preliminary Inquiry" Law and Contemporary 
Problems, Vol. 17, pp. 698 – 710, at p. 698. 
6. Okekeifere, A. I. (1998) “Commercial Arbitration as the Most Effectively Dispute 
Resolution Method: Still a Fact or Now a Myth”, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 
15, No. 4, pp.81 – 105. 
7. Tashiro, K. (1992) “Quest for a Rational and Proper Method for the Publication of Arbitral 
Awards”, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 97 – 104; Trakman, L. E. 
(2014) “Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration”, Arbitration International, 
Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 1 – 18. 
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not in public. It is confidential because, except the parties agree otherwise, the 
parties themselves, their witnesses, if any, and arbitrators cannot disclose to third 
parties information concerning the arbitration, such as pleadings, evidence and 
decisions of the arbitrators.
8
  
One of the elements that differentiate litigation from arbitration is the rigidity of the 
court procedure. As a private dispute resolution mechanism, arbitration can be much 
more flexible both in time and procedure. Unlike litigation, parties to the arbitration 
agreement freely determine the most suitable procedure, structure and other details 
of the arbitration.
9
 In effect, neither the parties nor the arbitrators are tied to strict 
rules of court. Parties also by their agreement expressly or impliedly confer authority 
on the arbitrator within the limit of a relevant law or rules.
10
 In litigation, cases are 
randomly allocated to judges, and litigants have no say in the selection process, 
much less the freedom to elect a judge with a specialised skill or expert knowledge 
concerning their dispute. 
 In Nigeria, pursuant to the Arbitration Rules, arbitral proceedings are held ‘in 
camera’, save parties agree otherwise.11 Arguably, this means that arbitral 
proceedings and evidence generated are to be treated as private and confidential. 
Thus, it follows that awards and evidence related to the arbitration proceeding cannot 
be made public, except both parties give their permission.
12
 In England, there are no 
statutory stipulations in the AA 1996 which deal with confidentiality of evidence 
related to arbitration and the award. However, under the common law, evidence 
generated from arbitral proceedings including the award are considered confidential 
though, this presumption is rebuttable. This is evident in the English Court of Appeal 
case of Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partner.
13
 In that case, Lord Collins noted: 
… an implied obligation (arising out of the nature of 
arbitration itself) on both parties not to disclose or use 
                                                             
8. Hwang, M. S. C. and Chung, K. (2009) “Defining the Indefinable: Practical Problems of 
Confidentiality in Arbitration” Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 609 – 
645. 
9. Yu, H-L, (2012) “Duty of Confidentiality: Myth and Reality”, Civil Justice Quarterly, Vol. 
31, No. 1, pp. 68 – 88. 
10. Blackaby, N., Partasides, C., Redfern, A. and Hunter, M. (2009) Redfern and Hunter on 
International Arbitration, 5th ed., Oxford University Press, New York, p. 86. 
11. Article 25 (4) of the Arbitration Rules, First Schedule to the ACA. 
12. Chukwuemerie, A. I. (2007) “Arbitration and Human Rights in Africa”, African Human 
Rights Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 103 – 141. 
13. [2008] EWCA (Civ) 184 (CA). 
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for any other purpose any document prepared for and 
used in the arbitration, or disclose or produced in the 
course of the arbitration, or transcripts or notes of the 
evidence in the arbitration or the award, and not to 
disclose in any other way what evidence has been 
given by the witness in the arbitration, save with the 
consent of the other party, or pursuant to an order or 
leave of the court.
14
 
Conversely, the fact that a party is involved in court proceedings is a matter of public 
record, save such court proceedings cannot be made public by reason of statutory 
restriction or a court order. Thus, unlike litigation, in arbitration there is no public 
hearing and no public record. Nonetheless, the common law implied rule that the 
arbitration, evidence adduced in the arbitral proceedings and the award is 
confidential, is subject to exceptions. 
For example, in Ali Shipping Corp v Shipyard Trogir,15 The English Court of Appeal 
considered the general rule of confidentiality of documents (and awards) and laid the 
following rules: disclosure made with the express or implied permission of the party 
who originally produced the document; where there is an order of the Court, for 
instance where an order is made for disclosure of materials generated by an 
arbitration for the purposes of a later Court proceedings; disclosure when and to the 
degree judiciously necessary for the establishment or protection of an arbitrating 
party’s legal rights vis-à-vis a third party; where leave of the Court has been given. 
Potter LJ recognised that difficulties would arise with the question of what grounds 
would give rise to such leave being given; and disclosure required in the public 
interest.
16
 
                                                             
14. Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partner [2008] at para. 81. Similarly, Thomas, LJ at para. 129 
stated that:  
… a specific obligation of confidentiality in relation to documents produced 
by each party to the arbitration under the process of disclosure applicable by 
the procedural law of arbitrations conducted in England and Wales. This is 
analogous to that imposed by the courts of England and Wales in proceedings 
before them. As between the parties, all such documents are covered by the 
obligation of confidentiality.  
15. [1999] 1 WLR 314. 
16. In Glidepath BV and Others v John Thompson and Others [2005] EWHC 818 (Comm), the 
court applied the principle in Ali Shipping Corp. and held that arbitration proceedings and 
evidence generated were treated as confidential to the parties and the arbitrator, subject to 
certain exceptions. 
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Again in Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Ltd (“Aegis”) v European 
Reinsurance Co. of Zurich,
17
 the Privy Council further considered the extent of 
confidentiality attaching to an arbitral award. The question that arose for 
determination was whether an express confidentiality agreement relating to an earlier 
arbitration between the same parties precluded one of them from referring to the 
earlier award in a later arbitration between them. The Privy Council considered that 
the justification for the duty of confidentiality was to determine the disputes between 
the parties to the arbitration in a way that did not involve the disclosure of 
information to parties with interests adverse to those involved in the arbitration. 
Thus, it was held that the use of the earlier award in a later arbitration between the 
same parties would not give rise to such danger. Their Lordships went on to hold 
that to forbid any disclosure of the award would truncate an essential purpose of the 
arbitration by thwarting enforcement of the award.  
3.1.2 The consensual nature of arbitration 
Arbitration is either mandatory or voluntary. It is compulsory where parties are 
required by legislation or a court order to submit their dispute to arbitration without 
their willingness to do so. Under this type of arbitration, parties are compelled to 
arbitrate their dispute. Conversely, it is voluntary where parties willingly agree to 
refer or submit their dispute to a neutral third party (arbitrator or arbitrators) with a 
legal intention that the valid decision (award) of the arbitrator or arbitrator will be 
binding on them.
18
 Unlike mandatory arbitration, an agreement to arbitrate cross-
border commercial disputes is voluntary.
19
 Such election requires both parties’ 
assent, the consensus ad idem. This meeting of the minds is considered the 
foundation on which the arbitral process is built.
20
  
In an international commercial arbitration, proceedings are seen as an expression of 
the parties’ intention to refer or submit their dispute to the arbitrators on the basis of 
                                                             
17. [2003] 1 WLR 1041. 
18. Katz, L. V. (1993) “Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-
Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin”,  Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1993, No. 
1, pp. 1 – 55; LeRoy, M. H. (2009) “Crowning the New King: The Statutory Arbitrator and 
the Demise of Judicial Review”, Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2009, No. 1, pp. 2 – 48. 
19. Khan, L. A. (2013) “Arbitral Autonomy”, Louisiana Law Review, Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 1 – 58. 
20. Steingruber, A. M. (2012) Consent in International Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, paras. 6.33 – 6.40. 
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party autonomy.
21
 This consensus of the parties to have their dispute resolved by 
arbitration is fundamental for the validity of the arbitration agreement and by 
extension, the arbitral proceedings and its resultant award. A binding contract, 
international commercial arbitration agreement inclusive, requires consensus ad 
idem, agreeing to the same thing in the same sense by the parties. Thus, the element 
of consent in an international commercial arbitration is indispensable, without it 
there can be no valid arbitration reference and arbitral award.
22
 This is because one 
of the significant values upon which arbitration rests is that the arbitrator’s authority 
flows from the consent and voluntary agreement of the parties. 
The English and Nigerian courts would normally not invoke their jurisdiction and 
would generally stay proceedings before them in favour of arbitration. This is 
because the NYC, AA 1996 and the ACA, by virtue of which the English and 
Nigerian courts honour commercial arbitration agreements in the first place, are 
expressly concerned with arbitration processes premised on consensual 
agreements.
23
 
3.1.3 Final and binding 
International commercial arbitration policies are founded upon two cardinal interests, 
namely: preserving the finality of arbitral awards and maintaining a just private 
dispute resolution system.
24
 To this end, a final arbitral award is a concluding and 
binding determination of parties’ rights and obligations. The final and binding 
element of arbitration awards resonates with the parties’ initial consent to arbitrate 
their dispute.
25
 In effect, once an award is rendered, all issues and claims of the 
parties to the arbitration cannot be re-arbitrated or even litigated. Such issues and 
claims become res judicata in the same way as a court judgement.
26
 
                                                             
21. Hanotiau, B. (2011) “Consent to Arbitration: Do we Share a Common Vision?” Arbitration 
International, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 539 – 555. 
22. Brekoulakis, S. (2015) “Parties in International Arbitration: Consent v Commercial Reality” 
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Though arbitral proceedings are not court proceedings, the procedures that are 
followed in reaching a final and binding award may be described as judicial. The 
arbitrator is bound to act judicially and judiciously. This implies that the arbitrator, 
like a judge, must “act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each 
party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his 
opponent”.27 Although the above quotation is from the English AA 1996, the 
obligation is arguably one of general application. This is because similar provision is 
contained in basically all laws on arbitration and is a basic requirement of natural 
justice, due process. This leads to the observation that the crux of the nature of 
arbitration can be summed up as party autonomy.
28
 Therefore, given the importance 
of party autonomy in the arbitral process, the sections that follow will often revert to 
that freedom. 
3.2 Arbitration under the NYC, AA 1996 and ACA 
The contractual nature of transnational arbitration permits parties to pre-arrange a 
predictable system of dispute resolution which preserves the privacy of their 
commercial relationship. This section discusses the nature of cross-border 
commercial arbitration under the NYC, the AA 1996 and ACA respectively. To this 
end, it examines party autonomy (3.2.1), arbitration agreement (3.2.2), arbitrability 
of the subject matter (3.2.3), the writing requirement (3.2.4), judicial interpretations 
of the writing requirement (3.2.5) and separability of the arbitration agreement 
(3.2.6).  
3.2.1 Party autonomy  
Whereas litigation proceeds under state law and court assigned judge, arbitration 
proceeds on the agreement of the parties.
29
 The primary idea of arbitration is rooted 
in party autonomy, which is often referred to as the cornerstone of cross-border 
commercial arbitration.
30
 The essence of party autonomy is to hold parties to their 
                                                             
27. Section 33 (1) (a) of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
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International Law, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 265 – 277. 
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agreement by allowing them to freely mould the conduct of their arbitration and be 
bound by the outcome of the arbitration they submitted to.
31
 Thus, parties in 
exercising their freedom to contract may agree on the choice of arbitrator (or 
arbitrators and of the chairman), the strategy for the conduct of the arbitration, the 
seat of the arbitration, the choice of law applicable to the main contract and the 
arbitration agreement, the choice of documentary evidence and the examination of 
witness(es).
32
 In this regard, party autonomy ensures that arbitration will proceed and 
the award honoured in accordance with the parties’ agreement. 
Under Article II of the NYC, though not expressly stipulated, an agreement in 
writing implies that parties are free to tailor their arbitration agreement to their 
dispute resolution needs.
33
 In effect, if the arbitration is conducted without the 
parties’ consent, the resultant award would be refused enforcement. For example, 
article V (1) (d) of the NYC provides that recognition and enforcement of the arbitral 
award may be refused if “the composition of the arbitral authority or the procedure 
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties …” 
In Polimaster Ltd. (Belarus) and Na & Se Trading Co. Ltd. (Cyprus) v RAE Systems 
Inc. (US)
34
, the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 plaintiffs contracted with the defendant for the 
manufacturing and distribution of the 1
st
 plaintiff’s radiation detection instruments. 
The contracts contained clauses to the effect that disputes between the parties will be 
settled by reference to arbitration “at the defendant’s site”, which is the geographical 
location of the defendant’s principal place of business. When disputes arose, the 
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plaintiffs filed a joint request for arbitration at the defendant’s principal place of 
business in California, USA. An arbitrator was appointed. The defendant filed an 
answer which also contained counterclaims. The 1
st
 plaintiff argued that the 
arbitrator lacked jurisdiction over the counter claims filed by the defendant. 
Contending that under the parties’ arbitration agreement, claims must be brought at 
the location of the party against whom such claims are brought. Thus, the defendant 
counterclaims are to be brought at Belarus, the 1
st
 plaintiff’s principal place of 
business. The arbitrator after considering issues before it rendered an award in 
favour of the defendant. The defendant sought to enforce the award at the US 
District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division. The court 
granted the application for enforcement. 
On appeal to the US Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, one of the issues the 
court considered was whether the arbitration had been conducted in accordance with 
the parties’ agreement. The court consequently reversed the district court’s decision 
and refused enforcement. Citing article V (1) (d) of the NYC, the court stated that 
enforcement of an arbitral award may be declined on the basis that “the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties”. The court held 
that the dispute relating to the counterclaim should not have been arbitrated in 
California, but in Belarus. The court reasoned that the arbitration agreement required 
disputes to be arbitrated at Polimaster’s site. Thus, conducting the arbitration 
otherwise was a breach of the parties’ agreement.  
Though, party autonomy is broadly reflected in the arbitral process, the freedom is 
not absolute.
35
 There are a number of restrictions imposed by the NYC in order to 
ensure that the requirements of due process are met.
36
 These restrictions stem from 
the lack of bona fide authenticity, illegality or breach of public policy.
37
 The 
provisions of article V (1) (a) and (2) of the NYC, which are on procedural public 
policy, are no less mandatory. If not taken into account by parties in their agreement, 
                                                             
35. Scherer, M. and Silberman, L. (2016), p. 441. 
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they may affect the validity of the award or its recognition and enforcement under 
the NYC.
38
 These provisions are examined in detail in chapter 5. 
One of the underlying considerations of the AA 1996 is party autonomy.
39
 Under the 
AA 1996, the principle of party autonomy is stated in section 1 (b) thus:
40
 “The 
parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such 
safeguards as are necessary in the public interest.” The section gives parties the 
freedom to adopt the procedure they wish for the resolution of their dispute. 
According to the DAC Report, party autonomy encompasses two distinct limbs: (i) 
parties should be held to their agreement; and (ii) parties should be free to agree how 
their dispute is to be settled.
41
 Undoubtedly, the first limb presupposes that the 
parties agreed to accept and be bound by the decision of the arbitrator. Such 
agreement is therefore to be respected and given effect by the courts.
42
 The second 
limb gives parties the discretion to choose their arbitrator(s) and structure the arbitral 
process freely. In Hashwani v Jivraj,
43
 the UK Supreme Court reaffirmed its support 
for the doctrine of party autonomy. Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony stated: 
One of the distinguishing features of arbitration that sets 
it apart from proceedings in national courts is the 
breadth of discretion left to the parties … to structure 
the process for resolution of the dispute. This is 
reflected in section 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996…44 
The case arose from a dispute between parties who were at a time partners. In 1981, 
the parties entered into a contract which contained an arbitration clause. The clause 
provided that disputes between the parties would be settled by ‘respected members 
of the Ismaili Community and holders of high office within the Community’. When 
disputes arose, Mr Hashwani sought to appoint a retired English judge who was not a 
member of the Ismaili community as one of the arbitrators. Mr Jivraj challenged the 
appointment in court. Mr Hashwani contended that the clause requiring arbitrators to 
be members of Ismaili community was invalid as it offended the Employment 
                                                             
38. Tweeddale, A. and Tweeddale, K. (2007), pp. 496 – 497. 
39. DAC’s Report of February 1996 at para. 69. 
40. The following sections directly or indirectly refer to the party autonomy principle: sections 7, 
8, 12, 14, 42, 44, 45, and 47 – 58. 
41.  DAC’s Report of February 1996 at para. 19. 
42. Section 1 (c) of the AA 1996. 
43. [2011] UKSC 40; [2011] ICR 1004. 
44. [2011] ICR 1004 at 1026, para. 61.  
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Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulation 2003, the Human Rights Act 1998, or 
public policy at common law. Mr Hashwani’s argument was rejected by the trial 
court. The court held inter alia that Mr Hashwani was not at liberty to appoint an 
arbitrator who was not a member of the Ismaili community. Dissatisfied, Mr 
Hashwani appealed to the Court of Appeal and the appeal was allowed with 
conditions. Dissatisfied with the Court of Appeal’s judgment, both parties cross 
appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed Mr Hashwani’s 
appeal and allowed Mr Jivraj’s appeal.  
The Supreme Court’s decision demonstrated the court’s pragmatic and supportive 
approach to arbitration as an independent dispute resolution mechanism. It also 
recognises that party autonomy as stipulated under section 1 of the AA is the guiding 
principle in determining the procedure to be followed in the arbitral process.
45
 
However, under the AA 1996, party autonomy is not absolute. It is subject to such 
safeguards as are necessary in the public interest.
46
 These safeguards are provided by 
the mandatory provisions of Part I of the AA. The safeguards apply regardless of any 
agreement between the parties to the contrary.
47
 Another exception to party 
autonomy is where parties’ choice is contrary to public policy.48 In such cases, the 
parties’ choice will not be followed and the arbitral awards resulting from such 
choices may not be recognised or enforced by the English courts.
49
 
In Nigeria, party autonomy underpins the ACA.
50
 Unlike the English AA 1996 
which expressly embeds the principle of party autonomy, the principle is implied 
into certain provisions of the ACA. The combined effect of sections 6 and 7 of the 
ACA is the guarantee of the parties’ freedom to appoint their arbitrator(s) or 
prescribe the procedure for the appointment of the arbitrator(s). Under section 6, 
parties are free to determine the number of arbitrators who shall arbitrate their 
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dispute. However, where the parties fail to agree the number of arbitrators, it shall be 
deemed that they intended to appoint three arbitrators. Also, it is the right of the 
parties under section 7 (1) to decide the procedure for appointing their arbitrators. In 
the event that they fail to appoint their arbitrator(s) or specify the procedure for such 
appointment, section 7 (2) will apply if it is a domestic arbitration, and if it is an 
international commercial arbitration, section 44 in addition to section 7 (2) will 
apply. 
Parties also have the autonomy to waive the arbitrator challenge procedure. Under 
the ACA, a potential arbitrator shall, when offered an appointment, disclose all 
circumstances likely to lead to any justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or 
independence.
51
 The duty of disclosure imposed on the arbitrator continues even 
after the arbitrator has been appointed and subsists throughout the arbitral 
proceedings.
52
 Nonetheless, parties in their agreement to arbitrate are free to waive 
such disqualifying circumstances when disclosed by the potential arbitrator.
53
 The 
parties in their arbitration agreement are also free to decide the procedure to be 
followed in challenging the arbitrator.
54
 However, where no procedure is determined 
by the parties in their arbitration agreement, the provisions of articles 9 to 12 of the 
first Schedule to the ACA will then apply.
55
 Section 9 of the ACA guarantees the 
freedom of the parties to determine the procedure to be adopted in challenging their 
arbitrator in the appropriate circumstances. 
Nigerian courts have given weight to the principle of party autonomy.
56
 This is borne 
out of the fact that disputing parties are free to resort to private dispute settlement 
without unjustified intervention by the court.
57
 One example is the case of M. V. 
Lupex v Nigerian Overseas Chartering Shipping Ltd.
58
 In M. V. Lupex, parties under 
clause 7 of their charter-party agreement contracted to submit to arbitration in 
London under English law. When dispute arose, the respondent sued the appellants 
                                                             
51. Section 8 (1) of the ACA. 
52. Section 8 (2) of the ACA. 
53. Section 8 (1) of the ACA. 
54. Section 9 (1) of the ACA. 
55. Section 9 (2) of the ACA. 
56. Niger Progress Ltd. V North East Line Corp. [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 107) 68; M. V. Lupex v 
Nigerian Overseas Chartering and Shipping Ltd. [2003] 15 NWLR (Pt. 844) 469. 
57. Nwakoby, G. C. (2004) The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in Nigeria, IYKE 
Ventures Production, Enugu, Nigeria, pp. 328 – 338. 
58. [2003] 15 NWLR (Pt. 844) 469. 
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at the Federal High Court Lagos, claiming damages for breach of contract. They also 
sought an interim order for the arrest of M. V. Lupex. The interim application was 
granted. The appellants applied to the court to set aside the ex parte order and stay 
proceedings sine die. The appellants informed the court that at the time of the court’s 
interim order to arrest M. V. Lupex, the respondents had made a counterclaim 
against the appellants in arbitration proceedings in London. The court declined to 
stay proceedings and further held that the appellant should supply a bank guarantee 
in the sum of USD735,000.00 or its equivalent in Naira before M V Lupex could be 
released. Dissatisfied with the trial court’s ruling, the appellant appealed to the Court 
of Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The appellant further appealed 
to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in affirming the principle of party 
autonomy and the court’s duty not to encourage the breach of a valid arbitration 
agreement stated: 
The mere fact that a dispute is of a nature eminently 
suitable for trial in a court is not sufficient ground for 
refusing to give effect to what the parties have by 
contract, expressly agreed to. So long as an arbitration 
clause is retained in a contract that is valid and the 
dispute is within the contemplation of the clause, the 
court ought to give due regard to the voluntary contract 
of the parties by enforcing the arbitral clause as agreed 
to by them.
59
 
In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court considered the provisions of 
sections 4 (2) and 5 of the ACA and came to two conclusions that where parties have 
agreed to arbitrate their dispute: 
(1) the provision of section 4(2) of the ACA may make 
the court’s refusal to order a stay ineffective as the 
arbitral proceedings may nevertheless be 
commenced or continued and an award made by 
the arbitral tribunal may be binding on the party 
that has commenced an action in court, and 
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(2) the court should not be seen to encourage the breach of a valid 
arbitration agreement particularly if it has international flavour.
60
 
However, like under the NYC and the AA 1996, party autonomy under the ACA is 
not absolute, it is exercisable according to the provisions of the ACA.
61
 For example, 
under section 52 (2) (b) (i) and article V (2) (a) of the Second Schedule to the ACA, 
an enforcing court in Nigeria is obliged to consider the arbitrability of a dispute in 
accordance with the laws of Nigeria. The implication of the above provisions of the 
ACA is that parties cannot by their arbitration agreement agree to arbitrate a dispute 
that is non-arbitrable under the laws of Nigeria.
62
  
3.2.2 Arbitration agreement  
Article II (1) of the NYC defines the arbitration agreement as:   
… an agreement in writing under which the parties 
undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences 
which have arisen or which may arise between them in 
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether 
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable 
of settlement by arbitration. 
Article II (1) also obliges its Contracting States to recognise such arbitration 
agreement.
63
 The onus of recognition falls precisely on national courts of the 
Contracting States when considering the validity of an arbitration agreement.
64
 The 
courts’ duty to recognise an agreement to arbitrate can become important in different 
                                                             
60. M. V. Lupex v Nigerian Overseas Chartering Shipping Ltd ., [2003] at pp. 490-491, per Iguh, 
JSC 
61. Fagbemi, S. A. (2015) “The Doctrine of Party Autonomy in International Commercial 
Arbitration: Myth or Reality”, Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy (The), 
Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 202 – 246. 
62. For example, in SNEP & 3 ors. v FIRS & anor. (2016), Appeal No. CA/A/208/2012, 
delivered on 31/08/2016 and EEPN & anor. v NNPC (2016) Appeal No. CA/A/507/2012, 
delivered on 22/07/2016, respectively, the Court of Appeal held that disputes arising under 
the Petroleum Tax Act are not arbitrable. The court reasoned that disputes relating to the 
revenue of the Government of Nigeria or its organ and matters pertaining to taxation of 
companies and other bodies carrying on business in Nigeria are not arbitrable. 
63. Article II (1) of the NYC states that:  
“Each Contracting State shall recognise an agreement in writing under which the 
parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen 
or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, 
whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration.” 
64. Poudret, J. F. and Besson, S. (2007) Comparative Law of International Arbitration, Sweet 
and Maxwell, London, para. 72; Berger, K. P. (2003) International Economic Arbitration , 
Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, The Netherlands, p. 133. 
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situations. One of which is where a party to the arbitration seeks enforcement of the 
arbitral award.
65
 From the provisions of article II (1), an arbitration agreement must 
satisfy three important conditions in order to be valid, namely: it must relate to 
existing or future differences arising out of a defined contractual or non-contractual 
legal relationship; the subject matter of the dispute between the parties must be 
arbitrable, and; the arbitration agreement between the parties must be in writing.
66
   
However, even if the three requirements are satisfied and the arbitration agreement 
held valid, the court is still obliged to determine whether the parties are bound by the 
arbitration agreement. This is because the court has to be satisfied that parties were 
ad idem when they contracted to arbitrate their dispute. The determination of the 
question is also important if one of the parties in the proceeding did not sign the 
arbitration agreement. It is noted that the NYC does not fully regulate all the 
requirements because it does not stipulate uniform provisions that overrides national 
laws.
67
 Accordingly, it leaves other requirements to national laws to regulate with 
that more favourable national law can apply.
68
 
With regards to the writing requirement, cross-border and most national arbitration 
agreements are required to be in writing.
69
 This requirement is drawn from the 
provisions of article II (1) of the NYC and several national arbitration legislations.
70
 
                                                             
65. Others may include: where a party to the arbitration challenges the arbitral awards; where a 
national court seized of an action in a matter covered by an arbitration agreement – 
application of Article II (3) of the NYC; where a party in an arbitral proceedings requires the 
court’s assistance in respect of interim measures, appointment or removal of arbitrator(s). 
66. Kroll, S. (2011) The Arbitration Agreement in Enforcement Proceedings of Foreign Awards: 
Burden of Proof and the Legal Relevance of the Tribunal’s Decision , in Kroll, S. et al, (ed.), 
International Arbitration and International Commercial Law: Synergy, Convergence and 
Evolution, Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, The Netherlands, pp. 317 – 335. 
67. Though, it can be argued that article II (2) of the NYC is an overriding provision that is to be 
interpreted uniformly across Contracting States. 
68. Article VII (1) of the NYC. 
69. Yu, H-L. (2012) “Written Arbitration Agreements: What Written Arbitration Agreements?” 
Civil Justice Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp.68 – 93. 
70. For example, article 178 of the Swiss Private International Law provides, “As to form, the 
arbitration agreement shall be valid if it is made in writing, by telegram, telex, telecopier, or 
any other means of communication that establishes the terms of the agreement by a text”, 
Article 1507 of the French Code of Civil Procedure 2011, requires domestic arbitration 
agreements to be in writing and precludes any such condition in cross border arbitration 
agreement; article 1677 of the Belgian Judicial Code provides, “An arbitration agreement 
shall be constituted by an instrument in writing signed by the parties or by other documents 
binding on the parties and showing their intention to have recourse to arbitration”; section 2 
of the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act; article 16 of the Arbitration Law of the People’s 
Republic of China; also make the same provisions. 
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The reasons for this requirement are sufficiently canvassed by commentators.
71
 
According to Hu and Nasir, requirements such as writing and signature are based on 
the need for some evidence or authentication from the parties who have given up 
their right of access to national courts.
72
 In effect, the significance of an arbitration 
agreement resides in the fact that by undertaking to refer or submit disputes to 
arbitration, parties denounce their right to litigate in a national court.
73
 Such waiver 
is not to be taken lightly, or be foisted on the parties.
74
 A written arbitration 
agreement therefore, draws the attention of the parties that they are entering into a 
solemn contract. Thereby, requiring parties to discuss and determine arbitral issues 
with thoughtfulness and seriousness.
75
 It also reduces disputes as to whether or not 
an arbitration agreement was reached, its terms and conditions and other issues 
covered by the written arbitration agreement.
76
 
The text “agreement in writing” under article II of the NYC is also contained in 
article 7 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, but construed differently. Under article 
II (2) of the NYC, ‘agreement in writing’ includes an arbitral clause in a contract or 
an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters 
or telegrams. While under article 7 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, ‘agreement in 
writing’ will be established if it is contained in a document signed by the parties or 
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NYC and the Federal Arbitration Act” Stanford Journal of International Law, vol. 48, pp. 47 
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73. Born, G. A. (2014) at pp. 660 – 663.  
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FAAS. 206, Comity, Anti-suit injunctions worldwide and their effects in E. U. Before and 
After the New E. U. Regulation 1215/2012” American Review of International Arbitration 
Vol. 24, No. 3, 515; Carducci, G. (2012) “The Arbitration Reform in France: Domestic and 
International Arbitration Law”, Arbitration International, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 125 – 157. 
75. Hill, R. (1999) “Online Arbitration: Issues and Solutions”, Arbitration International, Vol. 
15, 199. 
76. DAC’s Report of February 1996 para. 33. 
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in an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication 
which provides a record of the agreement. The UNCITRAL Model Law provides a 
broad spectrum of ‘in writing’ than the NYC. The difference in the provisions of 
article II of the NYC and article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law are reflected in 
national arbitration laws.
77
 This leaves open the question of what constitutes valid 
written arbitration agreement; or when the ‘in writing’ requirement of article II (2) of 
the NYC is met.  
A cardinal prerequisite for a valid arbitration agreement, aside from the form 
requirement, is parties’ consent to arbitrate their dispute.78 While this statement 
appears rather straightforward, deciding the issue of whether the parties gave their 
consent to arbitrate a dispute between them generally proves difficult. Sometimes 
parties may have their arbitration agreement in writing, yet deny consenting to such 
agreement. For example, where both parties did not sign the arbitration agreement or 
where the principal contract containing the arbitration clause was signed by both 
parties but the arbitration clause in another document was not signed. To establish 
consent, article II of the NYC requires the arbitration agreement to be evidenced in 
writing. To satisfy the ‘in writing’ requirement of article II (2), and by extension 
establish parties’ consent to arbitrate, it is sufficient if the principal contract 
containing the arbitration clause is signed by both parties.
79
 However, parties need 
not sign the arbitration clause as a separate agreement because what is relevant is the 
parties’ intention, and not the form of the document establishing the intention. 
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According to Wilner, “it is the spirit of the agreement, rather than the mere wording, 
which will govern the construction of the arbitration clause.”80 
This point is illustrated in the old case of Societe Italo-Belge pour le Commerce et 
I’Industrie (Belgium) v S.p.a. I. G. O. R. (Italy).81 The principal contract which was 
signed by both parties contained an arbitration clause to refer any dispute arising out 
of the contract to arbitration in London under the Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats 
Association (FOSFA). When disputes arose, the claimant initiated arbitration in 
London against the respondent. The arbitrator rendered its award in favour of the 
claimant. Upon the respondent’s refusal to honour the award, the claimant requested 
enforcement of the award before the Court of Appeal of Brescia. The respondent 
objected to the enforcement of the award on the grounds that the arbitration 
agreement was null and void because it was not written as required by article 2 of the 
Italian Code of Civil Procedure and article II (1) and (2) of the NYC; and the 
arbitration clause was inoperative as it had not been specifically approved in writing 
as required by the Italian Civil Code. The court granted the claimant’s application 
and held inter alia that the arbitration clause was valid and as required by Italian law 
and the NYC. 
The court reasoned that the arbitration clause did not leave any doubt that disputes 
which may arise out of the contract shall be arbitrated by FOSFA. The court then 
held that the respondent cannot deny knowledge of FOSFA having exchanged 
correspondence with the body.
82
 Therefore, in the context of the case, article II (1) 
and (2) of the NYC, being special law, prevail over the general provisions of article 
2 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure and articles 1341 and 1342 of the Italian 
Civil Code. This case, although decided over three decades ago, illustrates 
application of the spirit of the law. 
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The text “contained in an exchange of letter or telegrams” in article II of the NYC 
has been suggested to mean a written offer and a written acceptance of the offer.
83
 
The written acceptance binds parties and establishes their mutual intention to 
arbitrate disputes arising out of their legal relationship. In Kukje Sangsa Co. Ltd 
(Korea) v GKN International Trading (London) Ltd (UK)
84
 the defendant argued that 
the arbitration agreement was invalid because it was not discussed by the parties. It 
further argued that the exchanged document which contained the arbitration 
agreement was printed in smaller letters than the other terms and conditions of the 
contract. The Supreme Court of Korea rejected the argument and held that the 
writing requirement of article II of the NYC was sufficiently satisfied. The court 
reasoned that the parties concluded a valid arbitration agreement when the purchase 
orders containing the arbitration clause was accepted. It was immaterial that the 
clause was not discussed or was written in smaller letters than the other terms and 
condition. The acceptance of the purchase orders containing the arbitration clause 
therefore, must be read as establishing parties’ intentions to arbitrate their dispute. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Korea arguably makes good commercial 
sense. This is because an inadvertent or deliberate omission by one or both parties to 
sign a document establishing their intention should not diminish the validity of the 
arbitration agreement contained in the document. However, the source of such 
document would need to be established if fraud is alleged.
85
 
 In XYZ v ABC & JKL,
86
 one of the issues before the arbitrator was whether the 
parties’ arbitration agreement was formally and substantively valid. In that case, the 
legal predecessor of XYZ (an Italian seller) entered into sale and purchase contract 
with the legal predecessor of ABC (a US buyer). JKL (a Ukrainian) was the 
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85. In Israel Chem. & Phosphates Ltd v NV Algemene Oliehandel (1976) ICCA, Yearbook 
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consignee/guarantor of the sale and purchase contract. The contract that was signed 
by the parties contained an arbitration clause. When disputes arose, the Italian seller 
initiated ICC arbitration against the US buyer and the Ukrainian consignee/guarantor 
for breach of contract. The US buyer and the Ukrainian consignee/guarantor did not 
respond. Following the appointment of a sole arbitrator by the ICC, the Ukrainian 
consignee/guarantor filed an objection to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. The 
Ukrainian consignee/guarantor argued that the arbitration agreement between the 
parties was invalid as it did not meet the writing requirement stipulated under 
international law and Swiss law. Also, that the ambiguous reference to the 
‘International Commercial Arbitration Court of Geneva’ rendered the arbitration 
agreement unenforceable.  
The arbitrator considered the provision of article 178 (1) of the Swiss Private 
International Law which is on all fours with article II (2) of the NYC. The arbitrator 
held that, the arbitration agreement between the parties was formally valid under 
Swiss law, and that the ambiguous reference to ‘International Commercial 
Arbitration Court of Geneva’ was a reference to ICC arbitration in Geneva. The 
arbitrator reasoned that the formal validity stipulated in article 178 (1) of the Swiss 
law is designated to serve as a ‘form of conclusion’ and not as a mere ‘form of 
evidence’. Therefore, even if one is to reach a conclusion that the contract between 
the parties (including the arbitration agreement) has not been duly signed, the 
arbitration agreement in the principal contract would still be valid in terms of form. 
This is because, what is required is not a signed arbitration agreement rather an 
arbitration agreement ‘evidenced by a text’. 
This thesis argues  (supported by the Italian Court of Appeal’s decision in Societe 
Italo-Belge pour le Commerce et I’Industrie supra) that matters concerning article II 
(1) and (2) of the NYC constitutes lex specialis, and  should therefore prevail over 
general provisions of national laws. The NYC does not require specific approval, in 
form of signature, of an arbitral clause in contracts. It is unnecessary. What is 
required is evidence of the parties’ intention to arbitrate their dispute. If a contract 
contains an arbitral clause, the clause forms part of the document. The signature of 
the parties in the contract must be deemed to apply to the arbitral clause as an 
84 
 
unequivocal manifestation of the parties’ common intention to refer their dispute to 
arbitration.
87
  
In England, section 5 of the AA 1996 requires that the arbitration agreement must be 
in writing. However, such arbitration agreement need not be signed by the parties to 
satisfy the writing requirement.
88
 This condition is interpreted broadly to satisfy not 
only clearly written arbitration clauses, but also recorded agreements in exchange of 
communications.
89
 It is sufficient if the agreement is simply evidenced in writing or 
made otherwise than in writing, incorporating general terms and conditions which 
are written.
90
 The requirement is also met if there is an exchange of submissions in 
legal or arbitral proceedings in which an arbitration agreement is alleged to exist by 
one party and not denied by the other.
91
 Such exchange of written submissions 
between the parties will amount to an arbitration agreement in writing. Finally, an 
arbitration agreement under the AA 1996 is assumed to be in writing if it is recorded 
by any means.
92
 
Unlike article II of the NYC, the provisions of section 5 of the AA 1996 arguably are 
drawn widely. It even includes circumstances where a party through its agent’s 
ostensible or actual conduct, accepts the terms of a contract incorporating an 
arbitration clause. This is illustrated in the case of Toyota Tsusho Sugar Trading Ltd 
v Prolat SRL.
93
 The applicant agreed to sell sugar to the defendant under a contract 
which contained an arbitration clause with its seat in London. The defendant 
commenced judicial proceedings in Naples alleging various breaches of contract and 
also tortious infringements. The applicant objected to the jurisdiction of the Italian 
court in reliance on the arbitration clause. Pending a determination by the Italian 
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court, the applicant commenced arbitration in London seeking payment of the 
purchase price for the sugar. The defendant objected to the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal, asserting that it had never signed any arbitration clause. On the evidence, 
the court found the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties, and 
held that the requirements of section 5 of the AA 1996 had been satisfied. The court 
reasoned that the defendant was bound by the arbitration agreement because it 
carried out the terms of the principal contract despite not signing the contract. In 
effect, what is material is the parties’ legal intention to be bound by the written 
document and not the signature. This is because signatures are not a necessary 
evidence of the content of the document but authentication of the document. Thus, 
they are not themselves a necessary condition of a valid arbitration agreement.
94
 
Furthermore, an oral agreement that incorporates the terms of a written agreement 
containing an arbitration clause will constitute an agreement in writing. This is so 
because section 5 (3) of the AA 1996 permits oral agreements insofar as such oral 
agreement incorporates written arbitration terms. It also covers an agreement by 
conduct, where one of the parties offers to contract on written terms containing an 
arbitration clause, and the other party, without expressly accepting the offer in 
writing, performs the contract in accordance with the written terms.
95
  
However, to incorporate a written term orally, such incorporation must be sufficient 
and unequivocal. In Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada v C X Re insurance 
Company Ltd.
96
, the parties agreed on a reinsurance contract that was partly oral and 
partly written. They negotiated and contracted the wording of a draft treaty, which 
contained an arbitration clause, but did not execute it. One of the issues before the 
Court of Appeal was whether the incorporation of the arbitral clause was sufficient 
and unequivocal. The Court of Appeal found that the parties’ incorporation of the 
written arbitration clause was not sufficient and unequivocal. The court also found 
from the facts of the case that the parties were yet to conclude on the arbitral clause. 
They were negotiating on the ground that execution of a formal contract was a pre-
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condition for contracting to arbitral disputes between them. Thus, the arbitration 
clause was held to be ‘null and void’. 
Under section 6 (2) of the AA 1996, a reference in a principal agreement to a 
separate written arbitration clause or to a document containing an arbitration clause 
constitutes an arbitration agreement. However, such reference must make the 
arbitration clause part of the agreement. One of the legal effects of section 6 (2) is 
that an oral agreement which incorporates written terms that provides for arbitration, 
constitutes an arbitration agreement between the parties.
97
 The incorporation of the 
agreement to arbitrate by reference must be nonetheless clear and unequivocal.
98
 
In Christian Kruppa v Alessandro Benedetti and other,
99
 a contract between the 
parties provided that, in the event of a dispute, the parties should “endeavour” to 
resolve the matter through Swiss arbitration first. Pursuant to section 9 of the AA 
1996, the defendants applied to stay court proceedings, on the grounds that the 
parties were bound to arbitrate. Mr Justice Cooke dismissed the application and held 
that the parties did not contract to refer their disputes to arbitration. The court 
reasoned that by virtue of the parties’ agreement, they were merely obliged to 
“endeavour” to resolve their dispute through Swiss arbitration. Given the wording of 
the clause, it is logically impossible to have a two-tiered dispute resolution clause 
possessing two binding elements. Accordingly, the requirement to submit to a 
binding arbitration was lacking from the agreement. Therefore, there was no valid 
arbitration agreement for the purposes of section 6 (1) of the AA 1996. 
Related to this is the issue of whether an arbitration clause can be incorporated into a 
contract by general words and the validity of such incorporation. According to van 
der Berg, a contract may reference a written arbitral clause from anywhere provided, 
the arbitration clause is effectively incorporated into the contract.
100
 Though, the 
question whether there is an effective incorporation by reference will depend upon 
the facts and interpretation of the agreement on a case by case basis. Nonetheless, 
where parties seek to incorporate terms in their earlier contracts, general words of 
incorporation will suffice in an arbitration clause from the previous contract without 
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specifically referring to it. This is evidenced in the case of Habas Sinai Ve Tibbi 
Gazlar Isthisal Endustri AS v Sometal SAL.
101
  
In Habas Sinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar Isthisal Endustri AS, the respondent through its 
agent, entered into a sale contract with the applicant. The contract contained an 
arbitration clause with London as seat and stipulated inter alia that “the rest will be 
as per previous contracts.” Between the parties, there had been 14 previous contracts. 
The applicant drafted the first 3 contracts, the 1
st
 and the 2
nd
 contracts contained 
arbitration clauses without any seat. The other 11 contracts were drafted by the 
respondent and its agent. When disputes arose, the respondent commenced arbitral 
proceedings in London and the applicant objected to the jurisdiction of the 
arbitrators. The applicant argued that the sale contract did not incorporate London 
arbitration clause in the earlier contracts drafted by the respondent. The arbitrators 
rejected the applicant’s submission and rendered an award in favour of the 
respondent. Dissatisfied, the applicant challenged the arbitral award. One of the 
issues before the court was, whether the general words of incorporation were 
effective to incorporate the arbitration clause into the sale contract. The court held 
that general words of incorporation are capable of incorporating terms which 
includes an arbitral clause without expressly referring to it, provided the parties seek 
to incorporate terms in earlier contracts between them. The court reasoned that an 
arbitration clause is not usually some kind of oppressive term to which special 
attention has to be drawn. Thus, the court dismissed the application and stated that: 
…a distinction should be drawn between incorporation 
of the terms of the earlier contracts made between the 
same parties, and incorporation of the terms of a 
contract made between different parties. In relation to 
the latter, a more restrictive approach was required. In 
such a case, it might not be evident that the parties 
intended not only to incorporate the substantive 
provisions of the other contracts, but also provisions as 
to the resolution of disputes between different parties, 
particularly if a degree of verbal manipulation was 
needed for the incorporated arbitration clause to work. 
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Those considerations did not apply to contracts 
between the same parties.
102
 
However, in contrast to excess insurance cases, a strict test of application is required. 
An arbitration clause contained in one contract will not be regarded as been 
incorporated into another contract between the same parties simply by the latter 
contract stating that it is made on the same conditions as the former. Arguably, this is 
because of the special nature of insurance contracts. The proposition is that insurance 
contracts are drawn up by insurance companies staffed with expert legal counsel to 
draft policies to serve the companies’ best interests and the insured, who usually 
without the benefit of counsel, merely adheres to it, with little or no choice as to its 
terms. Consequently, insurance companies must pay the penalty for any ambiguity it 
creates in the process.
103
 
In Trygg Hamsa Insurance Co. Ltd. V Equitas Ltd
104
 the applicant reinsured the 
respondent Lloyd’s syndicates. The primary policy contained an arbitration clause 
with London as seat. The reinsurance contract incorporated the arbitration clause in 
the primary policy. When disputes arose, the applicant reinsurer sought a stay of 
action by its excess of loss reinsured. It contended that the excess of loss insurance 
contract had incorporated the arbitration clause in the principal policy so that, the 
reinsurance dispute is subject to arbitration. The issue was whether the general words 
of incorporation in the excess of loss and reinsurance contracts were sufficient to 
incorporate the arbitration clause into the insurance contract between the parties. The 
court rejected the argument that general words of incorporation indicated an 
intention by the parties to incorporate the arbitration clause from the primary 
insurance contract. It further held that in the absence of special circumstances, 
general words of incorporation are not to be treated as sufficient for the purposes of 
section 6 (2) of the AA 1996. To incorporate arbitration clause from one contract to 
another, express reference is required. 
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According to Tweeddale and Tweeddale, case law on incorporation of arbitration 
clause is largely inconsistent in England.
105
 In some cases, it has been held that clear 
words of incorporation are needed for a valid arbitration to be upheld.
106
 Yet in other 
cases, it has been stated that express incorporation is needed because of the 
supplementary character of arbitration clauses to the principal contract.
107
 Therefore 
under English law, where parties have notice of the terms of the substantive contract 
containing the arbitration clause, general words of incorporation will suffice.
108
 
Express wording is only required when parties do not have such notice.
109
 
In Nigeria, for an arbitration agreement to come within the ambit of the ACA, the 
agreement must be in writing and relate to resolving present or future disputes by 
arbitration.
110
 Section 1 of the ACA provides: 
(1) Every arbitration agreement shall be in writing 
contained; 
(a) in a document signed by the parties; or 
(b) in an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other 
means of communication which provide a record 
for the arbitration agreements; or 
(c) in an exchange of points of claims and of defence 
in which the existence of an arbitration agreement 
is alleged by one party and not denied by 
another.
111
 
In C. N. Onuselogu Enterprises Ltd v AfriBank (Nig.) Plc.,
112
 the appellant had a 
fixed deposit account with the respondent bank, which the appellant used as 
collateral to secure an overdraft which was later increased. When dispute arose over 
                                                             
105. Tweeddale, A. and Tweeddale, K. (2010) “Incorporation of Arbitration Clauses Revisited”, 
Arbitration, Vol. 76, No. 4, p. 656. 
106. Thomas v Portsea [1912] AC 1. 
107. Seabridge Shipping A. B. v A. C. Orssleff’s Eftf’s? A/S [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Report 685. 
108. Sea Trade Martime Corp. v Hellenic Mutual War Risk Association (Bermuda) Ltd (No. 2) 
[2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 183; Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs v 
Percy International and Kier International [1998] 65 Con. L. R. 11. 
109. Trygg Hamsa Insurance Co. Ltd. V Equitas Ltd, supra note 106; Todd, P. (2014) 
“Incorporation of Charterparty terms by general words”, Journal of Business Law, No. 5, pp. 
407 – 424. 
110. Nwakoby, G. C. (2001) “Arbitration Agreement under the Act: A Critique of Stay of 
Proceedings”, UNIZIK Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 220 – 236. 
111. The provision of this section is on all fours with article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
which itself is premised on article II (2) of the NYC. 
112. [2005] 1 NWLR (Pt. 940) 577. 
90 
 
the state of the appellant’s account, both parties orally agreed to submit the dispute 
to a sole arbitrator. The arbitrator rendered an award in favour of the respondent. The 
appellant refused to honour the award and the respondent went to court to recover its 
debt against the appellant. The trial court gave judgement in favour of the 
respondent. Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. One of the 
issues before the Court of Appeal was whether, from the documents submitted by the 
parties, there was a valid arbitration agreement under the ACA. The court in 
dismissing the appeal held that an arbitration agreement under the ACA must be in 
writing, precise and unequivocal. The court then stated:  
Although, under the common law, an oral agreement 
to submit present or future differences to arbitration 
may be valid and enforceable, but section 1 (1) and (2) 
of the Act have clearly displace[d] this common law 
principle.
113
 
To satisfy the writing requirement, no particular form is necessary, save that parties 
must be ad idem.
114
 Besides the parties signing the arbitration agreement, proof of 
the existence of the arbitration agreement may be established from other documents 
related to the agreement. Such documents may be found in correspondences like 
letters, telex, telegrams, e-mails and other forms of cable or electronic 
communication between the parties. In Continental Sales v R. Shipping, 
Ogunwumiju, JCA, stated the law regarding e-mail as a form of document in writing 
thus:  
 E-mail is a form of communication that is set 
down in writing. It is not oral. The fact that it is 
electronic is immaterial. It can be downloaded 
and as real as a hard copy of a letter or mail.
115
 
Also, in Fidelity Bank Plc v Jimmy Rose Company Ltd and Mr James Eze,
116
 the 
respondents obtained a credit facility from the appellant using the 2
nd
 respondent’s 
property as collateral for the facility. When a disagreement ensued, the respondents 
on April 1, 2003 wrote a petition against the appellant to the Bankers Committee on 
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Ethics and Professionalism of the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria. On 
March 3, 2004, the respondents wrote a plea to the same Bankers Committee for the 
determination of the dispute between them and the appellant. The appellant on April 
28, 2004, responded to the petition and the plea. The appellant on May 7, 2004 
instituted a suit against the respondent at the High Court to recover its debt. While 
the suit at the trial court was still pending, the appellant filed a motion asking the 
court to recognise and enforce the final arbitration award rendered by the Bankers 
Committee as a judgement of the court. The respondent objected to the application. 
The application for the recognition and enforcement of the award was dismissed by 
the trial court on the grounds that there was no valid arbitration agreement between 
the parties. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal considered the issue whether there was a valid 
arbitration agreement between the parties as stipulated by the ACA. In their 
arguments, both parties conceded that there was no formal agreement to arbitrate 
their dispute. Nevertheless, the appellant contended that the respondent’s petition 
and plea constituted an offer to submit the dispute between them to arbitration. 
While their response to the petition and the plea was the acceptance of the offer, 
making a valid arbitration agreement by incorporation. The Court of Appeal rejected 
the appellant’s argument and held that there was nothing on the face of the 
documents referred to that suggested that the parties intended to submit their dispute 
to arbitration. Okoro, JCA, noted: 
The position of the law is that whether or not the 
arbitration agreement is a document signed by the 
parties as envisaged by section 1 (1) (a) of the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Cap. A18, 2004 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, or discoverable 
from correspondences as per Section 1 (1) (b) thereof, 
the essential prerequisite is that it must be precise and 
unequivocal. The court will hold such an agreement to 
be unequivocal if the word used is neither permissive 
nor discretionary.
117
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    3.2.3 Arbitrability of the subject matter 
For an arbitration agreement to be valid under article II (1) of the NYC, it is required 
that the subject matter must be “capable of settlement by arbitration”. To this end, a 
subject matter is arbitrable where it is not mandatorily required to be resolved under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of a national court.
118
 Nevertheless, article II do not 
stipulate the types of disputes that are capable of settlement by arbitration nor the 
law that governs the determination of the issue.
119
 This creates a gap in the NYC. To 
fill this gap, national courts may distinguish between domestic and international 
disputes. Thus, the question of whether a dispute is domestic or transnational then 
becomes significant to the determination of the issue of arbitrability. If the dispute is 
transnational, issues of arbitrability may be interpreted more liberally than in a 
domestic context. 
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.,
120
 the issue was whether 
private anti-trust claims were arbitrable under United States law. The US Supreme 
Court held that private anti-trust claims are arbitrable in international commerce. The 
court in a five-to-three decision ruled that, the issues of arbitrability should be 
interpreted more broadly in an international context than in a domestic context. The 
majority stated that if an international contract contains a broad arbitration clause, 
the US policy favouring arbitration will override its domestic public policy against 
arbitration of antitrust claims. Thus, the court stated that: 
… concerns of international comity, respect for the 
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and 
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial 
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes 
require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even 
assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming 
in a domestic context.
121
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Citing the case of Fritz Scherk v Alberto-Culver Co.,
122
 with approval, the court 
further stated that:  
 it will be necessary for national courts to 
subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to 
the international policy favouring commercial 
arbitration.
123
  
Arbitrability under the English AA 1996 and Nigerian ACA are examined in more 
details in chapter 6.  
3.2.4 Separability of the arbitration agreement  
This section raises the issue of the effect of the arbitration clause where the principal 
contract has either been terminated by performance or declared null and void. The 
relevant questions examined are whether the arbitration agreement is separate from 
the main contract under the jurisdictions examined. If yes, what is the effect of 
separability of the arbitration agreement on the enforcement of the arbitral award? 
The concept of separability posits that an arbitration clause is separate from the 
principal contract. This ensures that the validity of the arbitration agreement is not 
subject to that of the principal contract
124
. Separability implies that certain defects in 
the principal contract will not affect the arbitration agreement within it, save those 
that explicitly pertain to the arbitration agreement.
125
 Thus, the arbitration agreement 
survives even where the principal contract may have been performed, terminated or 
vitiated.
126
 It also protects the integrity of the arbitration agreement and commands a 
vital role in ensuring that the parties’ intention to arbitrate their dispute is not easily 
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defeated.
127
 Thus, Onyema summarised the justification for the independence of the 
arbitration agreement as: 
Respecting or upholding the autonomy of the parties who, having agreed 
on arbitration, do not wish to have part of their claim decided by 
arbitration and part by national courts. Where parties want this they use 
clear words limiting the scope of the arbitration agreement. This doctrine 
prevent[s] or checks the excesses of parties wishing to frustrate or delay 
the arbitral reference by pursuing claims before national courts that the 
underlying contract was void or vitiated by one factor or the other. This 
doctrine ensures that the same results are achieved whether the 
arbitration agreement is pre-dispute or post-dispute. The doctrine ensures 
that when requested to determine whether an arbitration agreement is 
valid or not, the danger of the courts going into the merits of the dispute 
is greatly reduced since this will be contrary to the purpose of arbitration 
as an alternate forum to determine and decide the issues in dispute 
between the parties.
128
 
This principle that preserves the autonomy of parties who have consented to arbitrate 
their dispute is not explicitly provided for under the NYC but can be implied.
129
 
Hence Born commented: 
… the Convention does assume that international arbitration agreement 
from the parties’ underlying contract, impliedly treats them as such, and 
sets forth substantive rules applicable only to such agreements. In so 
doing, the Convention reflects the general understanding and 
expectations of the parties to international arbitration agreements that 
such agreements are separable, but does not mandate such an 
understanding.
130
 
It appears that the provisions of article V (1) (a) of the NYC imply the independence 
of the arbitration agreement from the principal contract.
131
 Though, the article 
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stipulates an exception to the enforcement of awards,
132
 nevertheless, it contemplates 
the application of a definite national law to the arbitration agreement and an 
investigation into the validity of the agreement, distinct from the principal 
contract.
133
 Also the provisions of article II (2) of the NYC  implies the existence of 
an independent, better still a separable, agreement which is or can be separated from 
the principal agreement, if need be.
134
  
However, it is noted that there are divergent opinions as to whether the NYC 
recognises the doctrine of separability of the arbitration agreement. Some writers 
conclude that the NYC is “indifferent” to the doctrine.135 Others posit that the NYC 
adopts or at least requires the application of the doctrine by “implication”.136  Born 
believes that both positions are wrong and argued that by virtue of articles II and V 
(1) (a) of the NYC: 
…the Convention rest(s) on the premise that arbitration agreements can, 
and will ordinarily, be separate agreements and that these agreements 
therefore will often be treated differently from, and subject to different 
rules of validity and different choice of law rules than, the parties’ 
underlying contracts.
137
 
Nonetheless, there is no significant difference between Born and Schwebel’s 
positions. The only difference, if at all, is the choice of words. Therefore, this thesis 
argues that the combined effect of articles II and V (1) (a) of the NYC permit the 
separability of the arbitration agreement from the principal contract.  
English courts, approach to the rule that an arbitration agreement is distinct, self-
contained and collateral to the principal contract has long been established by case 
law in England.
138
 Thus, the agreement survives the invalidity, ineffectiveness or 
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allegation of illegality against the principal contract.
139
 Under the AA 1996, an 
arbitration agreement will remain valid notwithstanding a decision (by an arbitrator) 
that the principal contract has been terminated by performance or is null and void.
140
 
In Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation and 20 Ors v Yuri Privalov and 17 Ors
141
 
disputes arose out of charter party contracts entered into between a Russian group of 
ship owners and some charter companies. The ship owner wished to rescind the 
charter-party contracts alleging that they were secured by bribery. The charter-party 
contracts contained a ‘law and litigation’ clause that stipulated for disputes arising 
‘under’ or ‘out of’ the charter to be settled by the English courts. The contract also 
gave both parties the right to elect to have their dispute settled by arbitration in 
London. The parties chose arbitration in London and sought to proceed to arbitration 
accordingly. The ship owners sought an injunction preventing the arbitral 
proceedings. They argued that the charter-party agreements and the arbitration 
agreements had been rescinded on grounds of alleged bribery. The trial court granted 
the injunction sought by the ship owners. On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the 
appellants’ submission and reversed the trial court’s decision.  
Dissatisfied, the ship owners appealed to the House of Lords. One of the issues 
before the House of Lords was whether the invalidity or rescission of the principal 
contract also means invalidity or rescission of the arbitration agreement. The House 
of Lords upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal and emphasised the doctrine of 
separability of arbitration agreements as enshrined under section 7 of the AA 1996. 
The court further stated that an arbitration agreement can only be invalidated on 
grounds that are directly related to it, and not as a consequence of the invalidity of 
the principal contract. However, Lord Hoffmann noted that there may be 
circumstances when an attack on the principal contract means a challenge to the 
validity of the arbitration agreement. For instance, in situations where the signature 
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or the document containing the principal contract and the arbitration agreement was 
forged, or where the agent lacked the authority to contract on the principal’s behalf. 
On the facts of the case, the House of Lords held that the allegation of bribery was 
insufficient to show that the agent had been bribed into concluding the arbitration 
agreement. 
The House of Lords in Fiona Trust
142
 considered the real intention of the parties in 
entering into the arbitration agreement, which is to settle their dispute out of court. 
The decision confirmed the limited scope for challenging the validity of an 
arbitration agreement in court. If parties desire to impeach an arbitration agreement, 
a direct challenge to the arbitration agreement is required.
143
 It will be insufficient to 
attack the principal contract, except the reason for such attack is also a direct 
challenge against the validity of the arbitration agreement.
144
 Similarly, in Vee 
Networks Ltd v Econet Wireless Int’l. Ltd.,145 one of the issues for determination was 
whether a partial award was open to challenge on the ground that if the arbitrator had 
ruled the principal contract to be ultra vires, then the arbitration agreement would 
have fallen with it. The court held, applying section 7 of the AA 1996, that a ruling 
on an issue affecting the validity of the principal contract will not, by implication, 
ground a ruling on the validity of the arbitration agreement  
In Nigeria, the independence of the arbitration agreement from the principal contract 
is stipulated under section 12 (2) of the ACA, thus: 
For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, an 
arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall 
be treated as an agreement independent of the other 
terms of the contract and a decision by the arbitral 
tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not 
entail ipso jure the validity of the arbitration clause.
146
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The effect of this doctrine on arbitration in Nigeria is mandatory. Parties cannot, in 
their arbitration agreement agree otherwise.
147
 Section 12 (2) of the ACA ensures 
that the arbitration agreement survives even when the principal contract has been 
performed or repudiated
148
. It also ensures that the arbitration agreement survives 
when the principal contract comes to an end prematurely as a result of supervening 
circumstances, such as illegality or force majeure.
149
  
However, novation of the principal contract is an exception to separability. An 
arbitration agreement in an abrogated contract cannot be transferred to a new 
contract between the parties. Where a contract which contains an arbitration clause is 
novated, the arbitration clause in the old contract if not contained in the new contract 
will not bind the parties.
150
 
In M/S Young Achievers v IMS Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd.,
151
 parties by a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) titled “Exit Paper” dated 01/02/2011 
abrogated their earlier partnership contracts dated 01/04/2007 and 01/04/2010 (the 
partnership contracts). The partnership contracts contained arbitration clauses, while 
the MOU did not. When disputes arose, the respondent filed an action at the High 
Court of Delhi for the determination of the dispute. The appellant moved the court to 
stay proceedings and refer the dispute to arbitration, contending that the arbitration 
clauses contained in the partnership contracts are still valid. The High Court 
dismissed the appellant’s application and held that the arbitration clauses cannot 
survive the partnership contracts because it elapsed by reason of the new contract, 
the MoU. On appeal, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissed the 
appellant’s appeal and upheld the trial court’s ruling.  
Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of India. One of the issues 
the Supreme Court considered was whether an arbitration clause in an abrogated 
contract can be invoked in a new contract between the parties. The Supreme Court 
answered the question in the negative and, stated thus: 
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Survival of the arbitration clause…in the agreement dated 01/04/2007 
and 01/04/2010 has to be seen in the light of the terms and conditions of 
the new agreement dated 01/02/2011. An arbitration clause in an 
agreement cannot survive if the agreement containing the arbitration 
clause has been superseded/novated by a later agreement…The principle 
laid down is that if the contract is superseded by another, the arbitration 
clause, being a component part of the earlier contract, falls with it… [the] 
principle laid down by the House of Lords in Heyman v Darwins Ltd 
1942 (1) All E.R. – 337 was also relied on by this court for its conclusion 
… so far as the present case is concerned, parties have entered into a 
fresh contract … it is nothing but a pure and simple novation of the 
original contract by mutual consent. Above being the factual and legal 
position, we find no error in the view taken by the High Court.
152
 
On the contrary, in NNPC v CLIFCO Nig. Ltd,
153
 the Supreme Court of Nigeria held 
that an arbitration agreement in an abrogated contract can be invoked in a new 
contract between the same parties. The facts of the case are that the appellant 
challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitrators to render an award in an arbitration in 
which it fully participated. The appellant in a contract dated 07/10/1994 agreed to 
sell to the respondent 24 cargos of Vacuum Gas Oil (VGO contract) at the rate of 1 
cargo per month. When the appellant defaulted, the parties on 27/11/1999 novated 
the VGO contract for 19 cargos of Low Pour Fuel Oil (LPFO contract). The VGO 
contract contained an arbitration clause while the LPFO contract did not.   
When disputes arose, the parties arbitrated the dispute and the arbitrators rendered an 
award in favour of the respondent. The appellant sought to set aside the award. The 
trial court held in favour of the appellant and the award was set aside. Aggrieved, the 
respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal, Lagos Division 
set aside the part of the award which ordered the appellant to pay damages to the 
respondent, and affirmed the part which ordered specific performance of the LPFO 
contract. Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. One of the issues 
the court considered was whether the arbitrators had jurisdiction to render the award 
given the fact that the VGO contract was novated by the LPFO contract. The 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that the appellant’s failure to 
timeously raise the issue of jurisdiction before the arbitrators in accordance with 
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section 12 (3) (a) and (b) of the ACA was fatal to the appeal. On the effect of 
novation on arbitration clauses contained in abrogated contracts, the court stated: 
Novation is the substitution of a new contract for an existing one 
between the same or different parties. It is done by mutual agreement. It 
is never presumed. The requisites for novation are a previous valid 
obligation, an agreement of all the parties to a new contract, the 
extinguishment of the old obligation and the validity of the new one … 
Generally, in … agreements, where the arbitration clause is a part, the 
arbitration clause is regarded as separate. So where there is novation, 
purpose of the contract may fail but the arbitration clause survives. See 
Heyman v Darwins Ltd [1942] AC 356 … The purpose of the contract 
might have failed, but the arbitration clause which is not one of the 
purposes of the contract survives.
154
 
The court’s conclusion that where a contract is novated the purpose of the contract 
may fail but the arbitral clause survives, is not the correct position of the law in 
common law jurisdictions. All the more so, the court cited the case of Heyman v 
Darwins Ltd.
155
 It is argued (fortified by M/S Young Achievers’ case) that an 
arbitration clause cannot survive if the contract containing the clause has been 
novated by another contract without a similar clause. The justification for the non-
survival of the arbitration clause in a novated contract is the lack of arbitral consent 
between parties in the new contract. Apparently, without an agreement to arbitrate 
disputes, arbitration will not occur, even if it occurs the award will be invalid.
156
 This 
is so because as the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is material to the validity of the 
award, so is mutual consent of parties to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
157
 
It appears the Supreme Court of Nigeria did not consider Lord Macmillan’s dictum 
in Heyman v Darwins Ltd, which is very instructive. Lord Macmillan in that case 
confirmed that an arbitration clause in an abrogated contract cannot be invoked for 
determination of rights and obligations under the new contract and stated that:  
Parties to a contract may agree to bring it to an end to 
all intents and purposes and to treat it as if it had never 
existed. In such a case, if there be an arbitration clause 
in the contract, it perishes with the contract for the 
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contract which has abrogated the arbitration clause in 
the abrogated contract cannot be invoked for the 
determination of questions under the new agreement. 
All this is more or less elementary
158
 
Thus, had the Supreme Court addressed Lord Macmillan’s observation (which was 
also cited in the Indian case of M/S Young Achiever v I M Learning Resources Pvt. 
Ltd) the court would have reached a contrary conclusion. However, for now, the law 
in Nigeria remains that the arbitration agreement survives novation of the principal 
contract. 
3.3 The theories of arbitration  
The juridical nature of arbitration depends on the policy considerations of a national 
legal system. Five theories have been suggested with regard to the juridical nature of 
arbitration, namely: the jurisdictional (3.3.1), the contractual (3.3.2) the mixed or 
hybrid (3.3.3), the autonomous (3.3.4) and the concessional (3.3.5). Though, none of 
these theories has received universal acceptance, they explain the interaction 
between arbitration as a private process and the sovereignty and control of a State, 
and how the legal system of the State relates to the arbitration mechanism. 
3.3.1 The jurisdictional theory  
The thesis of the jurisdictional theory is based on the notion of the state as a 
sovereign entity. Therefore, the arbitrator derives its authority from the state, not 
from the parties’ agreement, and the lex loci arbitri regulates the arbitral process, 
procedure and award.
159
 It then follows that the exercise of judicial powers are the 
exclusive prerogative of the state.
160
 Klein argued that: 
…the state alone has the right to administer justice, so 
that if the law allows the parties to submit to 
arbitration, this institution could be exercising a public 
function …161 
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The theory emphasises the importance of the state’s regulatory and supervisory 
power over the arbitral process.
162
 In effect, the parties’ freedom to conclude a valid 
arbitration agreement, appoint arbitrator, the arbitrator’s powers and the arbitral 
proceedings need to be regulated by the municipal laws of the seat of arbitration.
163
 
According to Onyema, disputing parties can submit their dispute to arbitration only 
to the extent allowed by the law of the seat of arbitration.
164
 Thus, Mann stated: 
Whatever the intentions of the parties may be, the 
legislative and judicial authorities of the seat control 
the tribunal’s existence, composition and activities … 
The local sovereign does not yield to them except as a 
result of freedoms granted by himself.
165
  
The jurisdictional theory also contemplates arbitration as part of a single national 
legal order, especially that of the seat of arbitration.
166
 The proponents of the theory 
argue that arbitrators are a component of the state’s judiciary. Arbitrators as 
alternative arbiters to the municipal judges perform quasi-judicial functions and 
derive their authority from the state
167
. Accordingly, Lew noted: 
It follows that the arbitrator, like the judge, draws his 
power and authority from the local law; hence the 
arbitrator is considered to closely resemble a judge. 
[…] The only difference between judges and 
arbitrators is that the former derives his nomination 
and authority directly from the sovereign whilst the 
latter derives his authority from the sovereign but his 
nomination is a matter for the parties.
168
 
The effect of the jurisdictional theory on the arbitral award is that, arbitral awards are 
accorded the same status as a judgement of a municipal court judge. Recognition and 
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enforcement of the award, in the absence of voluntary performance, is executed in 
the same way as the court’s judgment in the enforcing state. In this sense, the arbitral 
award derives its legal validity exclusively from the sovereign law of the seat of 
arbitration through the court.
169
 Hence, Niboyet contended that in practice, an award: 
… is still only a draft judgement, and it only becomes 
a final judgement when the judicial authorities of the 
country in which it was rendered have adopted it by 
means of national exequatur. This exequatur gives the 
award of the arbitrator the seal of a judicial decision 
which the law accepts as final.
170
 
Though the jurisdictional theorists are not in conflict with the idea that arbitration 
has its root in the parties’ agreement, they firmly posit that arbitration occurs at all 
because the state permits it.
171
 Thus, the validity of the arbitrator’s power, arbitration 
process, procedures and award are determined by municipal law, especially of the 
seat of arbitration.
172
 Acting on the power conferred on them, either by the parties or 
by a third party empowered by the parties or by law, arbitrators do not occupy public 
office by such appointment. Therefore, arbitrators are not conferred with pre-existing 
state judicial powers, which they obtain only at the instance of the parties’ consent. 
While the jurisdictional functions and powers of the arbitrator are essentially in 
parallel to that of a judge, an arbitrator lacks the capacity to utilise the coercive 
authority of a judge. This is because the source of the arbitrator’s power is limited to 
the private agreement between the parties.  
Nevertheless, much as the jurisdictional theorists support the state’s monopoly over 
the administration of justice within its jurisdiction, their argument diminishes the 
practical effect of article V (1) (d) of the NYC.
173
 The jurisdictional theory stands in 
the way of party autonomy and over stresses the power of the state in controlling the 
arbitral process. 
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3.3.2 The contractual theory 
The contractual theory rejects the arguments of the jurisdictional theorists and 
suggests that the validity of the arbitral process, procedure and the award are wholly 
premised on the parties’ mutual agreement.174 It is the parties themselves that decide 
the system of arbitration (institutional or ad hoc) expressly or impliedly, appoint the 
arbitrator, decide the venue and time of the arbitral proceedings, regulate the 
procedure to be followed and voluntarily agree in advance to accept and carry out the 
award of the arbitrator.
175
   
The contractual theorists traverse the supremacy of the state on arbitration. They 
posit that the most central and material part of arbitration is the parties’ voluntary 
agreement to arbitrate disputes arising out of their legal relationship. According to 
Kitagawi, the State has no authority on arbitration because the whole arrangement is 
premised on the parties’ agreement.176 The resolution of private disputes by 
arbitration should not be influenced by the state. The parties’ agreement should be 
observed as final and binding on them.  A similar view is expressed by Kellor thus: 
… arbitration is wholly voluntary in character. The 
contract of which the arbitration clause is part is a 
voluntary agreement. No law requires the parties to 
make such a contract, nor does it give one party power 
to impose it on another. When such an arbitration 
agreement is made part of the principal contract, the 
parties voluntarily forgo established rights in favour of 
what they deem to be the greater advantages of 
arbitration.
177
 
The contractualists argue that because parties voluntarily agree to arbitrate their 
disputes, it follows that they also agree in advance to accept the award as having 
binding contractual force on them.
178
 The effect of this is that, the arbitral award is a 
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contract between the parties’ and not a judgement of the court. The point is 
emphasised by Niboyet in the following words: 
Arbitration awards have a contractual nature, as the 
arbitrators do not hold their power from the law or the 
judicial authorities, but from the parties’ agreement 
(arbitration agreement, submission to arbitration). The 
arbitrator decides just as the parties could have done 
by agreement; [the parties] give the arbitrators a real 
mandate to decide in their place. The award is thus 
impregnated with a contractual character, and 
[according] to the law, it appears to be the work of the 
parties, it must have, as with all agreements, lawful 
effect, and [it must] possess the authority of a final 
judgement.
179
 
Although the contractualists de-emphasise the concept of arbitration as a part of a 
single national legal order of the seat, they concede that arbitration can be influenced 
by the laws of the enforcing state.
180
 Therefore, the award having “lawful effect” and 
possessing “authority of a final judgement” implies that parties are obliged to 
voluntarily perform their obligations under the award. Failing which, the award can 
be enforced by the courts, not as a judgement of another court, but as an executed 
contract against the defaulting party.
181
 
On the status of the arbitrator as an agent of the parties, the contractualists hold 
different views. Merlin believes that arbitrators are agents of the parties’ to the 
arbitration agreement.
182
 This view is anchored on the premise that arbitrators’ 
authority is drawn from the parties’ agreement, and so they represent the parties who 
appoint them to act on their behalf. Foelix and Demangeat in support of Merlin’s 
opinion argued that the relationship between the parties and the arbitrators is private 
and not public, thus a principal and agent relationship.
183
 The parties as the principal 
while, the arbitrators are the agents.  
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However, Bernard disagreed with Merlin, Foelix and Demangeat’s positions but 
upheld the contractual nature of arbitration.
184
 He argued that though, the authority 
of an arbitrator is drawn from the parties’ agreement, the relationship between the 
parties and the arbitrator is not a principal and agent relationship. It is a relationship 
of a contract of its own kind and unique in its characteristics.
185
 Samuel described 
the relationship in the following terms: 
It is a contract sui generis, governed by rules 
appropriate to it and which must be dealt with by 
taking into account both the principles governing 
contracts in general and the particular nature of the 
function exercised by the arbitrator.
186
 
Also rejecting Merlin’s agent theory, Laine argued that the functions of arbitrators 
are contrary to that of an agent.
187
 The agent works on the principal’s behalf and in 
their best interest. The arbitrators are appointed by the parties to settle the dispute 
between them independently, rather than work for the best interest of the party who 
appointed them.
188
 
It is doubtful whether the contractual theory can be relied upon as providing any 
answer to the juridical nature of commercial arbitration. Firstly, it distorts the real 
nature of commercial arbitration by assuming that the relationship of the parties and 
the arbitrator is one of principal and agent. The crucial duty of the arbitrator to 
evaluate the claims put forward by the parties, and render a final and binding award 
on the merit is cardinal to the nature of commercial arbitration. This duty cannot be 
treated merely as a contract between the parties and the arbitrator. Thus, the contract 
theory fails to offer sufficient explanation of the responsibility of the arbitrator as an 
impartial umpire.
189
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Again, the contractual theory is faulted on the ground that it down plays the role of 
the state. This is because the contractual theory has no regard for the laws of the seat 
of arbitration as its central theme is on parties’ contract and no more. These laws 
may be mandatory procedural rules and public policy principles to which parties 
must adhere and cannot contract outside of.
190
 It is questionable whether the 
fundamental idea of the theory is plausible and adequately represents the position of 
arbitration as a viable mechanism for the resolution of commercial dispute.
191
 To this 
end, this thesis supports the view that the contractual theory is an outdated theory for 
explaining the juridical nature of arbitration because of current international 
trends.
192
 Apparently, one of such current trends is the provisions of article V (1) (e) 
of the NYC which the central thesis of the contractual theory undermines.
193
 
3.3.3 The mixed or hybrid theory 
The crux of the hybrid theory is that arbitration contains both jurisdictional and 
contractual elements. The mixed theorists contend that arbitration though contractual 
cannot be wholly separated from the state as advocated by the classical contractual 
theorists.
194
 Therefore, arbitration derives from both contractual elements, which 
makes it a private contract between the parties, and procedural elements which gives 
it a public interest requiring some supervision from the state. According to Sauser-
Hall, the two elements are ‘indissolubly intertwined’.195 
The mixed theory was propounded by Professor Surville, and brought to limelight by 
Professor Sauser-Hall in his report to the Institute de Droit International in 1952.
196
 
Professor Sauser-Hall argued that international commercial arbitration as a ‘mixed 
judicial institution, sui generis, has dual character. It is rooted in the parties’ 
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agreement and draws its jurisdictional effects from civil law’.197 Supporting the dual 
nature of arbitration, Professor Sanders argued that it would be inadequate if the 
emphasis was only based on one character of arbitration because: 
On the one hand arbitration must be based on an agreement of parties to 
arbitrate; no arbitration can take place when there is no valid agreement 
of the parties to submit their differences to arbitration. If emphasis is laid 
upon this starting point and the line is drawn further, covering as well 
arbitral procedure and the award, it leads to the contractual theory on the 
nature of arbitration. On the other hand, emphasis may be put upon the 
quasi-judicial character of arbitration. Arbitration is a judicial process. 
The arbitrators, once appointed, act as a judge. Their function is to give a 
final decision on the differences submitted to them. Their decision has, in 
principle, the same effects as a judgement of a court. The dualistic 
character of arbitration has led to the intermediary view taken by those 
who adhere to what may be called the mixed arbitration theory. The 
character of arbitration is influenced both by its contractual origin and by 
the judicial process it involves.
198
  
The notion that international commercial arbitration draws from both contractual and 
jurisdictional elements is well canvassed.
199
 The parties’ autonomy to contract an 
arbitration agreement, choose arbitrators, venues, time and the governing laws is 
based on the contractual elements of arbitration. Undeniably also, issues relating to 
arbitral proceedings, validity of the arbitration agreement, validity of the award and 
recognition and enforcement of the award are scrutinised according to the mandatory 
rules and public policy of the seat of arbitration and the enforcing state.
200
 This view 
is also supported by Redfern and Hunter, who wrote that: 
International commercial arbitration is hybrid. It begins as a private 
agreement between the parties. It continues by way of private 
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proceedings, in which the wishes of the parties are of great importance. 
Yet it ends with an award which has binding legal force and effect and 
which, on appropriate conditions being met, the courts of most countries 
of the world will be prepared to recognise and enforce. The private 
process has a public effect, implemented by the support of the public 
authorities of each state expressed through its national law.
201
 
This dual character creates a nexus between the private and public aspects of cross-
border arbitration.
202
 Accordingly, the nature of the award is viewed by the mixed 
theorists as both the result of a contract and as a judgement.
203
 Nevertheless, the dual 
nature will mean dual review of the award, one by the seat and another by the 
enforcing state. This position has been criticised by Professor Gaillard in the 
following terms: 
Even though, technically speaking, such dual review does not amount to 
the double exequatur that the drafters of the NYC intended to abolish, it 
certainly borders on it. No matter how it is labelled, this dual control is 
undoubtedly a step backwards as compared to the model in which each 
national legal order makes its own determination of the conditions under 
which it will recognise international awards, subject to the application of 
the principles agreed upon in international conventions. In a world in 
which arbitration is increasingly recognised as the normal means of 
settling international disputes, the least one could say is that such an 
accumulation of obstacles to the juridicity of arbitration is archaic and 
inopportune.
204
 
Nevertheless, the mixed theory is regarded as the closest to the juridical nature of 
arbitration. However, it is problematic to rely on the theory as providing the basis for 
the juridical nature of arbitration and its resultant award. This is so because the 
mixed theory creates a gap regarding who regulates the arbitral process. From the 
thesis of the mixed theory, it is not clear whether it is the State or the parties’ 
arbitration agreement that regulates arbitral process. Furthermore, this gap or 
complication in the regulation of arbitration is expressed by Michaels thus: 
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The problem, in a nutshell, is this: on the one hand, the 
arbitrator now fulfils the role of judge, including a 
function of global governance. On the other hand, his 
legitimacy and his mandate are limited to those of a 
service provider, which especially limits his ability for 
governance. The state, on the other hand, which would 
be competent to regulate, is deprived of this 
competency by the private arbitration agreement. So 
long as state courts cannot reach the transnational 
sphere and arbitrators do not have the legitimacy to 
regulate, we face a potential regulation deficit.
205
 
3.3.4 The autonomous theory 
The autonomous theory was advanced by Professor Rubellin-Devichi.
206
 The theory 
views international arbitration from a different perspective from the jurisdictional, 
contractual and mixed or hybrid theories. Autonomous theorists reject the 
jurisdictional and contractual theories because both theories fail to comport with 
reality and controverted each other. The autonomous theorists also reject the mixed 
or hybrid theory because of its ambiguous scope of application.
207
 The jurisdictional, 
contractual and hybrid theorists focused on the aspects of arbitration which 
correspond with municipal and international law, how the right of the parties to 
arbitrate their dispute and determine the arbitral process is restricted by the law. In 
contrast, the autonomous theorists focus on the issues of arbitration itself, such as the 
objective of arbitration, the arbitral proceedings, the function of arbitration and the 
rationale behind the functions.
208
 
The theme of autonomous theory is that the real nature of arbitration should be 
determined on the premise of its use and purpose. This is done by placing arbitration 
on a supra-national level which recognises its autonomous character.
209
 The theory 
contemplates international arbitration as an autonomous legal order – the arbitral 
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legal order. Thus, cross-border commercial arbitration should remain free from the 
restraints of municipal laws, especially that of the seat of arbitration.
210
 Considering 
the practical aspects, the existence and continuous development of arbitration which 
accord with the demands of the international commercial community, Rubellin-
Devichi argued that: 
… in order to allow arbitration enjoy the expansion it 
deserves, while all along keeping it within its 
appropriate limits, one must accept, I believe, that its 
nature is neither contractual, nor jurisdictional, nor 
hybrid, but autonomous.
211
 
The proponents of the autonomous theory maintain that arbitration was first created 
and developed by businessmen. With globalisation, the law simply sustains and 
amplifies the effects of arbitration.
212
 Therefore, the parties’ freedom to decide both 
substantive and procedural law is not premised on the jurisdictional or contractual or 
even a combination of both elements, but on the exigencies of commercial custom 
and practice.
213
 Yet, the reason why arbitration agreements and its awards are 
enforceable is not because they are just contract, or the enforcing state gives 
concession, but because businesses across the globe will not be able to engage in 
cross-border commercial transactions successfully if arbitration agreements and its 
awards are unenforceable.
214
 In effect, the theorists contend that the supremacy of 
party autonomy should be the controlling factor in international commercial 
arbitration. 
Arguing on the status of the arbitral award, the theory contemplates delocalisation or 
supra-national arbitration for the validity of arbitration and its award.
215
 In effect, the 
autonomous theorists maintain that the validity of arbitration and the arbitral award 
should be placed in a delocalised or supra-national level which recognises its 
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autonomous character.
216
 This simply means that parties’ autonomy to arbitrate their 
dispute should be respected, and the arbitration agreement and the award be 
recognised and enforced in any country without controls imposed by the state. Yu 
described delocalisation theory as it relates to the validity of the award in the 
following terms: 
With respect to the issue of validity of arbitration 
agreement and arbitral awards, in accordance with the 
delocalisation theory, the proponents of the 
autonomous theory maintain that arbitration should be 
free from restraints imposed by the laws of the relevant 
states. They also argue that the national laws of the 
place of arbitration or the place where the recognition 
or enforcement is sought should not have supervisory 
role to play in an arbitration. Furthermore, because of 
the parties’ wishes to arbitrate and the supra-national 
nature of arbitration, arbitration agreements and 
awards should be enforceable in any country.
217
 
Paulsson writing in support of delocalisation, explained the concept thus: 
The sometimes – used expression ‘floating arbitration’ 
is not entirely satisfactory, because all arbitral awards 
may, and frequently do, ‘float’ … the question is not 
so much whether an award may float … this seems 
beyond dispute … but whether it may also drift, that is 
to say enjoy a potential for recognition in one or more 
enforcement jurisdictions without being ultimately 
anchored in the national legal system of the country 
where it was rendered.
218
 
The decisions of the French Supreme Court strongly demonstrate the validity and 
their acceptance of the autonomous theory. Recently, in Ryanair v SMAC,
219
 the 
Cour de Cassation (French Supreme Court) considered an appeal against a Paris 
Court of Appeal decision. The appeal concerned whether the enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award, which involved a public procurement contract, fell within the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts as opposed to administrative courts. The Supreme 
Court overruled the Court of Appeal and held that the enforcement of a foreign 
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award, regarding public procurement, fell within the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
courts. 
Chiefly remarkable in Ryanair was the French Supreme Court’s heavy reliance on 
the fact that international arbitration is an autonomous “international arbitral order” 
thus, international arbitral awards are not connected to any national legal system. In 
effect, the Supreme Court unambiguously acknowledged the scheme that 
international arbitration is an autonomous legal order. While the famous 2007 
decision in Putrabali v Rena
220
 had recognised that an international award is not 
attached to any national legal system, this decision goes further and clearly accepts 
the existence of an independent international arbitral order, at least in France. 
One of the criticisms against the theory of delocalisation is that it has the undesired 
effect of preventing finality in arbitration.
221
 Finality in cross-border arbitration is 
cardinal to parties when electing to have their disputes settled by arbitration.
222
 
Another contention against the delocalisation theory is that it robs parties of the 
judicial assistance which guarantees the integrity of the arbitration process.
223
 The 
court is there to provide assistance and support to the arbitral process.
224
 For 
example, this can be done in enforcing the arbitration agreement and providing 
parties safeguards against arbitrators exceeding their authority. 
The view is however taken that the arguments of the autonomous theorists reflect a 
practical assessment of modern arbitration as a whole. Though, no empirical 
investigation has been carried out on this line of argument, however, Samuel 
remarked that the major problem with the  functional evaluation of arbitration is that 
empirical data which would cast some light on the functions of arbitration is limited 
and often quite unrepresentative of the arbitral community as a whole.
225
 Lately, 
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though, efforts have been made to have more representative surveys.
226
 
Notwithstanding empirical evidence, Lew, Mistelis and Kroll remarked that:  
 International arbitration has developed because parties sought a 
flexible, non-national system for the regulation of their commercial 
disputes. They wanted their agreement to arbitrate to be respected 
and enforced; they envisaged fair procedures, fashioned according 
to the characteristics of the particular case but not copying any 
national procedural system; they expected the arbitrators would be 
impartial and fair; they believed the ultimate award would be final 
and binding, and they presumed that it would be easily enforceable. 
Arbitration, organised the way they considered it appropriate, is 
how the parties have decided to determine disputes between 
them.
227
 
3.3.5 The concession theory 
The concession theory was used by Stokes to explain the full legal personality of 
corporations in modern times.
228
 The theory as it relates to company law sees the 
company as an artificial entity created by state law. From this viewpoint, the separate 
legal status of the company is regarded as a concession granted by the state.
229
 The 
theory claims that the company has no right except the state elects to grant it legal 
personality.
230
 Concession theory in effect emphasises public interest over the 
private interest of those individuals involved in the company. 
From this perspective, Yu and Sauzier adapted and applied the theory to justify the 
juridical nature of international commercial arbitration. Yu and Sauzier posit that 
though arbitration is a contract between the parties on the one hand, and the parties 
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and the arbitrator, on the other hand, the contract is developed, regulated and 
supervised by municipal laws.
231
 The law enacted typify the state’s show of 
concession of some judicial responsibility to the arbitrator to settle private disputes 
between parties. The concession as it regards to international arbitration exists by the 
consensual agreement of states acceding to international treaties and conventions, 
such as the NYC.
232
 The arguments of the concessionist extend to compliance with 
mandatory public policy requirements of either the seat of arbitration or the 
enforcing state. By this, they contend that even in an institutional arbitration, the law 
of a particular state is still relevant, whether it is applied or not. The mere fact that 
parties to the arbitration did not invoke the relevant laws will not diminish the 
relevance and existence of such laws.
233
 
The theory is distinguished from the jurisdictional theory where the state delegates 
some of its judicial powers to the arbitrator.
234
 The concession theorists argue that 
the state’s intervention is purely supportive and not intrusive. Thus, the supportive 
intervention is available to be invoked by the parties and the arbitrator before, during 
and after the arbitral proceedings.
235
 However, like the jurisdictional theory, the 
applicability of the concession theory is most apparent on the issue of arbitrability.
236
 
This is true as it is within the purview of a state to define disputes that can be 
determined by arbitration. Where parties agree to arbitrate a dispute that is not 
arbitrable, such agreement, the arbitration itself and its award may be declared 
invalid and unenforceable.
237
 
From the arguments of the concession theorists, it is difficult to clearly define the 
juridical status of the arbitral award. However, it appears that the theory supports the 
concept of ‘delocalised arbitral award’, enforceable in any jurisdiction by invoking 
the relevant laws of the enforcing states. Thus, Onyema described the theory as a 
semi-autonomous theory with the capacity of producing a semi-delocalised award, in 
the following terms: 
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…it is possible to describe the concession theory as a 
semi-autonomous theory of international arbitration, 
which [falls] short of removing international 
arbitration completely from the reach of the states to 
which it may be connected while at the same time 
recognising the effect of various limitations on party 
autonomy as it affects international arbitration.
238
 
From this viewpoint, this thesis adopts the autonomous theory because it focuses 
more on the intention of the users of arbitration (the parties) and the purpose of 
arbitration rather than whether arbitration is a part of a national legal system, the 
nature of the arbitrator’s function and the nature of the award. Furthermore, it argues 
that the autonomous theory highlights arbitration more as a flexible transnational 
procedure for dispute settlement than the other theories. The other theories highlight 
how parties’ right to submit or refer their dispute to arbitration and define the arbitral 
process is limited by national law. Thus, enforceability of arbitral award is subject to 
the decision of the national court of the seat of arbitration. This should not be, 
because as a flexible or user friendly procedure, enforceability of the award should 
not be limited by the seat’s annulment decision. Hence, if an award is annulled at the 
seat of arbitration, the successful party may still seek to enforce the award elsewhere. 
The flexibility of the procedure and the delocalisation of the award are contemplated 
under article V (1) of the NYC and arguably, one reason arbitration remains the 
preferred transnational dispute settlement mechanism.
239
 
3.4   Justification for enforcement of awards 
This section examines the policy considerations that support the enforcement of 
arbitral award in England and Nigeria. The successful party in a cross-border 
arbitration dispute expects the unsuccessful party to voluntarily comply with the 
terms of the award without delay.
240
 If the unsuccessful party fails to voluntarily 
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perform the award, the successful party may have recourse to the courts for the 
enforcement of such award.
241
  
It can be argued that the legal justification for the enforcement of arbitral award in 
England is party autonomy, which in principle reflects the autonomous theory. This 
position is underscored by the general principles of the AA 1996. Section 1 provides: 
1. The provisions of this Part are founded on the 
following principles, and shall be construed 
accordingly 
(a) The object of arbitration is to obtain the fair 
resolution of disputes by impartial tribunal without 
unnecessary delay or expense; 
(b) The parties should be free to agree how their 
disputes are resolved, subject only to safeguards as 
are necessary in the public interest; 
(c) In matters governed by this Part, the court should 
not intervene except as provided by this Part. 
Wherefore, when parties agree to refer their dispute to arbitration, the court will in 
appropriate circumstances respect their election and ensure the finality of the arbitral 
process.
242
 In Aoot Kalmneft v Glencore International A. G. and others,
243
 Colman, 
J. gave judicial approval to the policy consideration of the AA 1996 thus: 
… the twin principle of party autonomy and finality of 
awards which pervade the Act tend to restrict the 
supervisory role of the court and to maximise the 
occasion for the courts intervention in the conduct of 
arbitrations … [The] threshold for intervention by the 
court has long been recognised in the field of the 
courts’ supervisory jurisdiction as appropriately 
preserving the finality of the awards and party 
autonomy.
244
 
This statement illustrates two issues, namely: (i) that the agreement to submit to 
arbitration, the form of arbitration and the regulation of the proceedings are within 
the exclusive control of the parties; and (ii) that the legal effect of the agreement and 
enforceability of the award are subject to the Act. It is all the more so when 
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considered in the light of Lord Clarke of Stone-cum Ebony, JSC statement in 
Hashwani v Jivraj.
245
 The law and case law on this point reject absolute party 
autonomy as the driving force in arbitration and enforceability of the award. Instead, 
a balance is struck between the State’s involvement in arbitration and the parties’ 
autonomy to resolve disputes by arbitration. In effect, where party freedom stops, 
statutory and judicial supportive supervision starts or vice versa.
246
 
Like England, the enforcement of arbitral awards in Nigeria is founded on parties’ 
freedom to refer their dispute to arbitration, which also in principle reflects the 
autonomous theory. To delimit the intrusive involvement of the court where parties 
have exercised their autonomy, section 34 of the ACA is instructive. It states: “A 
court shall not intervene in any matter governed by this Act except where so 
provided in this Act.” By this provision, the court is precluded from interfering with 
arbitral proceeding, save where so provided by the ACA. Indeed by the ACA, the 
court is expected to support and ensure that parties comply with the arbitral 
process.
247
 This is evident in the case of Nigerian Agip Exploration Ltd. V Nigerian 
Petroleum Corporation and Oando Oil 126 and 134 Ltd.
248
 
In Nigerian Agip Exploration Ltd., the appellant and the respondents entered into a 
production sharing contract (PSC) in respect of Oil Prospecting Licence which was 
later converted to Oil Mining Licence. The PSC contained an arbitration clause in 
accordance with the provisions of the ACA. When disputes arose, the appellant and 
the 2
nd
 respondent issued a notice of arbitration. The appellant and the respondents 
participated fully in the arbitration proceedings and the arbitral tribunal rendered a 
partial award in favour of the appellant and 2
nd
 respondent. The tribunal ordered the 
appellant and 2
nd
 respondent to provide their updated revised damages in accordance 
with the terms of the partial award to allow the tribunal render a final award. 
Dissatisfied, the 1
st
 respondent filed an originating and ex-parte applications in the 
Federal High Court. The ex-parte application was granted. It restrained the appellant, 
2
nd
 respondent and the tribunal from taking any further steps in the arbitration 
pending the final determination of the originating application. The appellant and the 
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2
nd
 respondent applied to the court to discharge its interim order. The trial court 
dismissed the appellant and 2
nd
 respondent’s application. Dissatisfied with the trial 
court’s refusal to discharge its interim order, the appellant appealed to the Court of 
Appeal. The Court of Appeal, Abuja Division, allowed the appeal. The Court of 
Appeal held inter alia that as a general rule, the law does not permit the court to 
intervene in arbitration proceedings so as not to interfere with the parties’ agreement 
to submit their dispute to arbitration.  
Similarly, in Statoil Nigeria Ltd & anor v NNPC & 2 ors,
249
 parties entered into a 
PSC which contained an arbitration clause. When disputes arose, the 1
st
 respondent 
objected to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to determine the dispute on 
grounds of arbitrability of the subject matter. Parties to the arbitral proceedings 
including the 1
st
 respondent agreed that the tribunal should determine the preliminary 
objection and the substantive dispute in one award, instead of having a partial and 
final award differently. During the pendency of the arbitral proceedings, the 1
st
 
respondent obtained an interim order restraining parties and the tribunal from further 
conducting the arbitral proceedings. Dissatisfied with the trial court’s order, the 
appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal. In allowing the appeal and setting aside 
the trial court’s order, the Court of Appeal held inter alia, that where parties have 
elected to refer their dispute to arbitration instead of an action in the regular court, a 
prima facie duty is cast upon the court to act upon the parties’ arbitration agreement.  
It can be argued that party autonomy as a basis for enforcement of arbitral award is 
highlighted in the ACA.
250
 To this end, arbitral awards are recognised and enforced 
by Nigerian courts as a decision binding the parties and not as a judgement of the 
court.
251
 This was demonstrated in the Nigerian Supreme Court case of Ral Pal Gazi 
Construction Company Ltd. V Federal Capital Development Authority.
252
  
In that case, the appellant was awarded a contract by the respondent to construct a 
cultural centre in Abuja. The contract was later terminated by the respondent. The 
appellant sued the respondent for damages. During the pendency of the suit, the 
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parties agreed and were allowed by the court to submit their dispute to arbitration. 
The arbitrator appointed by both parties rendered an award in favour of the appellant. 
The respondent sought to set aside the award, and the trial court in its ruling held that 
the award was binding on the parties. The court further declared that “the arbitration 
award is hereby made the judgement of the court.” The respondent was aggrieved 
and appealed to the court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set 
aside the decision of the trial court which made the arbitral award a judgement of the 
court.  In its place, a judgement recognising the arbitral award as binding between 
the parties was substituted. Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Supreme 
Court. One of the issues considered by the Supreme Court was whether an arbitral 
award can be made a judgement of court. Put differently, whether the court has 
jurisdiction to convert an arbitral award into its own judgement instead of 
recognising the award as binding on the parties for purposes of enforcement. The 
appeal was unanimously dismissed and Katsina-Alu, JSC who read the lead 
judgement stated the law inter alia: 
A valid award on a voluntary reference no doubt operates between 
parties as a final and conclusive judgement upon all matters referred … 
when parties decide to take their matter to arbitration, they are simply 
opting for an alternative dispute resolution … parties have a choice to 
either go to court … or refer the matter in dispute to an arbitrator 
resolution… Arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute resolution has 
for decades been given legal backing … There is nothing in the … Act 
which empowers the court to make the arbitral award the judgement of 
the … court … the court has no power to make the arbitral award its own 
judgement … nowhere in the Act is the … court given power to convert 
an arbitration award into its own judgement …253 
It can be argued that the most important part of the Court of Appeal’s strict 
interpretation of section 34 of the ACA in the cases of Nigerian Agip Exploration 
Ltd and Statoil Nigerian Ltd. is the court’s readiness to support and respect the 
parties’ choice of private dispute settlement. Thus, in this thesis’ view, supported by 
the Supreme Court case of Raj Pal Gazi Construction Company Ltd, the validity of 
arbitral processes is hinged on the parties’ voluntary agreement and is supported by 
the State as a valid process.  
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3.5. Summary  
This chapter examined the nature of arbitration and its juridical theories. It argues 
that in principle, the autonomous theory of arbitration best represents the laws and 
attitudes of the English and Nigerian courts towards the enforcement of arbitral 
awards. This allusion is demonstrated in the discussion under 3.4 above. The next 
chapter examines English and Nigerian courts approaches to the enforcement of 
arbitral awards rendered purely on the basis of transnational rules. 
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Chapter four 
Attitudes of Courts towards enforcement of awards 
4.0. Introduction 
Having received an arbitral award, the successful party can anticipate one of three 
things to happen: (i) the unsuccessful party to the arbitration may voluntarily 
perform the terms of the arbitral award; or (ii) the unsuccessful party may fail to 
honour the award and take no active steps to resist the award; or (iii) the 
unsuccessful party may refuse to honour the award, and take active steps to resist the 
award. Where either (ii) or (iii) is the case,  the successful party may have to take 
further steps to ensure the arbitral award is recognised and/or enforced, if it is to 
enjoy the fruits of its efforts in obtaining the award. 
To this end, this chapter examines the steps open to a party to enforce an arbitral 
award rendered in its favour in the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the chapter examines 
the competent authority to recognise and enforce arbitral awards (4.1). Secondly, it 
discusses the methods of enforcement of arbitral awards available to the successful 
party (4.2). Lastly, it engages with the issue of whether an arbitral award based 
purely on transnational rules is enforceable in England and Nigeria (4.3). The aim of 
this chapter is to determine two things. First, is to ascertain whether the English and 
Nigerian courts’ policy considerations for the enforcement of arbitral awards are 
effective; and secondly, to determine both courts’ attitude towards the enforcement 
of transnational arbitral awards. 
4.1. The competent authority 
Generally, aside from making an order authorising the successful party to enforce the 
award, the arbitrator lacks power to enforce its award. In simple terms, an arbitrator 
becomes functus officio once it renders a final award.  Thus, if the unsuccessful party 
fails to voluntarily comply with the award, the successful party may seek to enforce 
the award against the unsuccessful party. To enforce the award against the 
unsuccessful party, the successful party must bring its application before a competent 
authority where the unsuccessful party has assets. So the questions that then arise 
are: what (or who) is the competent authority (4.1.1) and its role towards the 
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enforcement of awards (4.1.2). This section also examines the powers of the 
competent authority (4.1.3). 
4.1.1. What (or who) is the competent authority? 
The NYC is silent on what or who the competent authority is. It only makes 
reference to the term ‘the competent authority’ in article V (1) of the Convention: 
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be 
refused, at the request of the party against whom it is 
invoked, only if the party furnishes to the competent 
authority where the recognition and enforcement is 
sought, proof that...
1
 
Arising from this silence, the competent authority varies from country to country. In 
some countries, the competent institution is the court (the judiciary) while in others, 
it is a public office or official.
2
 For example, in Saudi Arabia, the competent 
authority with jurisdiction to enforce foreign awards is the Enforcement Judge.
3
 
However, in most countries, it is the courts that are empowered to recognise and 
enforce foreign arbitral awards. In some countries different courts have jurisdiction 
over foreign and domestic awards. For example, in Belgium and Oman, the same 
courts have powers to enforce both foreign and domestic awards
4
   in Egypt and 
Qatar, the competence is vested in different courts.
5
 
In England, pursuant to section 105 of the AA 1996, the competent authority to hear 
applications for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is either the High Court 
or the County Court.
6
 Civil Justice in England and Wales is primarily dealt with in 
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the County Courts and, in matters involving substantial or complex issues, the High 
Court.
7
 The civil jurisdiction of the High Court is vested in the Queen’s Bench 
Division (Civil) and the Chancery Division. The Queen’s Bench Division (Civil) 
includes the Commercial Court, the Admiralty Courts; and the Technology and 
Construction Court. The Chancery Division includes; the Bankruptcy and 
Companies Court, the Patents Court, Chancery Chambers (Masters), and the 
Intellectual Property and Enterprise Court.
8
 Actions in respect of arbitrations are 
heard at first instance by the Commercial Court, usually with a right of appeal to 
Court of Appeal and ultimately the Supreme Court. The commercial court hears 
complex matters concerning business disputes, both national and international.
9
 
In Nigeria, by virtue of section 57 (1) of the ACA, the competent authority is the 
High court. The section stipulates that: 
  unless otherwise stated, court in the context of 
the Act means the High Court of a State, the 
High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, 
Abuja or the Federal High Court, and “Judge” 
means a judge of the High Court of a State, the 
High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, 
Abuja, or the Federal High Court.
10
 
However, the question that arises is whether the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal 
High Court under section 251 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) precludes the 
jurisdiction of the High Court of a State or the High Court of the Federal Capital 
Territory, Abuja,  in matters included in the section which is the subject matter of an 
arbitration. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
of the Order, actions under the AA may be commenced and heard in the Central London 
County Court Business List. This jurisdiction is regulated by the provisions of article 5 (2) 
(3) (4) and (5) of the Order. Article 6 of the Order empowers the judge in charge of the 
commercial list to transfer proceedings under AA to another list, court or Division of the 
High Court to which the judge has power to transfer proceedings ad where such transfer is 
made, the proceedings may be taken in that list, court or Division of the High Court as the 
case may be. 
7. https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-thejudiciary/the-justice-system/jurisdictions/civil-
jurisdiction [Accessed on 23/09/2016]. 
8. County Courts deal with contract and tort (civil wrong) cases and recovery of land actions. 
Some County Courts can also deal with bankruptcy and insolvency matters, as well as 
matters concerning wills and trust, equity and contested probate cases, where the value of the 
trust, fund or estate is less than £30,000.01, actions under the Race Relations Act 1976, and 
matters which parties agree to be heard in a County Court. 
9. The Work of the Commercial Court is regulated by Part 58 of the Civil Procedure Rules 
10. Section 57 (1) of the ACA. 
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In Adeoye Magbagbeola v Temitope Sanni,
11 the respondent pursuant to an 
arbitration agreement between him and the appellant brought an application under 
section 7 (2) (b) of the ACA at the High Court of Lagos State for the appointment of 
a sole arbitrator. The appellant filed a notice of preliminary objection challenging the 
jurisdiction of the court to entertain the matter on grounds that the court lacked 
competence to decide issues concerning the running and sharing of profits of 
companies incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990. In his 
ruling, the trial Judge held that the preliminary objection calls for the examination of 
the provisions of sections 251 (1) (e) and 272 (1) of the 1999 Constitution (as 
amended). The court then held that it has jurisdiction to hear and determine the 
applicant's claim. Accordingly, the preliminary objection was dismissed. The court 
reasoned that there is nothing in the above sections of the Constitution which says 
that the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator. The 
substantive claim seeks the appointment of an arbitrator and a State High Court or 
Federal High Court has jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator. The appellant’s appeal 
to the Court of Appeal was also dismissed and the trial court decision upheld. 
Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court which also dismissed the 
appeal and stated that by virtue of section 57 of the ACA, both the State High Court 
and the Federal High Court have jurisdictions to hear and determine applications in 
any matter governed by the ACA.  
Thus, the competent authority with jurisdiction to hear arbitration applications at first 
instance is either the High Court of a State, the High Court of the Federal Capital 
Territory, Abuja or the Federal High Court, with a right of appeal to the Court of 
Appeal and finally to the Supreme Court.
12
 
4.1.2. The role of the ‘competent authority’ 
The issue to determine under this section is the extent of the role of the competent 
authority. This issue is examined in two fold thus: whether the competent authorities 
can enforce transnational commercial arbitral awards as a matter of discretion, and 
                                                             
11. [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 267) 1367. 
12. Onyema, E. (2010) “Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Sub-Sahara Africa”, Arbitration 
International, vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 115 – 137; Nwkoby, G. C. (2004) “The Courts and Arbitral 
Process in Nigeria”, Unizik Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 21 – 37. 
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whether the competent authorities are allowed to re-examine the subject matter of the 
arbitration which has been determined by the arbitrator. 
According to van den Berg, under the NYC, the accepted interpretation is that the 
competent authority before which enforcement is sought may restrain from 
reviewing the merits of an arbitral award.
13
 This principle according to Born: 
… is an almost sacrosanct principle of international 
arbitration that the court will not review the substance 
of arbitrator’s decisions contained in foreign arbitral 
awards in recognition proceedings.
14
  
The explanation for such interpretation is the explicit provision of article V of the 
NYC, which makes no reference to a review of an award as a ground for refusing 
enforcement of the arbitral award. Thus, van den Berg argues that a competent 
authority may only refuse enforcement of foreign arbitral award based upon the 
limited grounds under article V of the NYC, which does not include a review of the 
merits of the arbitral award.
15
 Consequently, a competent authority engaging in a 
review of the merits of a foreign arbitral award may diminish the essence of the 
NYC, which is to facilitate recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
globally.
16 This is because such review may result in a protracted process and also 
involve a review of the merits of the underlying dispute. 
The rule that a competent authority may not review the substance of an arbitral 
award in enforcement proceedings is illustrated in Open Type Joint Stock Company 
Efirnoye-EFKO (Russian Federation) v Alfa Trading Ltd. (Malaysia).
17
 The parties’ 
contract provided that disputes would be resolved by arbitration under the 
International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and 
                                                             
13. van den Berg, A. J. (1981) The NYC of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation, 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, The Hague, pp. 265, 269 – 273; Blackaby, N., et al 
(2009) Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 5h ed., Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, p. 638. 
14. Born, B.B. (2014) International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd ed., vol. III, Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands, p. 3707. 
15. van den Berg, A. J. (1981) at p. 269. 
16. Davidson, F. P. (2012) Arbitration, 2nd ed., W. Green, Edinburgh, p. 392; Garnett, R., et al 
(2000) A Practical Guide to International Commercial Arbitration, Oceana TM Publications, 
New York, pp. 130 – 131. 
17. (2012) Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 264-267; MK2 S.A (France) v 
Wide Pictures, S. L (Spain) (2012) Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 
297 – 299; Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v Saint Paul Fire and Marine Insurance 
Company & 2 ors. (2012) Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 368 – 372. 
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Industry of Ukraine (ICAC of Ukraine), if the claimant were the defendant, and at 
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation (ICAC of 
Russia), if the claimant were the plaintiff. When disputes arose, the defendant 
commenced arbitration at the ICAC of Ukraine. While the arbitral proceeding was 
pending, the plaintiff commenced another arbitration at ICAC of Russia.  
Initially, the defendant objected to the ICAC of Russia proceedings contending that 
the arbitral panel lacked jurisdiction because of the pending ICAC of Ukraine 
arbitration. Nonetheless, the defendant later filed a counterclaim in the ICAC of 
Russia proceedings. The ICAC of Russia panel held that they had jurisdiction to hear 
the dispute before them, and rendered an award in favour of the plaintiff (the Russian 
award). The ICAC of Ukraine panel also rendered an award in favour of the 
defendant (the Ukraine award). The defendant applied to set aside the Russian award 
at the Moscow Arbitrazh (Commercial) Court, the application was rejected. The 
plaintiff then sought recognition and enforcement of the Russian award in the High 
Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
The court granted enforcement of the Russian award and rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the arbitration had not been in accordance with the parties’ agreement. 
On the defendant’s argument that it was the first to file a claim with ICAC of 
Ukraine under the contract, the court noted that the issue had already been raised in 
the proceedings before the ICAC of  Russia and ICAC of  Ukraine and an award 
rendered on the issue. Thus, the court stated that its function at the enforcement stage 
is not “to re-hear or re-assess” the award.  
However, the rule that a competent authority may not subject an arbitral award to a 
review on the merits is not unfettered. The competent authority may re-examine the 
award for purposes of substantiating the grounds for refusal of recognition and 
enforcement as listed in article V of the NYC.
18
 For example, if a party under article 
V (1) (c) of the NYC claims that enforcement should be refused because the award 
dealt with an issue not contemplated by the terms of the arbitration, a competent 
authority may have to scrutinise the award in order to determine the validity of such 
                                                             
18. van den Berg (1981) at p. 270; 
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a claim.
19
 Nevertheless, the court is not precluded from reviewing whether the 
arbitrator has exceeded the limits of its authority and, in particular, the arbitrator’s 
competence, which has to be done in an autonomous and independent manner.
20
 
In England, there are no stipulations under the AA 1996 that the court is permitted to 
re-examine facts determined by an arbitrator.
21
 Nonetheless, the Act allows parties to 
agree to the review of an arbitral award for errors of law. Thus, a party to arbitral 
proceedings may upon notice to the other party and the arbitrator, appeal to the court 
on a question of law arising out of an award rendered in the proceedings.
22
  
The reason for non-re-examination of the merits of an award touches on the issue of 
finality of the arbitral award.
23
 A fundamental policy of the AA 1996 is that once 
parties have agreed to arbitrate their dispute, the court should give effect to that 
decision and the resulting award.
24
 This point was stressed in Aoot Kalmneft v 
Glencore International A G & anor
25
 where Colman, J stated that the policy of the 
AA 1996 is to preserve party autonomy, (as well as autonomy of the arbitration 
agreement) and ensure the finality of the arbitral award.
26
 
According to Zuleta, another justification for non-re-examination of the merits of an 
award is the doctrine of res judicata. Like judgements delivered in national courts, a 
final and binding arbitral award has a res judicata effect.
27
 Short of the arbitral 
                                                             
19. This point was demonstrated by the Italian Corte di Apello, Civil Section, of Trento (Court 
of Appeal of Trento), in General Organisation of Commerce and Industralization of Cereals 
of the Arab Republic of Syria v S. p. a SIMER (Societa delle Industrie Meccaniche di 
Rovereto (Italy) (1983) Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, vol. VIII, pp. 386 – 393. In that 
case, the respondent argued that the arbitrators had exceeded their authority by deciding on 
“technical” disputes contrary to the parties’ arbitration agreement that such “technical” 
disputes would be resolved according to the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber 
of Commerce in Paris. The court noted that, a court deciding on the enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award is not allowed to review the merits of the award. 
20. van den Berg, A. J. (1981) at p. 387. 
21. Sections 66 and 101 of the AA 1996. 
22. Section 69 (1) of the AA 1996; Johnson, A. (1999) “Illegal Contracts and Arbitration 
Clauses”, International Arbitration Law Review, vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 35 – 37; Ahmed, M. 
(2010) “Arbitration Clauses: Fairness, Justice and Commercial Certainty” Arbitration 
International, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 409 – 420. 
23. Section 1 (c) of the AA 1996; Johnson, A. (1999), p. 36. 
24. The Department Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law Report on the Arbitration Bill 
(Report of February 1996) paras. 273 – 283. 
25. [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 128 at pp. 136 – 140.  
26. The Department Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law Report on the Arbitration Bill, pp. 
136 – 140. 
27. Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100; Zuleta, E. (2011) “Post-Award Advocacy: The 
Relationship Between Interim and Final Awards – Res Judicata Concerns”, in van den Berg, 
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award being vacated, the same issues submitted to arbitration cannot be re-arbitrated 
or re-litigated between the same parties or their privies.
28
 Thus, the doctrine of res 
judicata judicially puts an end to repetitious litigation or arbitration. However, res 
judicata or finality of the award does not constitute a preclusion of parties’ statutory 
right to appeal in relation to a question of law under section 69 of the AA 1996.
29
 
In Shell Egypt West Manzala GmbH & anor. v Dana Egypt Ltd.
30
, the claimant, 
under a Cooperation Agreement, was to acquire from Centurion (the defendant’s 
predecessor in title) a 50 per cent interest in the concessions for two crude oil and 
gas explorations in the Nile Delta. The contract referred to arbitration under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules with a clause that “the decision of the majority of the 
arbitrators, rendered in writing, shall be final, conclusive and binding on the 
parties…” The arbitrators rendered their award in favour of the defendant and the 
claimant sought permission to appeal against the award under section 69 of the AA 
1996. The defendant applied for an order that the court had no competence to grant 
the permission because parties had otherwise agreed that there should be no right of 
appeal. The court dismissed the defendant’s application and granted the claimant’s 
application for permission to appeal the award on point of law under section 69. The 
court reasoned that the texts “final, conclusive and binding”, as it appeared in the 
context of the parties’ agreement, was not to be interpreted as an agreement 
precluding the parties’ right of appeal regarding a point of law under section 69. 
Nonetheless, there are circumstances which may require an enforcing court to re-
examine the merits of an arbitral award. One of such circumstances is where the 
arbitrator has made or ignored an obvious error which is clear from the arbitral 
award itself. Another is where illegality or fraud (serious irregularity) is apparent 
from the award.
31
 Others are where the arbitral award is contrary to international 
                                                                                                                                                                            
A. J (ed.) Arbitration Advocacy in Changing Times, Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, pp. 231 – 274. 
28. Brekoulakis, S. (2006) “The Effect of an Arbitral Award and Third Parties in International 
Arbitration: Res Judicata Revisited” American Review of International Arbitration, Vol. 16, 
No. 1, pp. 177 – 209. 
29. Roodt, C. (2012) “Border Skirmishes Between Courts and Arbitral Tribunals in the EU: 
Finality in Conflicts of Competence”, in Bonomi, A. and Romano, G. P. (eds.), Yearbook of 
Private International Law, Vol. 13, 2011, Seller European Law Publishers, pp. 91 – 144. 
30. [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 109. 
31. Lu, M. (2006) “The NYC on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: 
Analysis of the Seven Defences to Oppose Enforcement in the United States and England”, 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 747 – 785. 
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public policy or obtained contrary to the rules of natural justice.
32
 The justification 
for re-viewing the merits of an award on these grounds is not for the sake of the 
parties, but the court’s inherent responsibility to preserve the integrity of its process, 
and to ensure that it is not abused.
33
 These concerns cannot be overridden by parties’ 
private agreement or the fact that an arbitral award is final and binding as illustrated 
in the Court of Appeal cases Soleimany v Soleimany
34
 and Westacre Investment Inc. 
v Jugoimport – SPDR Holding Co. Ltd & Ors.35 
In both cases, the cardinal issue was whether an enforcing court is allowed to re-
examine the merits of an award, and if yes, what must the court consider? In 
Soleimany the Court of Appeal stated that there are circumstances in which an 
English court could go behind an arbitral award to review the merits of the award. 
One of such circumstances is where public policy is involved. Hence, the final and 
binding element of an arbitral award cannot insulate the award from the illegality 
which gave rise to it.
36
 In Westacre Investment Inc Waller, LJ stated: 
There are authorities which in my view support the 
proposition that where illegality is raised and at least 
where evidence of illegality is so strong that if not 
answered it would be decisive of the case, the court 
would not allow reliance on issue estoppel, or on the 
principle in Henderson v Henderson to prevent the 
point being ventilated. In other words, illegality can if 
raised provide the special circumstances in which an 
estoppel will not provide a defence.
37
 
Another question to consider is whether an English court could be allowed to re-
examine the merits of an award where the arbitrator has determined the issue of 
illegality, and found that there was none, or render a non-speaking award without 
been asked to give reasons. After a lengthy consideration of the authorities, Colman 
J in Westacre Investment Inc v Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co. Ltd stated that it: 
                                                             
32. Halsbury’s Law of England, IV ed., Vol. 8, paras. 6 – 8. 
33. Per Waller L. J in Soleimany v Soleimany [1998] EWCA Civ 285; [1999] QB 785 at p. 800; 
Maurer, A. G. (2013) The Public Policy Exception under the New York Convent: History, 
Interpretation and Application, (Revised Edition), JurisNet Publishing, New York, pp. 86 – 
96. 
34. [1998] EWCA Civ 285; [1999] QB 785. 
35. [1999] EWCA Civ 1401; [2000] QB 288. 
36. Soleimany v Soleimany [1998] p. 800. 
37. Westacre Investment [1999] p. 311. 
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Depends upon whether the nature of the illegality is such that, in the case 
of statutory illegality the statute has the effect of impeaching that 
agreement as well as the underlying contract, and, in the case of illegality 
at common law, public policy requires that disputes about underlying 
contract should not be referred to arbitration.
38
 
In Soleimany v Soleimany,
39
 Waller LJ endorsed this passage and further stated that: 
The difficulties arise when arbitrators have entered upon the topic of 
illegality, and have held that there was none or perhaps they have made a 
non-speaking award, and have not been asked to give reasons. In such a 
case, there is a tension between the public interest that the awards of 
arbitrators should be respected, so that there be an end to lawsuits, and 
the public interest that illegal contracts should not be enforced. We do 
not propound a definitive solution to this problem…if there is a prima 
facie evidence from one side that the award is based on an illegal 
contract, should inquire further to some extent. We do not for one 
moment suggest that the judge should conduct a full-scale trial of those 
matters in the first instance. That would create the mischief which the 
arbitration was designed to avoid. The judge has to decide whether it is 
proper to give full faith and credit to the arbitrator’s award. Only if he 
decides at the preliminary stage that he should not take that course does 
he need to embark on a more elaborate inquiry into the issue of 
illegality.
40
 
Therefore, it seems that if there is prima facie evidence of illegality of the principal 
contract, the enforcing judge will engage in a preliminary inquiry to determine 
whether the arbitral award should be accorded full faith and credit. A full-scale 
inquiry is only necessary if the enforcing judge decides not to give the award full 
faith and credit. However, more importantly, an enforcing judge should be concerned 
in the first instance with enforcing an award before it than otherwise. But if the 
award refers on its face to an illegality which the enforcing judge considers as being 
contrary to public policy, the court will not enforce such award. 
Again, the reason upon which a court may review the merits of an award as found in 
Westacre Investmnet Inc.
41
 is a balancing exercise between the competing public 
interests of finality and illegality. There are some factors the judge must consider 
when it engages in such balancing exercise before arriving at a conclusion of 
                                                             
38. [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 111 at p. 112. 
39. [1998] EWCA Civ 285. 
40. Soleimany v Soleimany [1998] p. 800. 
41. [1999] EWCA Civ1401. 
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whether to re-examine the merits of the award or not. These factors include but are 
not limited to, the nature of the illegality, the weight of the alleged illegality, the 
strength of the case in which there was illegality, and the measure to which it can be 
held that the alleged illegality was addressed by the arbitrator.
42
 Nonetheless, the 
illegality must be sufficiently strong to override the presumption in favour of the 
public interest of the finality and enforceability of the arbitral award. A strong case 
will exist where the alleged illegality is of a kind which is globally excoriated, such 
as human trafficking, corruption, terrorism. However still, less strong cases will be 
where the principal contract is legal in the place of performance, but unlawful in 
England.
43
 
Nigerian courts are also not empowered to re-examine the merits of arbitral awards. 
There is no provision in the ACA which permits a court to reopen issues of facts 
(and or law) resolved by an arbitrator.
44
 The non-re-examination of the merits of the 
award by the courts at this stage accords with the cardinal policy of the ACA that, a 
court shall not interfere in any matter regulated by the Act save where so stipulated 
by the Act itself.
45
 One of the effects of section 34 of the ACA is to ensure that a 
valid arbitral award on a voluntary submission operates between parties as a final 
and conclusive judgement of all issues submitted to arbitration.
46
 
The doctrine of res judicata also accounts for the non-re-examination of the merits 
of an arbitral award in Nigeria. The law is that parties to the proceeding are 
prohibited from arguing the same issues in future proceedings between the parties 
over the same subject matter. In Oyeroba v Olaopa,
47
 the court held that issue 
estoppel will arise in respect of matters which were raised, or ought to have been 
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raised in the former proceedings but were not raised. It also applies to issues raised 
but not expressly determined as such matters are deemed to have been determined by 
implication and therefore res judicata. 
From the provisions of section 31 of the ACA, it can be implied that an arbitral 
award has the same effect as a court judgement. The provisions of section 31(1) and 
(3) of the ACA is to the effect that an arbitral award shall be recognised as binding 
and may be enforced in the same manner as a court judgment or order. Like a court 
judgement, a valid arbitral award disposes of all issues between the parties that are 
submitted to arbitration. If a party sues on the same issues that have been disposed of 
by arbitration and on the same cause of action, the court will dismiss the action on 
the ground that the issues are res judicata on the basis of issue estoppel.
48
  
In Aye-Fenus Ent. Ltd. v Saipem Nig. Ltd,
49
 parties entered into a frame contract 
which contained an arbitration clause.  When disputes arose, the parties referred the 
matter to arbitration. The arbitrators rendered a consensus award in favour of the 
appellant. While the appellant sought the leave of court to enforce the award against 
the respondent, the respondent filed a motion on notice for an order of court for 
extension of time within which to apply to set aside the arbitral award. The 
respondent’s application was premised on the grounds inter alia that parties were not 
ad idem on the subject matter of the arbitration. The trial court refused the 
appellant’s application for leave to enforce the award on grounds that the arbitral 
proceedings and the award were improperly procured and thus, granted the 
respondent’s application to set aside the award. On appeal, Kekere-Ekun JCA in the 
lead judgement relied on the Supreme Court case of Ras Pal Gazi Construction 
Company v FCDA
50
 and stated that:  
By virtue of Section 34 of the ACA, a court shall not 
intervene in any matter governed by the Act except 
where so provided in the Act. If, in an arbitration 
proceeding, an issue is raised for decision and has been 
decided, that makes it final. The parties cannot be 
allowed thereafter to re-open it. The reason is that just 
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as the parties would not be allowed to do so in the case 
of a judgement not appealed from, the point so decided 
is res judicata. The only jurisdiction conferred on the 
court is to give leave to enforce the award as a 
judgement unless there is a real ground for doubting 
the validity of the award.
51
 
From the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court judgements above, it is not clear 
what constitutes “a real ground for doubting the validity of the award.” Thus, it is 
suggested that illegality, fraud, serious irregularity, or non- arbitrability of the 
subject-matter, that is apparent on the face of an award will constitute ‘a real ground 
for doubting the validity of the award.’ This view is fortified by the English Court of 
Appeal cases of Soleimany and Westacre cited above as persuasive authorities. 
Nevertheless, the implication of sections 31(1) and (3) and 34 of the ACA together 
with the Nigerian appellate courts’ statements in Aye-Fenus Ent. Ltd. v Saipem Nig. 
Ltd; and Ras Pal Gazi Construction Company v FCDA, are that the courts are not 
allowed to re-examine the merits of an award, except there is ‘a real ground for 
doubting the validity of the award.’ Hence, it remains to be seen what the Nigerian 
courts will designate ‘a real ground for doubting the validity of an award’ and thus, 
permit a re-examination of the merits of an award.  
4.1.3. Residual powers of the competent authority in England and Nigeria 
The text of article V (1) of the NYC indicates that recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards is at the discretion of the competent authority. The text provides that:  
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be 
refused, at the request of the party against whom it is 
invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent 
authority where the recognition and enforcement is 
sought…52 
According to Smith, the word “may” under article V of the NYC implies that a court 
must not necessarily grant an application for the non-enforcement of an arbitral 
award.
53
 Accordingly, Redfern and Hunter noted that the text of article V (1) is 
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permissive and not mandatory.
54
 Such discretion according to Alfons enables a 
competent authority to uphold the pro-enforcement bias of the NYC, though in many 
cases where a ground for refusal is established, the discretion is unlikely to be 
exercised in favour of recognition and enforcement.
55
 This interpretation appears to 
be widely accepted by both common law and civil law commentators.
56
 
However, notwithstanding this interpretation, some countries have adopted a 
different view. This may be attributed to the difference in the official translation of 
the NYC.
57
 For example, the same text is read in French as “… ne seront refusee 
…que si …” (interpreted as “will only be refused if”). In German, it is read as 
“shall”. Therefore, the competent authorities in those countries are precluded from 
exercising any discretion in respect of the same article V of the NYC. Nevertheless, 
according to Hass, they are allowed, pursuant to the effect of the text, to exercise 
their discretion in relation to granting leave for recognition and enforcement.
58
 For 
Paulsson, to accomplish the aim of the NYC, which is to facilitate the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, competent authorities must exercise the 
discretion necessary to enforce awards.
59
 However, if there are serious oppositions to 
enforcement and a ground for refusal is established, competent authorities should 
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decline enforcement. In doing so, according to Sampliner and this thesis agrees, the 
ends of justice and the objective of the NYC are met.
60
  
This conclusion leads to an examination of when this discretion should be exercised. 
This is important because the NYC does not provide guidelines on how it should be 
exercised.  
Di Pietro and Platte have suggested three ways by which a competent authority can 
exercise the discretion.
61
  Firstly, the discretion can be exercised pursuant to article 
VII (1) of the NYC which provides: 
The provisions of the present Convention shall not 
affect the validity of multi-lateral or bilateral 
agreements concerning the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by 
Contracting States nor deprive any interested party of 
any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral 
award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the 
law or the treaties of the country where such award is 
sought to be relied upon.
62
 
According to the authors, the text of article VII (1) provides for recognition and 
enforcement under the national law or another treaty in the country where 
enforcement is sought if such law or treaty is more favourable than the NYC. In 
effect, the more favourable law will override the rules of the NYC. An example is 
where a competent authority may exercise its discretion to recognise and enforce an 
award that has been annulled at the seat of arbitration.
63
 Secondly, the competent 
authority may rely on the doctrine of estoppel and waiver, regardless of whether one 
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of the grounds under article V (1) was established.
64
 Thirdly, a competent authority 
can rely on the distinction between domestic public policy and transnational public 
policy, even where a ground under article V (1) was satisfied. Thus, an award may 
offend domestic public policy, but not violate transnational public policy.
65
 
With regards to England, the word “may” in the text of sections 66 and 103 of the 
AA 1996 is to the effect that the Court has discretion to either enforce an award by 
leave of court, in the same respect as a judgement, or as an order of the court.
66
 It 
also implies the courts’ discretion to refuse enforcement even where a ground for 
refusal is established by the unsuccessful party in the arbitration. The exercise of this 
discretion depends on the merit of each case and whether the court deems it 
appropriate to enforce or not to enforce the award as illustrated in Soleimany and 
Westacre. 
Section 103 of the AA 1996 stipulates grounds upon which the court may refuse to 
grant leave to enforce a NYC award. Accordingly, even if the unsuccessful party in 
the arbitration establishes a ground for refusal as contained in subsection 2 (a) to (f), 
the court may still enforce the arbitral award. However, according to Mustill and 
Boyd, the approach of the court will necessarily depend on whether subsection (2) or 
(3) is applicable.
67
 This is because under subsection (2), the court is weighing, at a 
distance, the repercussion of things which are said to have gone wrong at the seat of 
the arbitration. On the other hand, the intent of subsection (3) is to stipulate avenues 
of protecting the specific interest of the State of which the court is an integral part.
68
 
According to Clarkson and Hill, in exercising its discretion under subsection (3), the 
court is persuaded by an argument whether or not the award is in regard to a dispute 
which is not arbitrable, or whether or not it would be contrary to the public policy of 
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England to recognise or enforce the award.
69
 However, Lord Collins and others 
opine that the court’s discretionary power to refuse enforcement where one of the 
grounds under section 103(2) and (3) is established is not open-ended.
70
 
Accordingly, Zaiwalla and Mayer respectively explained that the court in exercising 
its discretion under article V of the NYC will balance the interests between 
upholding the arbitral award as final and binding on the parties and protecting the 
public policy interest of the State.
71
 
4.2. Procedures for enforcement of arbitral awards 
Having identified the competent authority to determine an application for the 
enforcement of an arbitral award, this section examines the issue of the assignment 
of enforcement to the lex fori under the NYC (4.2.1.), the methods of enforcement of 
arbitral awards in England (4.2.2.) and Nigeria (4.2.3.), the time limit to enforce 
awards (4.2.4.) and evidential documents (4.2.5.) necessary for such enforcement. 
This section interrogates whether those procedures are adequate and capable of 
ensuring the enforcement of transnational commercial arbitral awards in England and 
Nigeria. 
4.2.1. Enforcement under the lex fori 
Article III of the NYC contains the key provision that Contracting States shall 
recognise arbitral awards as binding. Article III permits the lex fori (the enforcing 
court) to apply its own rules of procedure for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards.
72
 However, enforcing courts are mandated to recognise 
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them under the conditions set out in the 
NYC.
73
 The affirmative obligation is evidenced by the use of the word “shall”. 
Hence, Contracting States are obliged to recognise and enforce arbitral awards, save 
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where the conditions in article IV are not satisfied or one of the exceptions in article 
V applies.
74
 
4.2.2. Methods for enforcement in England 
The procedure for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is dependent 
upon where the award was rendered and the arbitration law that applied.
75
 The 
procedure for enforcement can be by an action on the award at common law (i) and 
by summary procedures (ii). Enforcement by an action on the award at common law 
is not regulated by legislation. However, enforcement by summary procedure is 
regulated by legislation. In National Ability SA v Tunna Oils & Chemicals Ltd (The 
Amazon Reefer)
76
 Thomas LJ of the Court of Appeal stated this point thus: 
It is necessary to say a little more about the two 
methods of enforcing awards obtained under the 
Arbitration Act 1950 (which continue to apply under 
the Arbitration Act 1996). (i) Enforcement of an award 
by action is by an ordinary action brought in the High 
Court. The procedure is not subject to any statutory 
provision, but it has long been established at common 
law as an action founded upon the implied promise to 
pay the award. It is given statutory recognition in 
section 66 (4) of the 1996 Act. (ii) Enforcement of the 
award in the same manner as a judgement is a statutory 
process…77 
(i) Action on the award at common law 
Generally, an arbitration agreement whether in writing or oral, presupposes a 
promise to honour a valid award.
78
 Nevertheless, for an award to be recognised and 
enforced under the AA 1996 the arbitration agreement together with the award must 
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comply with the requirements of the Act.
79
 However, where a valid award is not 
voluntarily implemented and the successful party cannot obtain enforcement or elect 
not to enforce the award pursuant to the AA 1996, it may sue on the award.
80
 The 
idea of suing on the award at common law is predicated on the violation of the 
implied or express obligation in the arbitration agreement to honour the award.
81
  
It seems there are two principal reasons why the successful party may want to sue on 
the award rather than utilise the summary procedure under the AA 1996. Firstly, 
where the arbitration agreement is not in writing, and secondly, where there is a 
defect in the arbitral award so that it does not comply with the provisions of the AA 
1996.
82
 In respect to the latter, it is unlikely that a court will grant leave to enforce 
the award especially, where such defect is determined as fundamental.
83
 For 
example, a defect that relates to a breach of fair hearing will be determined as 
fundamental. In respect to the former, a court will most likely grant leave for the 
enforcement of the award, provided, it is satisfied that there was a valid oral 
arbitration agreement between the parties.  
Action on the award at common law raises the question of whether or not the 
arbitration agreement and the principal contract are merged in the award as the basis 
for the cause of action. There is no clear authority on the issue as it has been the 
subject of many (at times conflicting) decisions and commentaries. For example, in 
Norske Atlas Insurance Co. Ltd. v London General Insurance Co. Ltd,
84
 the 
plaintiffs based their action on the award and not the arbitration agreement. The 
court in its judgement stated thus: 
I quite agree that if the plaintiff were suing upon this treaty for marine 
losses sustained by them under insurances they were making, and were 
claiming as reinsurers, these pleas in defence would be fatal to the 
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plaintiffs. They would be suing upon a contract of marine insurance 
which, first of all, was not expressly in a policy, and secondly, was not 
stamped, and could not be stamped, as a policy needs to be. But in my 
judgement the question is not that at all. The plaintiffs here are suing on 
the award, it is, I think, necessary for the plaintiffs to prove, first, that 
there was a submission, secondly, that the arbitration was conducted in 
pursuance of the submission; and thirdly, that the award is a valid award, 
made pursuant to the provisions of the submission, and valid according 
to the Lex fori of the place where the arbitration was carried out and 
where the award was made.
85
 
However, in Bremer Oel Tansport GmbH v Dewry
86
 the plaintiffs’ cause of action 
was based on the arbitration agreement and not the award, and the Court of Appeal 
per Slesser LJ stated that: 
The few cases which appear to support the view that an action may be 
brought upon the award in my view do not exclude in any event an 
action brought upon the agreement to refer differences and for this 
purpose, in my view, the submissions are here sufficiently stated to be in 
the charter party of November 19, 1929. Without, therefore, finally 
determining whether an action may or may not be brought on an implied 
contract in the award itself, I am clearly of the opinion that it may be 
brought upon an agreement containing a term to refer disputes, and that 
the present claim is properly pleaded as arising from such an 
agreement…87 
Besides, in Agromet Motorimport v Maulden Engineering Co.(Beds.)
88
 the issue was 
about application for leave to enforce an award made more than six years after the 
breach of contract to which the arbitral award related. Hence, the argument that the 
cause of action occurred upon a breach of the principal contract on which the award 
was based was rejected, and the court held: 
That an action to enforce an arbitrator’s award was an independent cause 
of action, arising from the breach of an implied term in the arbitration 
agreement that the award would be honoured and not from the breach of 
the contract which had been the subject of the arbitration; that the six 
year limitation period imposed by section 7 of the Limitation Act 1980 
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upon bringing of an action to enforce an award therefore began to run 
from the date of the failure to honour the award … 89 
The effect of the above cases is that the plaintiff in its case must plead and prove 
both the arbitration agreement and a valid arbitral award. It also implies, depending 
on the context, that the proceedings is classified, either as an action on the award or 
an action on the arbitration agreement.
90
 Mustill and Boyd, writing from a merger of 
the arbitration agreement with the arbitral award perspective, stated: 
It has been sometimes necessary to decide whether the action is ‘ground 
upon a contract’ or brought ‘to enforce contract.’ This point would give 
greater weight to one or other element of the cause of action, depending 
on the circumstances, but at the end both of them must be present before 
the plaintiff can sue.
91
 
Lord Collins of Mapesbury, et al in addressing the issue of whether or not the non-
merger applies to foreign arbitral awards noted that: 
An English award may give rise to a cause of action estoppel or an issue 
estoppel, and if the award is a final award under the law governing the 
arbitration proceedings the claimant in the arbitration should not be 
entitled to sue on the original cause of action. There is no reason of legal 
policy why the same should not be true in the case of foreign award. In 
relation to foreign judgement the non-merge rule has been abolished by 
statute and there is no reason of policy or principle why the obsolete and 
anomalous rule of non-merge in relation to foreign judgement should not 
be extended to foreign awards. Indeed the consensual and contractual 
character of arbitration means that parties to an arbitration agreement 
impliedly promise to perform a valid award, and it should follow that 
they also promise not to take any action inconsistent with the submission 
to arbitration. Bringing proceedings on the original cause of action would 
be wholly inconsistent with the obligation under the submission and the 
subsequent award. If, therefore, under the law governing the arbitration 
proceedings the original cause of action is merged in the award, a 
claimant should not be entitled to rely on the original contract.
92
 
The above authorities raise the question whether there is a particular ground 
(whether on the principal contract, arbitration agreement, or the award) upon which 
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the successful party must bring its action on the award before the English Court. The 
argument whether or not the foreign arbitral award is merged in the principal 
contract or the arbitration agreement as the cause of action is linked to its 
counterpart, foreign judgement. The position in respect of a foreign judgement was 
to adopt the non-merger rule.
93
 Hence, the successful party can rely on the original 
cause of action or on the judgement recovered to enforce the judgement. The non-
merger rule has since been abolished by statute.
94
 Thus, there is a gap on judicial 
authority in this regard at common law. To close this gap, Lord Collins of 
Mapesbury, et al, suggest that the law that regulates the arbitration proceedings 
should determine the ground upon which the action should be brought.
95
  If the law 
takes the view that the original cause of action is merged into the arbitral award, 
then, the successful party can depend on such cause of action to enforce the foreign 
award. 
It appears the current position of the English Courts is to enforce the arbitral award, 
and not the principal contract. This is evidenced in Westacre Investments Inc. v 
Jugoimport – SDPR Holding Co. Ltd.96 The 1st and 2nd defendants appointed the 
plaintiffs as consultants in respect of procurement contracts for the sale of military 
equipment by Yugoslavia to Kuwait. The consultancy agreement stipulated that the 
contract ‘shall be governed and construed under the laws of Switzerland’ and any 
dispute arising out of the contract shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with 
the Arbitration Rules of the ICC in Geneva. When disputes arose, the parties referred 
to arbitration in Switzerland. The ICC arbitrators found in favour of the plaintiffs and 
held that the defendants failed to establish that the parties to the contract procured it 
by illicit means such as bribery. 
To enforce the award, the plaintiff commenced legal proceedings on the award. The 
defendants challenged the enforcement of the award and argued that the principal 
contract was procured by illicit means. The Commercial Court held inter alia: 
…this was not a case of direct enforcement of the 
underlying contract, but of enforcement of the award 
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which was a valid award in accordance with the law, 
Swiss Law, chosen by the parties and one made by 
arbitrators having jurisdiction in respect of a contract 
governed by Swiss Law; the arbitrators addressed the 
issue whether the consultancy agreement was illegal 
under Kuwait law and whether under Swiss Law it was 
invalid because of lobbying by the plaintiffs, and they 
concluded that it was neither …97 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision and stated that: 
Although the award was not isolated from the 
underlying contract, it was relevant that the court was 
considering the enforcement of the award, not the 
underlying contract…98 
In the light of the above cases, it is argued in this thesis that the cause of action of the 
arbitration in the principal contract is merged with the award. Accordingly, the court 
will consider the award and not the principal contract. The cause of action will not be 
re-litigated or re-arbitrated as the award may give rise to a cause of action estoppel 
or an issue estoppel.
99
 All the more so, an action on the award is a fresh cause of 
action which requires the plaintiff to prove its case. This position of the law is 
demonstrated in Noble Assurance Co. v Gerling-Konzern General Insurance Co.
100
  
Noble Assurance concerned an application by the claimants to continue a temporary 
injunction restraining the defendant from taking further steps in an action against the 
claimant in Vermont. The claimant provided cover for Shell under an insurance 
policy which contained an arbitration clause. The defendant reinsured the claimant 
and the reinsurance policy stated that “all provisions of the underlying policy … 
shall apply to this policy as though this policy was a direct insurance”, and “the 
insurance provided by this policy shall follow all the terms and conditions of the 
Noble Policy.” When disputes arose between the parties, arbitration proceedings 
were commenced by the claimant and Shell against the defendant. The arbitrators 
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rendered a partial award in favour of the claimant. Dissatisfied with the award, the 
defendant commenced legal proceedings in Vermont against the claimant and Shell 
seeking inter alia, a temporary injunction restraining the claimant and Shell from 
taking any steps to confirm the award. The Vermont court granted the temporary 
restraining order. In a later judgement, the order was set aside on the ground that the 
defendant’s allegations in the suit had been put to the arbitrators and same dismissed 
by the arbitrators. The court held that the doctrine of res judicata applied. Toulson 
LJ stated that: 
Judge Sessions has already concluded that Gerling’s 
claim did not pass the test of being likely to succeed on 
the merit or even raising sufficiently serious questions 
to make them a fair ground for litigation, because of 
the probability that they are defeated by the doctrine of 
res judicata. A declaration of this court declaring the 
scope and affirming the validity of the award would 
provide a further foundation on which Noble and Shell 
would be entitled to rely. It could … provide a 
platform not only for res judicata but for collateral 
estoppel.
101
 
Thus, an action on the award constitutes a fresh cause of action based upon a breach 
of the implied or express promise in the arbitration agreement to honour the 
award.
102
 This requires the successful party to prove its case as illustrated in Delta 
Civil Engineering Co. Ltd. v London Docklands Dev. Corp.
103
 Staughto LJ quoting 
Devlin J
104
 stated thus: 
The matter which the plaintiffs have to prove in order 
to succeed are, first, the making of the contract which 
contains the submission, secondly, that the dispute 
arose within the terms of the submission, thirdly, that 
arbitrators were appointed in accordance with the 
clause which contain the submission, fourthly, they 
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must prove the making of the award, and lastly, that 
the amount awarded has not been paid.
105
 
(ii) Summary procedures 
Summary procedures entail seeking the court’s permission to enforce an award in the 
same manner as a judgement of the court or to have the award entered as a 
judgement or order of the court to the same effect.
106
 The procedures are stipulated 
under sections 66 and 101 of the AA 1996.
107
 These provisions are mandatory and 
follow successively.
108
 Thus in order to benefit from the provisions, the enforcing 
party must first seek and obtain leave [now known as ‘permission’ under the Civil 
Procedure Rules (CPR) 1998] of court to enforce the arbitral award as a judgement 
or order of the court. Secondly, the court may enter judgement in terms of the 
arbitral award.
 109
 
The method of enforcement pursuant to sections 66 and 101 of the AA 1996 is set 
out in Part 62 of the CPR 1998. Under rule 62.3, an enforcing party is required to 
apply to the court for permission to enforce an award in an ‘Arbitration Claim 
Form’. Such application may be made without notice to the defendant. In National 
Ability SA v Tinna Oils & Chemicals Ltd (The ‘Amazon Reefer’)110 the Court of 
Appeal stated that: 
For many years it has been the practice of parties who 
seek to use the enforcement mechanism of the court in 
England and Wales to use the procedure under section 
26 of the 1950 Act and section 66 of the 1996 Act to 
enforce an award. The procedure is straight forward. 
                                                             
105. Delta Civil Engineering [1999]. 
106. Mustill, M. J. and Boyd, S. C. (2001) at p. 210. 
107. Pursuant to section 2 (2) (b) of the AA 1996, section 66 of the Act applies even if the seat of 
arbitration is outside England and Wales or Northern Ireland or no seat has been designated 
or determined. Section 101 of the AA 1996 relates to recognition and enforcement of NYC 
awards. While section 36 concerns recognition and enforcement of certain foreign awards 
which are not NYC awards.  
108. Mustill, M. J. and Boyd, S. C. (2001) at p. 210. 
109. Section 66(1) and section 101(2) of the AA 1996 respectively; Tevendale, C. and Cannon, A. 
(2013) pp.563 – 594. 
110. [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 222. 
147 
 
The parties make an application to the court on an ex 
parte (or without notice) basis…111 
However, the enforcing party must ensure that the appropriate arbitration claim form 
is served on the defendant within one month from the date of issue. The claim form 
must disclose all material facts to the court. Failing which, the court’s order granting 
leave may be set aside. In the recent case of Y v S
112
 the court’s decision suggests 
that a failure on the part of the claimant to use the appropriate claim form for an 
application for leave to enforce an award would be fatal to the success of the 
application. However in this case, following a concession from the defendant’s 
counsel that the failure to comply was not fatal to the application for leave to 
enforce, the court granted the application though not on terms sought. It remains to 
be seen whether such waiver and the court’s flexibility will excuse an applicant that 
breaches the requirements of rule 62.18 of the CPR 1998.  
A court enforcement order with regards to an applicant’s motion for permission to 
enforce an arbitral award against the defendant must be in terms of the award. The 
order must not change the content of the award in any form. For example, such order 
must not change the names of the parties or award interest, if such alteration was not 
mentioned in the arbitral award. In Norsk Hydro ASA v State Property Fund of 
Ukraine and ors.,
113
 the parties’ contract for the development of Hydro TIS Yuzhny 
Terminal in Ukraine contained an arbitration clause. When disputes arose, the 
applicants commenced arbitration against ‘the Republic of Ukraine, through the 
State Property Fund of Ukraine’. An award was rendered in favour of the applicants 
against ‘the Republic of Ukraine through the State Property Fund of Ukraine.’ The 
applicants sought the leave of court to enforce the award against ‘the State Property 
Fund of Ukraine’ and ‘the Republic of Ukraine’. Though the parties were different 
from the ones named in the arbitral awards, leave was granted. The respondent 
brought this action to set aside the leave to enforce the award. One of the issues the 
court considered was whether an enforcement order (leave to enforce an award) 
granted against a party not named in the award itself can be sustained. The court set 
aside the enforcement order because it provided for enforcement of the award against 
                                                             
111. National Ability SA [2010]; also in Walker & ors. v Rowe & ors. [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 116. 
at p. 119, Aikens J stated that, “an application to enforce an award pursuant to section 66 of 
the AA 1996 can be made without notice by using the practice form specified.” 
112. [2015] EWHC 612 (Comm). 
113. [2002] EWHC 2120 (Comm). 
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different parties, ‘the Republic of Ukraine and the Ukraine State Property Fund’, 
whereas, the arbitrators rendered the award against ‘the Republic of Ukraine through 
the State Property Fund’. Gross, J stated the law thus: 
… an order providing for enforcement of award must follow the award. 
No doubt, true “slips” and changes of name can be accommodated; 
suffice to say, that is not this case. Here it is sought to enforce an award 
made against a single party, against two separate and distinct parties…In 
my judgement, this is all inappropriate…The right approach is to seek 
enforcement of an award in terms of the award. Such considerations are 
reinforced and put beyond argument when regard is had to section 101 
and [section 66] of the 1996 Act … It seems to me, the … order was not 
an order “in terms of the award”; it was an order in different terms … 
that difference matters. There was no jurisdiction to enforce the award in 
the terms of the … order and that order must be set aside.114 
Also, in Walker & ors. v Rowe & ors,
115
 the applicants sought to set aside the rate of 
interest as contained in a High Court Order of May 7, 1999 granted to enforce an 
arbitral award as a judgement of the court against the respondents. The respondents 
(counter applicants) also sought to set aside the High Court Order mandating them to 
pay interest on the arbitral award. One of the issues before the court was whether the 
court can order a “post-award” interest where there is no reference in the arbitral 
award to “post-award” interest on the sum awarded by the arbitrator. The court held 
that under the AA 1996, if an award is to be entered by a court as a judgement or 
order of the court, it has to be entered “in terms of the award”. The court reasoned 
that section 49(4) of the Act makes it the sole responsibility of the arbitrator to 
decide whether or not to award “post-award” interest. To add “post-award interest” 
which is not part of the terms of the award will amount to an alteration of the arbitral 
award by the court.  
The court’s decision is consistent with the provisions of section 1(c) of the AA 1996 
which indicates that the court should not intervene in matters that are covered by Part 
I of the Act which includes sections 49(4) and 66. Thus, it is submitted in this thesis 
that the combined effect of sections 1(c), 49(4) and 66 of the AA 1996 is that the 
court lacks jurisdiction to alter the content of an arbitral award provided. 
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 It is noted that section 66(3) of the AA 1996 precludes enforcement of an arbitral 
award rendered outside the substantive jurisdiction of the arbitrator, provided the 
party contesting jurisdiction has not lost the right to do so.
116
 Loss of right to contest 
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator varies from case to case. Any objection to the 
arbitral award on the question of jurisdiction has to be made within 28 days of the 
publication of the award or as agreed by the parties. Failing which, the party 
contesting jurisdiction will lose that right. Such loss of right is subject to the court’s 
discretion to extend time.
117
  
In People’s Insurance Co. of China and another v Vysanthi Shipping Co. Ltd.,118 the 
defendant commenced arbitration in London against the claimants pursuant to an 
arbitration clause contained in a bill of lading. The defendant appointed its arbitrator, 
but the claimants did not. The defendant’s arbitrator pursuant to section 17(2) of the 
AA 1996 became the sole arbitrator. Though the claimants objected to the 
jurisdiction of the arbitrator, they appeared and defended the claim under 
reservation. The arbitrator after hearing and considering evidence from both parties 
held that he had jurisdiction under the arbitration clause. Consequently, the arbitrator 
rendered an award in favour of the defendant. The defendant obtained leave of court 
to enforce the award subject to the right of the claimants to apply to set aside that 
order. The claimant brought this action to set aside the arbitral award on the grounds 
that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to render the award. They also requested the 
court under section 80(5) of the AA 1996 to exercise its discretion by extending time 
for them to challenge the arbitrator’s award on the question of jurisdiction. The court 
held that pursuant to the AA 1996, any challenge to the arbitrator’s award on 
jurisdiction has to be made within 28 days of the publication of the award. The 
consequence of a failure to do so is that the party objecting to the jurisdiction loses 
that right.
119
 
Another instance where a party may forfeit its right to challenge the jurisdiction of 
the arbitrator is where it intentionally participated in arbitral proceedings that are 
improperly conducted.
120
. Alternatively, if the objecting party participated in the 
                                                             
116. Merkin, R. and Flannery, L. (2008) Arbitration Act 1996, 4th edn., Informa, London, p. 150. 
117. Sections 73(2) and 79 of the AA 1996. 
118. [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 617. 
119. People’s Insurance Co. of China and another [2003]. 
120. Section 73(1) of the AA 1996. 
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arbitral proceedings, it must satisfy the court that it raised the objection timeously 
during the arbitral proceedings.
121
 However, if a jurisdictional issue has been raised 
and the issue resolved by a preliminary ruling during the arbitral proceedings such 
issue cannot be reopened at the enforcement stage of the award.
122
 This is because 
the resolution of such jurisdictional issue by the arbitrator will constitute res judicata 
precluding parties from raising it at the enforcement stage of the award. 
4.2.3. Methods for enforcement in Nigeria 
Commercial arbitral awards may be enforced by a common law action on the award 
(i), by summary procedure (ii)
123
 and by registration (iii).
124
 
(i) Common law action on the award 
Commercial arbitral awards in Nigeria may be enforced by suing upon the award at 
common law. It is irrelevant that the award is domestic or was rendered in a country 
that has no reciprocal arrangement with Nigeria.
125
 According to Ezejiofor, where 
the award is rendered in a country that has no reciprocal arrangement with Nigeria, 
enforcement of such award may be possible by bringing a fresh action on the foreign 
arbitral award itself as the cause of action.
126
 The action for enforcement is premised 
upon the fact that the arbitration agreement contains an implied or express obligation 
to perform the resulting award. Thus, failure to perform a valid arbitral award may 
constitute a breach of the arbitration agreement. Hence according to Orojo and 
Ajomo, the successful party may be entitled to sue in respect of such breach and to 
obtain judgement in terms of the award.
127
  
To succeed in the action, the successful party must prove four issues: (i) the 
existence of the arbitration agreement, (ii) parties’ submission to the arbitration 
                                                             
121. Under section 72 of the AA 1996, a party may decide not to participate in the arbitral 
proceedings and still challenge the proceedings or the arbitral award in court. 
122. Aeberli, P. (2005) “Jurisdictional Disputes under the Arbitration Act 1996: A Procedural 
Route Map”, Arbitration International, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 253 – 299. 
123. Sections 31(1) and 51 of ACA 2004 and Article IV of the NYC.  
124. Sections 3 and 4 Foreign Judgement (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1960. 
125. In Alfred Toepper Inc. (New York) v Edokpolor (1965) 1 All NLR 292, the Supreme Court 
upheld the validity of a claim brought by the plaintiff, though no reciprocity arrangement had 
been concluded between Nigeria and the United States of America. 
126. Ezejiofor, G. (1981) “Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in Nigeria”. The Journal of 
Business Law, pp. 319 – 323; Ojukwu, E. (1996) “Enforcement of Foreign Judgement in 
Nigeria”, International Legal Practitioner, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 131 – 140. 
127. Orojo, J. O. and Ajomo, M. A. (1999) Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation in 
Nigeria, Mbeyi & Associates Nigeria Limited, Lagos, pp. 302 – 304. 
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proceedings, (iii) the proper conduct of the arbitration proceedings in accordance 
with the agreement and, (iv) the validity of the arbitral award.
128
 A successful party 
who seeks to enforce its award by suing on the award at common law need not 
obtain leave of the court or judge. There is also no need to commence a fresh action 
on the principal contract.
129
 This is because the arbitral award, just like a court 
judgement constitutes a cause of action and is enforceable at common law upon 
proof. In Alfred Toepfer Inc. (New York) v Edokpolor,
130
 the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria held that a foreign arbitral award is enforceable in Nigeria by suing upon the 
award. The court further stated that for the enforcing party to succeed in the action, it 
must prove the existence of the arbitration agreement, the proper conduct of the 
arbitration in accordance with the agreement and the validity of the award. 
The successful party in the arbitration can sue on the award through a summary 
judgement procedure or an undefended list procedure.
131
 Where such procedure is 
chosen then, the successful party must show that the unsuccessful party has no 
defence to its action. If the action succeeds, judgement may be entered without the 
successful party going through the cumbersome process of calling witnesses to prove 
its case.
132
 However, if the action fails, the successful party may then need to prove 
its case and the proceedings will go to full trial. 
(ii) Enforcement through summary procedures 
Enforcement of arbitral awards under section 31 of the ACA relates to domestic 
arbitration only.
133
 As highlighted earlier in this thesis, recognition and enforcement 
is not the same thing.
134
 An arbitral award may be recognised without being 
enforced, yet an award enforced is an award recognised.
135
 Under section 31(1), an 
award though recognised as binding between the parties to the arbitration, can only 
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be enforced against the unsuccessful party upon a written application to the court by 
the successful party. The written application for enforcement may be to enforce the 
award directly, or to enter judgement in terms of the award.
136
  
Though section 51 of the ACA relates to the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards, it is a re-enactment of section 31.  However, like section 31, the 
application for enforcement of arbitral award under section 51 must be made to the 
court in writing. Nonetheless, a major difference between sections 31 and 51 is that 
no rule of the Schedules to the ACA relates to section 31. The provision of the 
Second Schedule to the ACA which re-enacts the NYC verbatim relates to section 
51. According to Idornigie the conditions for enforcement are in actual fact subject 
to the provision of article IV of the NYC as contained in the Second Schedule to the 
ACA.
137
 These conditions are examined under the evidential requirements (3.2.4) 
below.  
However, unlike article I(3) of the NYC, section 51 of the ACA makes no 
reciprocity qualification.
138
 In effect, the text of section 51(1) of the ACA which 
reads inter alia “irrespective of the country in which it is made” indicates that a 
foreign arbitral award pursuant to section 51 is made subject to section 32 of the 
ACA only.
139
 Thus, it can be argued that by virtue of section 51(1) of the ACA, all 
foreign arbitral awards, non-NYC awards inclusive, are enforceable in Nigeria. In 
Tulip Nigeria Limited v Noleggioe Transport Maritime SAS, the Court of Appeal 
stated that: 
By the provision of section 51(1) of the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act, an arbitral award shall irrespective of 
the country in which it is made, be recognised as binding 
subject to the provisions of the Act, and shall upon 
application in writing to the court, be enforced by the 
court.
140
  
                                                             
136. Section 31 (3) of the ACA provides: “an award may by leave of the court or a judge, be 
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139. Idorinigie, P. O. (2002), p. 448. 
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Conversely, Nwakoby has argued that: 
Knowing the attitude of the Nigerian courts and the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in M. S. S. 
Line v Kano Oil Millers [1974] NNLR 1 and A. C. 
Toepter Inc of New York v John Edokpolor [1965] 1 
All NLR 292, reciprocity of treatment shall also be 
required in enforcement of awards pursuant to section 
51 of the Act. It may be wrong to think that because 
the legal draftsmen failed to include reciprocity clause 
in that section of the law, that all international awards 
are enforceable pursuant to it … reciprocity of 
treatment had been interpreted by the Supreme Court 
… to be material before any foreign judgement 
including arbitral awards could be enforced in Nigeria 
and this is an acceptable practice recognised 
internationally.
141
  
This thesis argues differently. Firstly, the decisions of the Supreme Court in 
Murmansk State Steamship Line v Kano Oil Millers
142
 and A. C. Toepter Inc New 
York v John Edokpolor
143
 were not based on the interpretation of section 51(1) of the 
ACA. Both cases pre-dated the ACA.
144
 And section 51 of the ACA is not subject to 
the Kano State Arbitration Law or the Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) 
Act which the Supreme Court interpreted in the cases. Secondly, the text of section 
51(1) of the ACA which is premised on article 35(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
is precise and unequivocal. To this end, it is clear that the legal draftsmen did not fail 
to include reciprocity clause but drafted the said section 51 according to the 
intentions of the lawmakers. Therefore, it can be argued that the effect of section 
51(1) of the ACA is that an arbitral award shall, regardless of the country in which it 
is rendered, be recognised as binding and subject to sections 32 and 51, shall, upon 
written application to the high court, be enforced by the court. To include or imply a 
reciprocity requirement means to include a clause not contemplated by the 
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lawmakers. Clearly if the lawmakers intended to include a reciprocity requirement, 
they would have used express terms. 
(iii) Registration before a High Court 
Foreign commercial arbitral awards can also be enforced by application to the high 
court for registration of the award. Such registration must be done either pursuant to 
the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgements Act 1958 (REJA 1958) or the Foreign 
Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 2004 (FJREA 2004).
145
 The REJA 1958 
provides a simplified registration procedure. The procedure is to expedite the 
reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgements obtained in certain 
commonwealth countries.
146
 The application of the REJA 1958 covers arbitral 
awards, if the award becomes enforceable at the seat of arbitration in the same 
manner as a judgement given by the court.
147
 
Before a judgement or arbitral award can be enforced under the REJA 1958, it must 
first be registered in the high court. There are four fundamental conditions for the 
registration and consequent enforcement of an award under the Act. Firstly, the 
arbitral award must be a final and conclusive award of an arbitration proceeding. 
Such arbitral award must order a definite and fixed sum payable.
148
 Unliquidated 
arbitral awards are normally not enforceable under this Act. This is because, 
according to Bamodu, it would require the registering court to police and supervise 
the terms of the original award.
149
 However, it may be possible to obtain the same or 
similar relief from the court in certain circumstances. If a foreign judgement or 
arbitral award is not conclusive or is for an unliquidated sum, the applicant may 
commence fresh action at the high court relying on the arbitral award as the original 
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cause of action. To this end, the applicant must have a cause of action under 
Nigerian law and be able to show that the registering court has jurisdiction to hear 
the dispute.
150
 If the action is defended, the applicant may seek to rely upon an ‘issue 
estoppel’ regarding the findings of fact by the arbitrator to prevent a retrial of the 
issues.
151
 Secondly, the application for registration and consequent enforcement must 
be made within 12 months from the date the arbitral award was rendered (or such 
longer period as the court may allow).
152
 Thirdly, the award debtor must not have 
asked a competent court to set aside the award. In effect, the arbitral award must not 
have been set aside by a competent court or a set aside application pending.
153
 
Lastly, it must be ‘just and convenient’ that the arbitral award should be enforced in 
Nigeria.
154
 
Where an arbitral award is registered pursuant to the REJA 1958, it has for the 
purposes of enforcement the same consequences as the judgement of the registering 
court. The registering court has the same control and jurisdiction over the arbitral 
award as it does over one of its own decisions. However, the registering court’s 
control and jurisdiction is only to the extent it relates to execution.
155
 
Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the FJREA 2004 is similar to the REJA 
1958. Like REJA 1958, the application of FJREA 2004 covers foreign arbitral 
awards if the award becomes enforceable at the seat of arbitration in the same 
manner as a judgement of a court.
156
 However, the scope of application of the 
FJREA 2004 is wider than the REJA 1958. Unlike REJA 1958, it applies to 
countries other than the United Kingdom and other parts of Her Majesty’s protection 
(now commonwealth countries).
157
 Pursuant to section 3(1) of the FJREA 2004, it 
seems that the deciding factor of countries that would benefit from the Act is 
substantial reciprocity arrangement with Nigeria. This is made possible if the 
Minister of Justice is satisfied that a foreign country will accord Nigerian judgements 
substantial reciprocity treatment. If satisfied, the Minister may by order direct that, 
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judgements of the superior courts or arbitral awards made in that country be enforced 
in Nigeria.
158
 
4.2.4. Time for application to enforce an award  
Time to apply for enforcement of the award is regulated under national law and this 
varies from country to country.
159
 This is because the NYC is silent on the issue. In a 
bid to harmonise the time within which an enforcing party may seek to enforce its 
award, the suggestion of a ten year period was rejected by the UNCITRAL Model 
Law working group. The working group reasoned that: 
Many legal systems already had rules on the period for 
enforcement of arbitral awards, either by assimilating 
for this purpose arbitral awards to court judgements or 
by special legislation. Harmonisation of these rules 
would be difficult to achieve since they were based on 
the differing national policies closely linked to the 
procedural law aspects of state.
160
 
In England, limitation period for action to enforce an arbitral award is imposed as a 
matter of substantive law. The Limitation Act 1980 applies to arbitration proceedings 
in the same manner as court proceedings. Section 7 of the Limitation Act 1980 
provides that:  
 An action to enforce an award, where the 
submission is not by an instrument under seal, 
shall not be brought after the expiration of six 
years from the date on which the cause of 
action accrued 
The issue that then arises is the determination of the text, “cause of action accrued.” 
Is it when the breach of the principal contract or the arbitration agreement, or the 
                                                             
158. Section 3(1) of the FJREA 2004; The Minister is yet to make any such order extending the 
provisions of Part 1 of the Act to other countries outside of the commonwealth. This is so 
because such an ‘order’ can only be made to cover a country which offers reciprocal 
treatment to the judgments of Nigerian courts. 
159. For example, in Australia it is six years pursuant to the Limitation Law of each state and 
territory; Gary, S. (2000) “International Enforcement of Arbitral Awards”, International 
Company and Commercial Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 7, pp. 253 – 259. 
160. Quoted in Davidson, F. P. (1991) International Commercial Arbitration: Scotland and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, Sweet and Maxwell, Edinburgh, p. 257. 
157 
 
award occurred? In Agromet Motorimport Ltd (Poland) v Maulden Engineering Co. 
(Beds) Ltd,
161
 Otton J answered the question thus: 
That an action to enforce an arbitrator’s award was an 
independent cause of action, arising from the breach of 
an implied term in the arbitration agreement that the 
award would be honoured and not the breach of the 
contract which had been the subject of the arbitration; 
that the six year limitation period imposed by section 7 
of the Limitation Act 1980 upon the bringing of an 
action to enforce an award therefore began to run from 
the date of the failure to honour the award …162 
In Minerals and Metal Trading Corp. of India v International Bulk Shipping and 
Services Ltd,
163
 the Court of Appeal agreed with the conclusion reached by Otton J 
in Agromet Motorpoint Ltd. The court held that time begins to run from the date on 
which the implied promise to perform the arbitral award is breached and not from the 
date of the arbitration agreement or from the date of the arbitral award. Accordingly, 
where the six year limitation period expires, the successful party may lose its right to 
enforcement. This point was illustrated in International Bulk Shipping and Services 
Ltd. v Minerals and Metals Trading Corp. of India
164
 where the Court of Appeal 
held that: 
The six year limitation period began whenever the 
claimants became entitled to enforce the awards; in 
legal terms, when their cause of action arose; 
conceptually the claim arose under a contractual 
undertaking to honour the award; the relevant cause of 
action arose sometime before the end of 1984 and the 
limitation period had expired before the applications 
were made; this factor alone meant that the order of Mr 
Justice Waller setting aside the leave given ex parte by 
Mr Justice Saville to issue and serve fresh proceedings 
in 1993 should be upheld.
165
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From the above decisions, the time to enforce the arbitral award starts to run from 
the day the implied promise to perform the award is breached. It is not from the date 
the principal contract was breached, nor from the date of the arbitral award.
166
  
To determine the time for commencing an action on the arbitral award, it will be 
necessary to establish, as suggested by McGee, that one of the following events has 
occurred. (i) that the time (if any) for implementing the arbitral award as stipulated 
in the principal contract has elapsed; (ii) where (i) does not apply, that time (if any) 
as contained in the arbitral award for implementing the award has elapsed; (iii) 
where neither (i) nor (ii) applies, that  a reasonable time for implementing the arbitral 
award since the award was rendered as elapsed and; (iv) in any of (i), (ii), or (iii) 
above, that the unsuccessful party has shown a clear and unequivocal intention not to 
perform the arbitral award.
167
 
However, sections 29 and 30 of the Limitation Act contain an exception to the six 
year limitation rule. The limitation period of six years can be postponed where there 
is an acknowledgement or part payment of the arbitral award by the unsuccessful 
party. This is evidenced in the case of Good Challenger Navegante S. A. v Metal 
Exportimport S. A.
168
 The respondent owners of the vessel (the Good Challenger) 
claimed demurrage and damages for detention against the appellant charterers of the 
Good Challenger. The dispute was referred to arbitration in London. On June 15, 
1983 the arbitrators rendered their award in favour of the respondents. In 2001, the 
respondents sought to serve an order ex parte issued by Mr. Justice Saville in 1993 
against the appellants. The appellant opposed the application and contended inter 
alia that the proceedings to enforce the award had become statute barred. The issue 
before the court inter alia was whether the telex sent by the appellant’s agents on the 
17
th
 of February 1988 constituted an acknowledgement of the award by the appellant 
so as to extend the limitation period of six years. In dismissing the appeal, the Court 
of Appeal considered the provisions of sections 29(5) and 30 of the Limitation Act 
1980 and held that: 
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…the [trial] judge was correct to hold that the owners 
[claimant/respondent] are not estopped from asserting 
in England that the claim was not time barred under 
the 1980 Act when they commenced proceedings in 
England in January, 1993. He was also correct to hold 
that the claim was not time barred because the six year 
time limit had been extended by an acknowledgement 
in the telex dated February 17, 1988, which extended 
the time to a date later than January, 1996…169 
In Nigeria, the limitation period is also regulated by legislation. Each state has its 
own statute governing limitation periods.
170
 Using Lagos State as an example, 
section 8(1) of the Limitation Laws of Lagos State imposes a limitation period of six 
years for causes of action founded on contract or tort.
171
 These Limitation Laws of 
the states apply to arbitration in the same manner as court proceedings. The periods 
specified are dependent on the nature of the underlying cause of action, such as in 
contract or tort and the state where the arbitral award is sought to be enforced.
172
  
In City Engineering Nig. Ltd. v Federal Housing Authority,
173
  the parties entered 
into a contract to build housing units at Festac Town, Lagos. The contract contained 
arbitration clause. When disputes arose, the contract was terminated on December 
12, 1980. The dispute was then referred to arbitration. Arbitration proceedings 
commenced on December 11, 1981 and the arbitrator rendered his award in favour of 
the appellant in November 1985. Sometime in 1988, the appellant sought to enforce 
the arbitral award at the High Court of Lagos State. The trial judge dismissed the 
appellant’s application for enforcement and held that by virtue of the Limitation Law 
of Lagos State, the action had become statute barred. The court reasoned that the 
action to enforce the award was bought in excess of six years after December 12, 
                                                             
169. Good Challenger Navegante S. A [2004] at p. 87.  
170. This is because under the present constitution, the power to legislate limitation laws is is 
within the legislative competence of the state lawmakers. By virtue of Parts I and II of the 
Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution (as amended) limitation is neither in the exclusive 
legislative list nor in the concurrent legislative list. 
171. The provision of this section is materially the same with the Limitation Laws of other states 
in Nigeria as well as the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. 
172. In Murmansk State Steamship Line (1974); the appellants commenced enforcement 
proceedings on the award against the respondents in Kano State. The proceeding was 
commenced after six years from the date underlying the cause of action to enforce the award. 
The court dismissed the appeal and held that the appellants failed to comply with the 
Limitation Law of Kano State. 
173. [1997] 9 NWLR (Pt. 520) 224. 
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1980 when the cause of action accrued. On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed 
the appeal and upheld the decision of the trial court.  
The appellant further appealed to the Supreme Court. In its argument, the respondent 
referred the Supreme Court to its earlier decision in Murmansk State Steamship Line 
where the court held that time starts to run from the date of the accrual of the original 
cause of action in the arbitration agreement, and not from the date of the arbitral 
award.
174
 However, the appellant argued that Murmansk State Steamship Line was in 
conflict with Obembe v Wemabod Estates Ltd
175
 and Kano State Urban Development 
Board v Fanz Construction Co. Ltd,
176
 two Supreme Court cases after the Murmansk 
State Steamship Line. The appellant further urged the court to consider the English 
position as evidenced in Argomet Motorpoint Ltd.
177
  
After a review of the relevant section of the Limitation Law and case law, the 
Supreme Court held that Murmansk State Steamship Line was correctly decided and 
thus binding on the lower courts. The court was not persuaded by Otton J, theory of 
“breach of the implied term to honour the arbitral award” in Agromet Motorpoint 
Ltd. The court further held that the decisions in Obembe and Kano State Urban 
Development Board respectively are not in conflict with Murmansk State Steamship 
Line case. The court reasoned that neither case touched on the issue of time bar and 
therefore were irrelevant to the instant case.
178
  
The implication of the Supreme Court decisions in the Murmansk and City 
Engineering cases is that the arbitration proceedings and the enforcement of the 
arbitral award constitute a single cause of action. This cause of action in an 
appropriate case must be prosecuted and enforced within the statutory limitation 
period of six years.  
                                                             
174. Murmansk State Steamship Line (1974).  
175. [1977] 5 S. C. 115. 
176. [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 142) 1. 
177. Agromet Motorimport [1985]. 
178. The Supreme Court was not also persuaded by the appellant’s reliance on the dicta of Agbaje 
JSC, in the Kano State Urban Development Board case where His Lordship quoted with 
approval the following text from Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th edn., para. 611, p. 323, 
thus: 
“… [an] award thus extinguishes any right of action in respect of the former 
matters in difference but gives rise to a new cause of action based on the 
agreement between the parties to perform the award which is implied in 
every arbitration agreement …" 
The court took the review that the reference to Agbaje JSC dicta in Kano State Urban 
Development Board case was unconnected to the time bar issue under consideration. 
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This thesis argues that the Supreme Court’s position portends substantial difficulty 
not only for contracting parties, but also for the future of arbitration in Nigeria. For 
example, it is not unlikely that the limitation period can elapse before the award is 
actually rendered. Where a party commences arbitral proceedings before the six year 
time bar, the limitation period ought to stop running. Otherwise, if the arbitral award 
is rendered after six years from the date the cause of action arose, the award will be 
useless or dead on arrival. What then is the use of the award if the successful party 
cannot enforce the award, maybe as a result of the arbitral proceedings lasting 
beyond the limitation period?  
Adaralegbe has observed that though at the time Murmansk State Steamship was 
decided, the preponderance of authority even in England seemed to support the 
decision in the case.
179
 For example the 18
th
 edition of Russell stated: 
The period of limitation runs from the date on which 
the ‘cause of arbitration accrued’; that is to say, from 
the date when the claimant first acquired either a right 
of action or a right to require that an arbitration take 
place upon the dispute concerned.
180
  
However, this position of the law has since changed in England as illustrated in the 
case of Agromet Motorpoint Ltd.
181
 Thus, Sutton and Gill in the 22
nd
 edition of 
Russell stated the current position of the law in line with Agromet Motorpoint Ltd 
case thus: 
The limitation period for an action on the award will 
usually be six years… Time runs from the date of the 
breach of the arbitration agreement – this is not the 
current law from the Agromet decision, not from the 
date of the arbitration agreement or the date of the 
award.
182
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180. Russell, F. (1970) Russell on the Law of Arbitration, 18th edn., Stevens, pp. 4 – 5. 
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Therefore, it remains to be seemed whether the Supreme Court of Nigeria will in 
subsequent cases adopt the dicta of Agbaje JSC in City Engineering and the position 
of the English law as expressed by Otton J in Agromet Motorpoint Ltd. 
4.2.5. Evidential requirements for enforcement of arbitral awards 
The effect of article IV of the NYC is that a party seeking the recognition and 
enforcement of an award under the Convention must produce some material 
evidence.
183
 The material evidence include, a duly authenticated original award or a 
duly certified copy thereof (i); the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified 
copy thereof (ii) and; if the award or agreement is in a language other than that of the 
enforcing court, a translation of it certified by an official or sworn translator or by a 
diplomatic or consular agent (iii).
184
 This subsection examines these requirements. 
(i) A duly authenticated original or a duly certified copy of it 
According to Onyema, the logic behind the requirement to produce the arbitral award 
is that, the award is a documentary evidence of facts contained therein.
185
 To this 
end, the award further indicates or corroborates the existence of an arbitration 
agreement between the parties. Thus, a valid arbitral award is conclusive evidence 
between the parties to the arbitration of facts contained in it.
186
 Under article IV (1) 
(a) of the NYC, the award must be supplied as a ‘duly authenticated original’ or as ‘a 
duly certified copy’ thereof.187 According to van den Berg, authentication denotes the 
‘formality by which the signature thereon is attested to be genuine’.188For Scherer, 
                                                             
183. Report by the Secretary-General; UN DOC E/2822 (January 31, 1956), at Annex I, 26 
reprinted in Gaja, G. (1978) International Commercial Arbitration – NYC, Part III: 
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(1) (a) of the Second Schedule of the ACA 2004.  
188. van den Berg, A. J. (1994) The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958:Towards a 
Uniform Judicial Interpretation, 2nd edn., Kluwer Law International, p. 251. 
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the purpose of authenticating an award is to inform the court that the award is 
genuine.
189
  
The provision of article IV (1) (a) of the NYC presupposes the existence of a written 
arbitral award that must, according to Born, be ‘duly’ and not ‘simply’ 
authenticated.
190
 Arguably, this provision would seemingly allow a Contracting State 
to deny recognition to an “award” that falls short of this condition, though oral 
awards are practically never made in international arbitration.
 
To satisfy this 
requirement, an arbitral award is usually in writing. The NYC does not prohibit 
Contracting States from imposing form requirements with respect to arbitral awards. 
Various national laws require the award to include the names of the parties, date on 
which the award was rendered, signature(s) of the arbitrator(s), the issue(s) decided 
and the relief granted by the arbitrator.
191
  
Pursuant to article IV (1) (a) of the NYC, if the enforcing party cannot supply a duly 
authenticated original award, production of a duly certified copy of the award will 
suffice. According to van den Berg, a certified copy means ‘the formality by which 
the copy is attested to be a true copy of the original’.192  Though, it appears that this 
means of producing an original copy of the award is for the purpose of convenience 
and flexibility. A certified copy of the award is a reassurance of the genuineness of 
the copy as being from the original provided by an independent third party, so it goes 
beyond convenience.
193
  
This raises the question of who will certify the award in circumstances where the 
arbitrator is dead or cannot be reached. It is suggested in this thesis that if it is an 
institutional arbitration, the institution under which the arbitration was conducted 
will do the certification. This is because arbitration under an institution is conducted 
by arbitrators on behalf of the institution. Thus, the institution will be the appropriate 
authority to certify the award. If the arbitration is ad hoc, then the enforcing party 
                                                             
189. Scherer, M. (2012) “Article IV [Formal Requirements for Recognition and Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards]” in Wolff, R. (ed.), NYC on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards: A Commentary, C. H. Beck/Hart Publishing, pp. 207 – 224.  
190. Born, G. (2012) International Arbitration: Law and Practice, Kluwer Law International, The 
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191. Born, G. (2014) at pp. 3029 – 3036. 
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must adduce credible evidence to prove the existence of the award and that the 
arbitrator actually rendered the award.  
(ii) The original arbitration agreement or duly certified copy thereof 
The enforcing party must also produce the original or a duly certified copy of the 
arbitration agreement.
194
 The question that arises from this requirement is, why is the 
arbitration agreement not required to be duly authenticated like the award? Arguably, 
the answer to the question is hinged on the description of arbitration agreement as 
stipulated under article II (2) of the NYC.
195
 For Otto, the text of article II (2) takes 
into account the possibility of providing an arbitration agreement which is not 
authenticated by the parties’ signatures.196 For example, it may be difficult for parties 
who agreed to arbitrate their dispute via email (or other electronic medium) to 
produce a signed arbitration agreement. Thus, the production of an unauthenticated 
original or a certified copy of the original arbitration agreement will suffice. To this 
end, if the opposing party intends to challenge the validity of the arbitration 
agreement then, the onus should be on him to show that parties did not consent to 
resolve their dispute via arbitration. Accordingly, Scherer remarked that: 
…the combined reading of Article IV, which provides 
that the applicant needs to “supply” the arbitration 
agreement (in one of the forms prescribed by that 
Article), and Article V, which requires the party 
resisting recognition or enforcement to “furnish [ ] … 
proof” that the agreement was invalid…197  
However, in the United States of America courts hold the view that the enforcing 
party must prove the validity of the arbitration agreement and also satisfy the article 
II (2) formal requirements.
198
 Their view is premised on their interpretation of the 
article IV (1) (b) requirement that the enforcing party supply the arbitration 
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agreement referred to in article II. Such proposition, according to Scherer, is 
conflicting to the unambiguous text of articles IV and V, the pro-arbitration bias of 
the Convention and the intent of the drafters of the Convention. Accordingly, she 
reasoned that: 
The reference in Article IV (1) (b) to the arbitration 
agreement “referred to in [A]rticle II” is merely aimed 
at ensuring “a linguistically proper and consistent 
wording of the text of the Convention.” It was not 
intended to require the applicant to meet the burden of 
proving Article II’s form requirements. Therefore, the 
better view is to interpret Article IV (1) (b) as not 
obliging the applicant to prove that the arbitration 
agreement complies with the written form requirement 
of Article II (2); rather the burden is on the party 
challenging the validity of the arbitration agreement on 
Article II (2) grounds to provide evidence to that 
effect.
199
  
(iii) Translation of arbitration award and/or arbitration agreement  
The idea of supplying the enforcing court a translation of an award and/or the 
arbitration agreement if not made in the official language of the court is to enable the 
court to read and understand the contents of the said arbitral evidence.
200
 The use of 
the word “shall” makes it mandatory for the enforcing party to supply the court with 
a translated and certified copy of the award or arbitration agreement.
201
 This 
requirement is statutory and cannot be dismissed by the court’s familiarity with the 
foreign language of the award or arbitration agreement. Though, van den Berg 
argues that a translation of the award or arbitration agreement is not necessary except 
the court thinks otherwise.
202
 For the translated award and/or agreement to be 
admissible evidence, it must be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a 
diplomatic of consular agent.
203
 In this regard, Otto argues that the purpose of 
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requiring a certified translation is to ensure the reliability of the translated award or 
arbitration agreement.
204
 
In England, a party seeking the enforcement of a NYC award must comply with the 
provisions of section 102 of the AA 1996.
205
 Pursuant to Hiscox v Outhwaite,
206
 to 
rely on this section, the enforcing party must first prove that the award sought to be 
enforced is a NYC award. This can be established by showing that the award was 
rendered pursuant to a written arbitration agreement, in a country, other than the 
United Kingdom which is a party to the NYC. To this effect, Harris, Planterose and 
Tecks have expressed the view that the place where the arbitration agreement is 
signed, despatched, or delivered to any of the parties is immaterial.
207
 
To obtain recognition and enforcement, the enforcing party must submit along with 
its application, cumulatively and not alternatively, the following evidence: (1) a duly 
authenticated original award or a duly certified copy of it, (2) an original arbitration 
agreement or a duly certified copy of it and (3) if the award or agreement is in a 
foreign language, a translation of such document certified by an official or a sworn 
translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent.
208
 This point is evidenced in 
Dardana Ltd v Yukos Oil Company.
 209
 The court in that case held that a party 
seeking recognition and enforcement of a NYC award must produce the award 
rendered by the arbitrator together with the arbitration agreement which gave rise to 
the arbitral proceedings. 
With regard to Nigeria, the enforcement of NYC award is regulated by the 
provisions of section 54 of the ACA. A party seeking recognition and enforcement of 
its NYC award in Nigeria will do so pursuant to article IV to the Second Schedule of 
the ACA.
210
 By the provision of section 54 (1) of the ACA, only awards arising out 
of a contractual relationship rendered in a country that has reciprocal legislation 
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recognising the enforcement of awards rendered in Nigeria in accordance with the 
Convention can be enforced in Nigeria. 
In accordance with article IV to the Second Schedule of the ACA, a party seeking 
recognition and enforcement must supply the court together with its written 
application: (a) a duly authenticated original arbitral award or a duly certified copy 
thereof, (b) an original arbitration agreement of a duly certified copy of it and, (c) if 
the award or agreement is not in English language, a translated copy of the award or 
agreement certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular 
agent. The production of these documents by the enforcing party is cumulative and 
not alternative.
211
 
In Ebokam v Ekwenibe and Sons Trading Co., the Court of Appeal stated that a party 
seeking the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award needs to exhibit in 
support to its written application the arbitral award and the arbitration agreement.
212
 
Further to its decision, the court made a list of five items the enforcing party needs to 
prove to obtain recognition and enforcement, thus: (i) the making of the contract 
which contains the submission, (ii) that the dispute arose within the terms of the 
submission; (iii) that arbitrators were appointed pursuant to the clause which 
contains the submission; (iv) the making of the award; and (v) that the amount has 
not be paid.
213
  
Although, Ebokam was not decided pursuant to the NYC, it appears that the 
conditions stipulated therein amount to additional conditions not stipulated in the 
relevant provision of the ACA. Thus, this thesis agrees with the views expressed by 
Onyema that the requirements of (i) and (ii) will be evidenced by the production of 
the arbitration agreement, thus further proof of facts contained in the arbitration 
agreement is irrelevant.
214
 Furthermore, requirement (iii) is not contemplated by the 
relevant sections of the ACA, however, it is a ground on which the award may be set 
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aside,
215
 requirements (iv) and (v) are evidenced in the arbitral award, copy of which 
is attached to the written application to the court for the enforcement of the award, 
therefore, should be conclusive proof of facts contained therein.
216
 Nevertheless, it 
remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will lift these extra burden placed on 
the enforcing party by the Court of Appeal. 
4.3. Enforceability of awards rendered purely on transnational rules 
The NYC is silent as to enforceability of arbitral award based on either procedural or 
substantive transnational rules or both. Neither article I of the Convention which 
outlines the field of its application, nor article V which provides defences to the 
enforcement of an award, specifically refers to reliance on either procedural or 
substantive transnational law or both. The question that then arises is whether an 
arbitral award rendered on the basis of either procedural or substantive transnational 
rules or both is enforceable in England and Nigeria.  
According to van den Berg, ‘a-national’ or ‘denationalised’ arbitral awards do not 
fall within the ambit of the NYC.
217
 He defines a-national award as resulting from an 
arbitration which is detached from the ambit of a national arbitration law by means 
of parties’ agreement.218 An examination of van den Berg’s definition of a-national 
award indicates that such de-nationalisation is purely procedural.
219
 In effect, only 
those awards which are detached from the procedural arbitration law of a particular 
state are to be regarded as a-national and outside the ambit of the NYC. In his 
argument against the enforceability of such arbitral awards under the NYC, van den 
Berg stated that: 
It should be emphasized that the question whether 
arbitration can be ‘de-nationalised’ must be 
distinguished from the question whether the parties are 
free to provide that the arbitrator is not bound to apply 
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216. Onyema, E. (2010), p. 124.  
217. van den Berg, A. J. (1981), p. 29. 
218. van den Berg, A. J. (1981), pp. 29 – 30. 
219. Zumbansen, P. (2002) “Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and Transnational 
Law”. European Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 400 - 432; Rivkin, D. W. (1993) “Enforceability 
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a national law to the substance of the dispute. Whilst 
the legal status of ‘de-nationalised’ arbitration is 
uncertain, the detachment of the substance from the 
ambit of national laws will generally not encounter 
difficulties. The main reason is that the national courts 
will as a rule not review the merits of the arbitrator’s 
decision. The ‘de-nationalization’ of the substance in 
international arbitration is, in fact, increasingly gaining 
acceptance. This is a welcome development which 
may eventually lead to the establishment of a new 
arbitral lex mercatoria.
220
 
Clearly, van den Berg encourages the use of non-national rules or principles by 
international arbitrators in deciding international commercial disputes. However, he 
argues against the enforcement of procedurally ‘de-nationalized’ arbitral awards 
alluding that such awards are stateless. Admittedly, the NYC applies to the 
enforcement of arbitral awards made in a state other than where the recognition and 
enforcement are sought.
221
 Nonetheless, there is a difference between making an 
award in a state and rendering an award pursuant to the law of that state. An award 
may be rendered in a state without the arbitrator applying the law of that state. This 
is because the place where the award is made may have been elected on the basis of 
neutrality and convenience. A better approach according to Paulsson is that if an 
award based on transnational principles is not contrary to the law of the state where 
it was rendered and the provisions of article V of the NYC, enforcement should not 
be denied under the Convention.
222
  
Again, the proponents of the unenforceability of award that is based on procedural 
transnational rules hold the view that because of the provisions of article V (1) (e) of 
the NYC, a-national awards are unenforceable.
223
 For instance, Lord Collins and 
others argue that: 
…it is still always necessary to connect the conduct of 
the arbitral proceedings to a national legal system, 
which will regulate, for example, the extent of 
autonomy which the parties are permitted to exercise 
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in selecting the arbitral procedure (and any mandatory 
rules from which the parties cannot derogate); the 
assistance which the national courts will provide to the 
arbitration in the grant of provisional measures, 
collection of evidence, etc., and procedures for the 
review of awards.
224
 
However, a careful reading of the provisions of article V (1) (e) of the NYC does not 
support the view of unenforceability of a-national arbitral awards. Article V (1) (e) 
of the Convention does not specifically require that an arbitral award must be made 
pursuant to the procedural or substantive national law of the seat of arbitration. 
Rather, according to Paulsson, article V (1) (e) of the Convention advances the 
concept that an arbitral award becomes binding immediately it is rendered until 
annulled by a competent authority at the seat of the arbitration.
225
 The fact that an 
award was rendered based on transnational rules does not necessarily translate that 
such arbitral award was rendered contrary to the national law of the seat of 
arbitration. A-national awards are not products of lawless laws either.
226
 In any case, 
to avoid annulment of a transnational award, if challenged at the seat, arbitrators are 
generally obliged to observe the cardinal rules of fairness and principles of public 
policy of the seat of arbitration.
227
  
To insist that an arbitral award must be rendered pursuant to the law of the seat of 
arbitration seems to contradict the provisions of the NYC. More so, it means 
compelling the parties to arbitrate on the basis of law, the effect of which may not 
have been contemplated by the parties. Arguably, the intendment of the NYC is not 
to compel parties to arbitrate according to the law of the seat which may not have 
direct nexus with the contract, the parties and the subject matter in dispute. Rather, 
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arbitrators are expected under the NYC to act in accordance with the terms of 
parties’ agreement. While keeping to the terms of parties’ agreement, arbitrators are 
also expected to have regard to the principles of public policy of the country closely 
connected to the contract and the parties. Thus, it is contended that to render an 
award pursuant to transnational rules is to base the decision on legal consideration 
with regard to parties’ interest and public interest of the country closely connected to 
the contract, the subject matter and the parties. 
4.3.1. English courts approach 
Prior to the AA 1996 the predominant understanding was that, English arbitrators 
must apply English conflict of law rules to find the law applicable to the merits of a 
dispute. Arbitrators could not apply any substantive law other than that of a fixed 
and recognisable system.
228
 Thus, transnational rules were not considered a fixed and 
recognisable system because transnational rules are not attached to any particular 
legal system. However, the AA 1996 changed the dynamics of English law on this 
point. 
As a foundation to clarify the change under the AA 1996, it is instructive to set out 
the text of article 28 (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law which stipulates that, “the 
arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the rules of law as are 
chosen by the parties.” The highlighted rules of law include the transnational rules. 
In effect, the parties may choose transnational rules, or in default of any express 
                                                             
228. In Orion Cía Española de Seguros v Belfort Maatschappij [1962] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 257, 
Megaw J held that arbitrators are bound, in general, to apply a fixed and recognisable system 
of law. When the same clause came for interpretation before the Court of Appeal in Eagle 
Star Insurance Co. Ltd. v Yuval Insurance Co. Ltd. [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 357, Lord 
Denning’s positive remark of Megaw J decision, at p. 361 was that, “He was of opinion that 
such a clause was invalid and should be given no effect. Despite its presence, the arbitrators 
were to decide in accordance with the ordinary rules of law. If the arbitrators did not do so, 
their award could be set aside by means of a case stated.” Also in Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt 
& Co. [1922] 2 KB 478 the court declared that, “Arbitrators must understand that parties 
before them have a right to take the opinion of the Court as to whether the arbitrators should 
be given the guidance of the Court in matters of law, and that they must not attempt to stop 
the action of the Courts by interfering with or hindering such a right of parties.” 
Accordingly, Clarkson, C. and Hill, J. (2006) The Conflict of Laws, 3rd edn., Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, pp. 254 – 255, remarked about this orthodox doctrine that, “At 
common law, it was assumed that English arbitrators were bound to apply the choice of law 
rules which were binding on the English courts. This rule was the consequence of the 
traditional English approach that awards could be reviewed by the courts on points of law, 
including choice of law issues.” 
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choice, the arbitrator may elect transnational rules, to govern the determination of the 
dispute referred or submitted to arbitration. 
Unlike the NYC, the AA 1996 is not silent as to the legal validity and authority of 
the disputing parties or the arbitrator to apply transnational rules in the determination 
of disputes referred or submitted to the arbitrator by the parties. Section 46 of the AA 
1996 stipulates that: 
(1) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute- 
(a) in accordance with the law chosen by the 
parties as applicable to the substance of the 
dispute, or 
(b) if the parties so agree, in accordance with such 
other considerations as are agreed by them or 
determined by the tribunal. 
(2) For this purpose the choice of laws of a country 
shall be understood to refer to the substantive 
laws of that country and not its conflict of laws 
rules. 
(3) If or to the extent that there is no such choice or 
agreement, the tribunal shall apply the law 
determined by the conflict of laws rules which 
it considers applicable. 
The question that arises from the above provisions is whether transnational law can 
be regarded as a ‘law’ under section 46 (1) (a) of the AA 199. In the explanatory 
notes to the AA 1996 made by the Departmental Advisory Committee on 
Arbitration, it was stated that section 46 of the Act (then a Bill) mirrors article 28 of 
the Model Law.
229
 Also, the 14
th
 edition of Dicey, Morris & Collins the Conflict of 
Laws notes the changes made by the AA 1996 and asserted that:  
…prior to the 1996 Act, it was axiomatic that an 
English arbitrator was bound to apply English law, 
including the English conflict of laws rules to decide 
the substance of any dispute, and many of the most 
important cases in the conflict of laws arose by way of 
appeal on matters of law from arbitral awards. The 
                                                             
229. Department of Trade and Industry, Consultative Paper on Arbitration Bill (July 1995), 
Section 1 and Section 2: Draft Clauses of an Arbitration Bill, 38. 
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other consequence of this approach was that, just as in 
the English courts an English arbitrator could only 
apply a national legal system, designated as applicable 
by the relevant choice of law rule. The tribunal could 
not apply non-national rules, still less decide the 
dispute ‘ex aequo et bono’ or as an ‘amiable 
compositeur’, on the basis of general principles of 
justice and fairness…230 
Although, there is no case law on the interpretation of whether section 46 (1) (a) of 
AA 1996 relates to a choice of transnational rules, it is submitted in this thesis that 
disputing parties may on the provision of that section choose a fixed and 
recognisable legal system or transnational rules to regulate their dispute.
231
  
In the alternative, are transnational rules regarded as ‘such other considerations’ 
under section 46 (1) (b) of the AA 1996? For Harris, et al, the text of section 46 (1) 
(b) contemplates the likelihood of the parties agreeing that their dispute should be 
determined not in accordance with any system of law, but pursuant to, for example, 
transnational rules, equity and good conscience.
232
 Admittedly, the editors of the 14
th
 
edition of Dicey, Morris & Collins the Conflict of Laws further confirmed that:  
This option allows the parties the freedom to apply a 
set of rules or principles which do not in themselves 
constitute a legal system. Such a choice may thus 
include a non-national set of legal principles (such as 
the 1994 UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts) or, more broadly, general 
principles of commercial law or the lex mercatoria.
233
 
Unlike section 46 (1) (a) of the AA 1996, English courts have considered the 
meaning of ‘such other considerations’ under section 46 (1) (b) of the Act. The 
courts have recognised that on the basis of the section 46 (1) (b) of the AA 1996, 
parties (or arbitrators in absence of parties’ express choice) are permitted the 
autonomy to apply transnational rules to determine the merits of a dispute in 
arbitration. This was demonstrated in the case of Musawi v RE International (UK) 
                                                             
230. Collins, L. et al (eds.) (2006) Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws, 14th  edn., 
Vol. 1, Sweet & Maxwell, London, paras 16 – 047. 
231. Lord Collins, et al (eds.) (2012) at pp. 851 – 852.  
232. Harris, B., et al, (2014) The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 5th edn., Wiley 
Blackwell, UK, p. 245. 
233. Collins, L. et al (eds.) (2006) at paras. 16 – 053. 
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Ltd.
234
 where the court held that section 46(1) (b) of the AA 1996 permits the parties 
to require the arbitrator to apply to the subject matter of the dispute and its 
determination the principles of Shia Sharia law. The court quoted with approval the 
text of paras. 16 – 053 of the 14th edition of Dicey, Morris & Collins the Conflict of 
Laws thus: 
Section 46 (1) (b) allows the parties the freedom to 
apply a set of rules or principles which do not in 
themselves constitute a legal system. Such a choice 
may thus include a non-national set of legal principles 
(such as the 1994 UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts) or, more broadly, 
general principles of commercial law or the lex 
mercatoria.
235
 
Also, in Halpern v Halpern
236
 which concerned the application of Jewish law, the 
Court of Appeal stated that if the seat of arbitration is England, then section 46(1) (b) 
of the AA 1996 would authorise the arbitral tribunal to apply the parties’ choice of 
transnational rules to regulate the merits of their dispute.
237
 The courts’ interpretation 
of section 46 of the AA 1996 is apt and it suggests that English courts will enforce 
arbitral awards that are rendered pursuant to transnational rules.
238
 
4.3.2. Nigerian courts’ approach 
The legal validity of parties to elect and the arbitrator to apply transnational rules in 
the determination of dispute is guaranteed under the ACA. Section 47 of the ACA 
provides that:  
(1) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in 
accordance with the rules in force in the country 
whose laws the parties have chosen as applicable 
to the substance of the disputes 
                                                             
234. [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. (Ch) 326. 
235. Musawi [2008]; Collins, L. et al (eds.) (2006) at paras. 16 – 053. 
236. [2007] EWCA Civ 291. 
237. In the case of Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft v Ras Al Khaimah National Oil 
Co. [1987] 3 WLR 1023, (decided under the relevant provisions of AA 1950 and AA 1975 
respectively) enforcement of a foreign award was resisted on the premise that the arbitral 
tribunal had determined as the governing law a common denominator of rules underlying the 
laws of various countries regulating contractual relations. The court of Appeal held that this 
did not affect the validity and enforceability of the award in England. 
238. Baron, G. (1999) “Do the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
Form a New Lex Mercatoria?” Arbitration International, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 115 – 130. 
175 
 
(2) Any designation of the law or legal system of a 
country shall, unless otherwise expressed, be 
construed as directly referring to the substantive 
law of that country and not to its conflict of laws 
rules 
(3) Where the laws of the country to be applied is not 
determined by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall 
apply the law determined by the conflict of laws 
rules which it considers applicable 
(4) The arbitral tribunal shall not decide ex aequo et 
bono or as amiable compositeur unless the parties 
have expressly authorised it to do so 
(5) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in 
accordance with the terms of the contract and shall 
take account of the usages of the trade applicable 
to the transaction 
(6) If the arbitration law of the country where the 
award is made requires that the award be filed or 
registered by the arbitral tribunal, the arbitral 
tribunal shall comply with this requirement within 
the period of time required by law 
The question that arises from section 47 (5) is whether the text “usages of the trade 
applicable to the transaction” contemplates transnational rules. According to 
Oduntan, ‘trade usages’ constitute the core of transnational rules and they are 
capable of filling in gaps in contract and interpreting contract terms.
239
 Viewed from 
this context, Nwakoby contend that the text “the usages of the trade applicable to the 
transaction” contained in section 47 (5) imply elements of transnational rules.240  
The provision of section 47 of the ACA modelled upon article 28 of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law is primarily directed to questions of choice of law applicable to 
substance of dispute. Accordingly, the provision of article 28 (4) of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, which is section 47 (5) of the ACA, underpins the provision of article 
28 (2) and (3) of the Model Law, which is section 47 (3) and (4) of the ACA. To this 
end, Davidson remarks that the arbitrator’s choice of conflict of law rules or 
approach to amiable composition must be informed by the terms of the contract and 
                                                             
239. Oduntan, G. (2016), p. 79. 
240. Nwakoby, G. C. (2004) at pp. 245 – 247. 
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any usages of trade applicable to the transaction.
241
 Arguably, Davidson’s view 
demonstrates a fair clarification of the drafters’ intent and purpose of article 28 (4) of 
the Model Law and by extension section 47 (5) of the ACA.  This observation is 
against the backdrop of the clear mandatory stipulation of article 28 (4) of the Model 
Law and section 47 (5) of the ACA. 
Though presently, there is no reported case law in Nigeria to aid an examination of 
the court’s interpretation of section 47 of the ACA. However, in TCL Air 
Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co. Ltd. v The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia & 
anor., 
242
 the High Court of Australia interpreted the provision of article 28 (1) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law as not precluding arbitrators from applying transnational 
rules. TCL argued that article 28 of the Model Law which requires the arbitrators to 
“decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law as are chosen by the parties 
as applicable to the substance of the dispute”, limited arbitrators’ authority under an 
arbitration agreement to deciding a dispute base on the law chosen by the parties. 
TCL contended that an award based on laws or rules not chosen by the parties is not 
binding on the parties pursuant to article 34 (2) (iv) of the Model Law. The court 
rejected TCL’s argument and found that the working papers of the UNCITRAL 
working group for the preparation of the Model Law reveal that the understanding of 
article 28 is that a miss-application (as distinct from a non-application) of the rules of 
law chosen by the parties does not amount to an excess of power leading to 
nullification of an arbitral award. 
4.4. Summary 
This chapter examined English and Nigerian courts attitudes to enforcement of 
arbitral awards. It also discussed whether the methods for enforcement of awards in 
both countries are effective. The chapter also demonstrated that arbitral awards 
rendered pursuant to transnational legal principles are enforceable in England and 
Nigeria, provided, such award did not violate the provisions of the AA 1996 and the 
ACA respectively. It concludes that the enforcement methods in both countries are 
effective and reflect the pro-enforcement regime of the NYC. The next chapter will 
examine attitudes of courts towards annulment of arbitral awards.   
                                                             
241. Davidson, F. P. (1991) International Commercial Arbitration: Scotland and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, W. Green/Sweet & Maxwell, Edinburgh, pp. 142 – 152. 
242. [2013] HCA 5. 
177 
 
Chapter five 
Attitudes of courts towards setting aside arbitral awards 
5.0. Introduction   
Most arbitration agreement, laws and rules stipulate that the arbitral award that result 
from arbitration under those laws or rules are ‘final and binding on the parties.’ Yet 
there is almost always the likelihood that a party will challenge the award. This is 
because no arbitration process guarantees due process and justice in every instance. 
Thus, a party to arbitration would need to have the opportunity to challenge the 
award if it has reason to do so. Such active challenge may be to set aside, or suspend 
or remit the award back to the arbitrator pursuant to an error within the award or 
some injustice that has led to the rendering of the award.
1
 This challenge process has 
been remarked by Kerr as a “bulwark against corruption, arbitrariness and bias.”2 For 
Tweeddale and Tweeddale, it is “a fundamental part of the arbitral process because it 
provides a system of checks and balances.”3 A successful challenge against the 
award will usually result in the award being set aside,
4
 and thus cease to exist, at 
least within the jurisdiction of the country of annulment. 
What is more important in the setting aside scheme is courts’ attitude towards a 
challenge to annul an award. This thesis argues that courts’ supportive and pragmatic 
approach to such annulment will improve the efficacy of international arbitration 
instead of abolishing the annulment scheme. This chapter is a precursor to the 
examination of courts’ attitude towards refusing enforcement of arbitral award that 
has been set aside at the seat of arbitration under 6.1.6.2 of chapter six. On one hand, 
it fleshes out the policy considerations of the English and Nigerian courts when 
asked to set aside an award. On the other hand, it engages whether the courts would 
be mindful of those considerations when moved to enforce an award set aside at the 
seat of arbitration on other grounds. Thus, this chapter examines the issue of the seat 
as the proper forum for challenging an award (5.1), the notion of setting aside awards 
                                                             
1. Tweeddale, A. and Tweeddale, K. (2005) Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International 
and English Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 372 – 373. 
2. Kerr, M. (1985) “Arbitration and the Courts: The UNCITRAL Model Law”, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 1 – 24 at p. 15. 
3. Tweeddale, A. and Tweeddale, K. (2005), pp. 372 – 373. 
4. The phrase ‘set aside’ is used interchangeably with ‘annulment’ in this thesis. 
178 
 
(5.2), and the attitude of courts toward a challenge to set aside arbitral awards (5.3), 
particularly the English and Nigerian courts. 
5.1. Establishing the nationality of an arbitral award 
The first step in challenging an international arbitral award is to determine the 
nationality of the award. Thereafter, the unsuccessful party in the arbitration may 
then seek to challenge the award in the courts of the country where the award was 
rendered. Article V (1) (e) of the NYC relates to an award being “set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of 
which, that award was made”. Article V (1) (e) of the Convention raises the issue of 
identifying the nationality of an award either by territorial criterion (the country in 
which that award was made), or applicable law criterion (under the law of which that 
award was made). The NYC provides no assistance as to how this issue may be 
determined. This gap has led to many debates amongst commentators and divergent 
judicial decisions. 
Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, the seat of arbitration is usually the country that 
the parties have specified in their arbitration agreement as the place of arbitration. In 
the absence of an agreement between the parties, the seat of arbitration is then 
determined by the arbitrator having regard to the circumstances of the case and the 
convenience of the parties.
5
 In Bharat Aluminium Co. v Kaiser Aluminium Technical 
Services Inc.,
6
 the Indian Supreme Court abandoned its earlier decision in National 
Thermal Power Corp.,
7
 and held that Indian courts are not empowered to set aside 
foreign arbitral awards. The Supreme Court clarified that this would be the case even 
if the law applicable to the substantive dispute was Indian law. The court further 
reasoned that holding otherwise would be consistent with article V (1) (e) of the 
                                                             
5. Article 20 (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
6. (2012) 9 SCC 522. 
7. In National Thermal Power Corp. v The Singer Co., the Indian Supreme Court held on 
appeal that an award rendered in England was nonetheless a domestic Indian award, not 
subject to the NYC in Indian Courts. The court reasoned that the award was made pursuant 
to an arbitration agreement regulated by Indian law. India’s enactment of the Model Law 
notwithstanding, the court further held that India is the proper forum for challenging awards 
rendered abroad. Thus, the court stated, at pages 407 – 409, that: 
… the overriding principle … that the courts of the country whose 
substantive laws govern the arbitration agreement are the competent 
courts in respect of all matters arsing under the arbitration agreement … 
An award is ‘foreign’ not merely because it is made in the territory of a 
foreign state, but because it is made in such a territory on an arbitration 
agreement not governed by the law of India. 
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NYC. To this end, the arbitral award is deemed rendered at the seat of arbitration 
elected by the parties or determined by the arbitrator. Tweeddale and Tweeddale 
arguing in support of the territorial criterion stated that, “treating the seat of 
arbitration as the place where the award is made provides a relatively certain method 
of ascertaining the country in which to challenge an award.”8 Though this view has 
been widely canvassed, it is still controversial whether parties can choose a 
procedural law other than that of the place of arbitration.
9
  
In relation to the applicable law criterion, views are divided as to whether the text of 
article V (1) (e) of the NYC which stipulates, “… under the law of which, that award 
was made,” relates to the procedural law or the law applicable to the arbitration 
agreement (or principal contract). For example, Swiss law provides that the parties to 
arbitration may, “subject the arbitral procedure to the procedural law of their 
choice.”10 Conversely, in Hitachi Ltd and Mitsui & Co. Deutschland v Rupali 
Polyster,
11
 the Pakistan Supreme Court held on appeal that the choice of law clause 
governing the principal contract also determined the law applicable to the arbitration 
agreement. The choice of law clause referred to Pakistan and on that ground, the 
Supreme Court held that the Pakistan court had jurisdiction to determine a motion to 
set aside an award rendered in England. 
This thesis argues that the position adopted by the Pakistan Supreme Court in 
Hitachi Ltd seems to misinterpret the second alternative of article V (1) (e) of the 
NYC. Article V (1) (e)’s second alternative, “under the law of which, [the] award 
was made”, denotes the country whose law the procedural law of the arbitration 
applies. The NYC clearly distinguishes between the law regulating the arbitration 
agreement and the law regulating the procedure of the arbitration. Article V (1) (a) of 
the Convention provides for the law regulating the arbitration agreement, while 
article V (1) (e) of the Convention provides for the law regulating the procedure of 
                                                             
8. Tweeddale, A. and Tweeddale, K. (2005) at p. 373. 
9. Mann, F. A. (1992) “Where is an Award Made?” in Mann, F. A. Notes and Comments on 
Cases in International Law, Commercial Law and Arbitration, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 
29; Sammartano, M. R. (1990) International Arbitration Law, Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publisher, Deventer, pp. 15 – 24. 
10. Article 182, Ch. 12, Swiss Private International Law 1987. 
11. (2000) Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Vol. XXV, 486. 
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the arbitration, which includes procedural transnational rules.
12
 Hence, Born 
remarked that: 
The correct interpretation of Article V (1) (e)’s second 
alternative is that it refers to procedural law of the 
arbitration, and not to other possible laws (such as the 
substantive law governing the parties’ underlying 
dispute or the arbitration agreement)… that is evident 
from the phrase “under the law of which [the] award 
was made”, which refers to the process of making the 
award (ie. the arbitral proceedings), rather than to the 
formation or validity of the arbitration agreement (much 
less the underlying contract).
13
 
5.1.1. English courts’ approach 
The seat of the arbitration is defined by section 3 of the AA 1996, thus: 
… ‘the seat of the arbitration’ means the juridical seat 
of the arbitration designated – 
(a) by the parties to the arbitration, or 
(b) by any arbitral or other institution or person vested 
by the parties with powers in that regard, or 
(c) by the arbitral tribunal if so authorised by the 
parties, 
or determined in the absence of any such designation, 
having regards to the parties’ agreement and all the 
relevant circumstances. 
In effect, the seat of arbitration is the place or country expressly or impliedly 
designated as such. The seat may be determined by express agreement of the parties, 
by the arbitrator or an arbitration institution, if the arbitration is institutional, 
pursuant to powers delegated by the parties. In default of section 3 (a) (b) and the 
first limb of (c) of the AA 1996, the court on an application by either party can 
designate the seat of the arbitration taken into consideration all the relevant 
                                                             
12. Scherer, M. (2005) “The Recognition of Transnational Substantive Rules by Courts in 
Arbitral Matters”, in Gaillard, E., Schlaepfer, A. V., Pinsolle, P. and Degos, L. (eds.), 
Towards a Uniform International Arbitration Law?, Juris Publishing, New York, pp. 91 – 
334. 
13. Born, G. B. (2012) International Arbitration: Law and Practice, Kluwer Law International, 
The Netherlands, p. 309. 
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circumstances.
14
 In U & M Mining Zambia Ltd. v Konkola Copper Mines Plc
15
 the 
court held that a clause referring dispute to LCIA and further stipulating that “the 
place of the arbitration shall be England …” made it plain that the parties had elected 
the seat of the arbitration to be England.  
According to Merkin and Flannery, the text “having regard to the parties’ agreement 
and all the relevant circumstances” under section 3 (c) of the AA 1996, implies that 
common law rules continue to apply to the determination of the seat of the 
arbitration.
16
 Under the common law, there is a presumption that the seat of the 
arbitration will be determined in the absence of any express choice of seat, by 
express choice of procedural law.
17
 An arbitral award is made in England and Wales 
or Northern Ireland if the juridical seat of the arbitration is designated or determined 
as England and Wales or Northern Ireland. It is immaterial where the award was 
signed, dispatched or received by the parties.
18
  
Furthermore, section 100 (2) (b) of the AA 1996 stipulates that “an award shall be 
treated as made at the seat of the arbitration, regardless of where it was signed, 
despatched or delivered to any of the parties.” The section is for purposes of 
enforcing a NYC award in England. The effect of the text “regardless of where it 
was signed, dispatched or delivered to any of the parties” contained in both sections 
53 and 100 (2) (b) of the AA 1996 is to outlaw the decision of the House of Lords in 
Hiscox v Outhwaite.
19
  
5.1.2. Nigerian courts’ approach 
The place of arbitration will be the place elected by the parties, or in default, a place 
determined by the arbitrator. The parties’ freedom to choose the place of the 
                                                             
14. Merkin, R. and Flannery, L. (2014) Arbitration Act 1996, 5th edn., Informa Law from 
Routledge, Oxon, pp. 18 – 21. 
15. [2013] EWHC 260 (Comm). 
16. Merkin, R. and Flannery, L. (2014), pp. 18 – 21. 
17. Naviera Amazonica Peruana SA v Compania International de Seguros de Peru [1988] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 116. 
18. Section 53 of the AA 1996 also provides that: 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where the seat of the arbitration is 
in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, any award in the proceedings 
shall be treated as made there, regardless of where it was signed, 
dispatched or delivered to any of the parties. 
19. In Hiscox v Outhwaite [1992] an award was held to have been rendered in Paris, France, 
mainly because the award was signed in Paris, even though the arbitration was conducted in 
London and had no link with France. 
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arbitration, or the arbitrator’s power to determine or designate a place of the 
arbitration, where the parties have not chosen one, is regulated by the provisions of 
section 16 of the ACA.
20
  
Nonetheless, section 16 of the ACA is silent as to circumstances where an arbitrator 
fails to designate a seat in the absence of parties’ agreement to that effect. The 
question that then arises is how to identify the seat of arbitration (or the nationality 
of the award) for purposes of setting aside the award. In such a case, this thesis 
argues that the effective place of arbitration should be held as the seat of arbitration. 
The effective place of arbitration in this context should be the place where all 
relevant actions in the arbitration took place, or if this cannot be ascertained, the 
place where the last hearing was conducted. This proposition is illustrated in 
Oberlandesgerich Dusseldorf.
21
 In Oberlandesgerich, the seat of arbitration was 
neither agreed upon by the parties nor determined by the arbitrators as stipulated by 
article 20 (1) of the Model Law. A German court held that the seat of arbitration was 
the effective place of arbitration or, if this cannot be determined, the place of the last 
oral hearing.
22
 
5.2. Setting aside vs non-enforcement of award 
This section distinguishes setting aside an award from resisting the enforcement of 
the award. Although the two schemes overlap and complement each other, they are 
distinct. Thus, Asouzu remarked that, the notions of setting aside (or annulment) of 
an award and the recognition or enforcement of an award are two distinct 
procedures, though they are closely inter-related.
23
 The general rule is that a party to 
the arbitration may bring an action before a competent court to set aside the award if 
                                                             
20. Section 16 corresponds with article 20 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and according to 
Akpata, it is designed primarily for international commercial arbitration. Akpata, E. (1997) 
The Nigerian Arbitration Law in Focus, West African Bok Publishers Ltd., Lagos, pp. 50 – 
52. 
21. 6 Sch 02/99, 23 March 2000; CLOUT Case No. 374. 
22. Though not expressly stated, it appears that pursuant to section 47 (6) of the ACA, which 
makes reference to “the arbitration law of the country where the award was made…,” 
Nigeria courts will hold that the nationality of an award is the law of the country where the 
award was made.  
23. Asouzu, A. A. (1995) “The National Arbitration Law and International Commercial 
Arbitration: The Indispensability of the National Court and the Setting Aside Procedure”, 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 68 – 97. 
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it believes it has a valid reason to do so.
24
 However, legal proceedings to set aside 
awards are most often sought by the unsuccessful party in the arbitration.
25
 With 
enforcement proceedings, the successful party commences the action against the 
unsuccessful party in a country in which it believes the unsuccessful party has assets.  
In international arbitration, there is a difference in terms of the place where legal 
action for setting aside an award and resistance against an award are sought. Legal 
action for the setting aside of an award is usually sought before a competent court 
where the arbitration took place. On the other hand, resisting enforcement of an 
award always take place before a competent court in an enforcing country.
26
 
Accordingly, Asouzu noted that in most cases, the very common situations, an action 
to set aside an award and an application to recognise or enforce an award takes place 
in different countries at different times.
27
 However, in domestic arbitration, both 
actions are taken before a competent court in the country where the arbitral award 
was rendered. 
The consequence of setting aside an award and the implication of non-enforcement 
of an award differ considerably.
28
 For instance, if an award is successfully annulled, 
it follows that such award loses its legal force and effect, at least, in the country 
where the award was rendered.
29
 On the other hand, a refusal to enforce an award by 
a competent court would appear to be effective only in the country where such 
enforcement was sought.
30
 In Astro Nusantara International v PT Ayunda Prima 
Mitra
31
 the Hong Kong Court of First Instance stated that:  
                                                             
24. Article 34 (2) (a) of the UNCITRAL Model Law “if the party making the application …” 
sections 67 (1), 68 (1) and 69 (1) of the AA 1996, “A party to arbitral proceedings may …” 
sections 29 (1), 30 (1) “a party” and section 48 (a) of the ACA, “the party making the 
application.” 
25. Morrissey, J. F. and Graves, J. M. (2008) International Sales Law and Arbitration: Problems, 
Cases and Commentary, Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, pp. 460 – 462. 
26. van den Berg, A. J. (2014) “Should the setting aside of the Arbitral Award be  Abolished?”  
ICSID Review, pp. 1 – 26. 
27. Asouzu, A. A. (1995), p. 77. 
28. Thadikkaran, M. (2014) “Enforcement of Annulled Arbitral Awards: What is and What 
Ought to Be?” Journal of International Arbitration, vol. 31, No. 5, pp. 575 – 608. 
29. However, in Astro Nusantara International [2015] the courts took a pragmatic view that an 
award annulled at the seat of arbitration still remains effective. 
Societe Hilmarton v Societe Ominum de traitement et de valorisation (1994) Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration, vol. XIX, p. 655; Chromallory Aeroservices v Arab Republic of 
Egypt, 939 F Supp 907 (DDC 1996). 
30. Scherer, M. (2016) “Effects of International Judgments Relating to Awards”, Pepperdine 
Law Review, Vol. 43, pp. 637 – 646. 
31. [2015] HCCT 45/2010 [28] (C.F.I.) (Legal Reference System) (H.K).  
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The fact that an award has been refused enforcement 
by a court in another jurisdiction … is not a ground for 
resisting enforcement of the arbitral award… under the 
NYC…32 
5.3. The attitudes of courts 
Arising from the provisions of article V (1) (e) of the NYC is the enforcing court’s 
discretion to refuse enforcement of an award that has been set aside at the seat of the 
arbitration. Clearly, the text of the Convention provides no assistance in relation to 
the grounds that may be relied upon to set aside an award at the arbitral seat. Thus, 
the grounds upon which an international arbitral award may be set aside are 
stipulated by national legislations as interpreted by the courts. A statement of the 
Supreme Court of India in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd v Aksh Optifbre Ltd. & 
anor
33
 is illustrative of this position, thus: 
…under the new law [Arbitration and Conciliation Act 
1996] the grounds on which an award of an arbitrator 
could be challenged before the court have been 
severely cut down and such challenge is now permitted 
on the basis of invalidity of the agreement, want of 
jurisdiction on the part of the Arbitrator or want of 
proper notice to a party of the appointment of the 
Arbitrator or of Arbitral proceedings.
34
 
Also, in Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons WLL v Toys “R” Us, Inc.35 the United States 
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit stated that: 
We read Article V (1) (e) of the Convention to allow a 
court in the country under whose law the arbitration 
was conducted to apply domestic arbitral law, in this 
case the FAA, to motion to set aside or vacate that 
arbitral award… There is no indication in the 
Convention of any intention to deprive the rendering 
state of its supervisory authority over an arbitral 
award, including its authority to set aside that award 
under domestic law… The Convention specifically 
contemplates that the state in which, or under the law 
                                                             
32. Astro Nusantara International [2015]. 
33. [2005] 1 NSC 417. 
34. Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd [2005]. 
35. 126 F.3d 15, (2d Civ. 1997). 
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of which, the award is made, will be free to set aside or 
modify an award in accordance with domestic arbitral 
law and its full panoply of express and implied 
grounds of relief.
36
 
Although, it is clear that the NYC does not expressly restrict the scope of national 
courts’ review of awards in setting aside proceedings, Born has suggested that a 
better approach would be to construe the Convention as impliedly doing so. He 
based his argument on the fact that the Convention requires Contracting States to 
recognise arbitration agreement pursuant to article II of the Convention, which 
reflects parties’ consent to a final and binding award.37 Born further reasoned that, 
concluding that the Convention does not impose limits on the setting aside of awards 
at the arbitral seat, an annulling court would, at least in principle, be free to subject 
all international awards rendered in its territory to de novo judicial review.
38
 Hence, 
he remarked that: 
…most national arbitration regimes have adopted 
broadly similar approaches to the grounds for 
annulment of international awards – generally, but not 
always, limiting such review to bases paralleling those 
for non-recognition of awards in Article V of the 
Convention.
39
 
 5.3.1. Common grounds for setting aside international arbitral awards 
According to van den Berg, up until in the 1980s, national arbitration legislations 
stipulated different grounds for setting aside arbitral awards.
40
 Apparently, that 
changed with the introduction of the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985. Admittedly, 
the Model Law proved to be successful with arbitration legislations based on it 
implemented one way or the other, in 72 countries in a total of 102 jurisdictions.
41
  
The grounds on which arbitral awards may be set aside as stipulated in article 34 (2) 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law are: lack of validity of the arbitration agreement, lack 
                                                             
36. Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons WLL [1997] at pp. 22 – 23. 
37. Article II of the NYC requires Contracting States to recognise arbitration agreements; Born, 
G. B. (2012), p. 312. 
38. Born, G. B. (2009) International Commercial Arbitration, Vol. II, Kluwer Law International, 
The Netherlands, pp. 2556 – 2560. 
39. Born, G. B. (2012) at p. 311. 
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of due process in the arbitral proceedings, excess of authority concerning relief 
sought, irregularity in the appointment of the arbitral tribunal; irregular procedure or 
a violation of the applicable arbitral rules or law, arbitrability of the subject-matter of 
the dispute, and the award in conflict with the public policy of the country where the 
award was rendered. Nonetheless, the implementation of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law is not uniform around the globe. Although England is not part of the countries 
that adopted or implemented the Model Law, the grounds for setting aside an award, 
particularly sections 67 and 68 of the AA 1996 reflect the grounds set out under 
article 34 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. As highlighted in Chapter One of this 
thesis, the Nigerian ACA is drafted to implement the UNCITAL Model Law. 
5.4. English courts approach to setting aside arbitral awards 
The AA 1996 contemplates three main grounds for the setting aside of an award. 
These grounds are; lack of jurisdiction, serious irregularity and error of law. Before a 
party can challenge the arbitral award on any of these grounds, the party must satisfy 
the court of three things. Firstly, the party must show that it has exhausted all the 
internal remedies with the arbitration process, if any. Secondly, the party should also 
have exhausted its right pursuant to section 57 of the Act. Thirdly, such challenge 
must be brought within 28 days of the date of the award.  
5.4.1. Lack of substantive jurisdiction 
Section 67 of the AA 1996 provides: 
(1) A party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to 
the other parties and to the tribunal) apply to the 
court  
(a) challenging any award of the arbitral tribunal as to 
its substantive jurisdiction; or  
(b) for an order declaring an award made by the 
tribunal on the merits to be of no effect, in whole 
or in part, because the tribunal did not have 
substantive jurisdiction 
A party may lose the right to object (see section 73) 
and the right to apply is subject to the restrictions in 
section 70(2) and (3). 
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(2) The arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral 
proceedings and make a further award while an 
application to the court under this section is 
pending in relation to an award as to jurisdiction. 
(3) On application under this section challenging an 
award of the arbitral tribunal is to its substantive 
jurisdiction, the court may by order – 
(a) confirm the award, 
(b) vary the award, or 
(c) set aside the award in whole or in part. 
(4) The leave of the court is required for any appeal 
from a decision of the court under this section. 
In determining whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction, the courts are guided by 
section 30 of the Act which relates to the competence of the arbitrator to rule on its 
own jurisdiction. The questions the court is called upon to address regarding the 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction are: whether there was a valid arbitration agreement between 
the parties, whether the arbitrator was properly appointed, and whether the arbitrator 
determined disputes which were not submitted or referred to arbitration by the 
disputing parties.
42
 The reason for the determination of whether an arbitrator has 
jurisdiction is strikingly because of the fact that arbitration is a creation of contract 
and parties must mutually agree to resolve their dispute by arbitration. 
In Republic of Serbia v Imagesat International NV
43
 the High Court considered an 
application pursuant to section 67 of the AA 1996. The matter was in respect to a 
challenge to the substantive jurisdiction of an ICC tribunal. The arbitrator had 
initially ruled inter alia, that it had jurisdiction to determine whether the applicant 
had vested on the tribunal jurisdiction to rule if the applicant was a party to the 
arbitration agreement. In arriving at its decision, the court relied on Azov Shipping 
Co. v Baltic Shipping Co.,
44
 and held that if the seat of the arbitration is England and 
Wales or Northern Ireland, the court will examine the issue of jurisdiction brought 
under sections 32 and 67 of the Act as a full review. In Republic of Serbia, though 
the court dismissed the challenge, it stated that in hearing an application pursuant to 
section 67, “it is for the court to determine whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction and 
whether he was correct in deciding that he did.” Following the approach in Azov, the 
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court also pronounced that the decision of the arbitrator concerning jurisdiction is 
only provisional. 
Also in Habas Sinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar Isthisal Endustri AS v Sometal SAL
45
 and 
Norscot Rig Management PVT Ltd. v Essar Oilfields Services Ltd
46
 respectively, the 
High Court considered the effect of section 67 of the Act. Though, the cases were 
respectively dismissed, the court had no reservations for conducting a full review of 
the jurisdiction challenges. 
5.4.2. Serious irregularity  
Section 68 of the Act provides that: 
(1) A party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties 
and to the tribunal) apply to the court challenging an award in the 
proceedings on the ground of serious irregularity affecting the 
tribunal, the proceedings or the award. 
A party may lose the right to object (see section 73), and the right to 
apply is subject to the restrictions in section 70(2) and (3). 
(2) Serious irregularity means irregularity of one or more of the 
following kinds which the court considers has caused or will cause 
substantial injustice to the applicant –  
(a) failure by the tribunal to comply with section 33 (general duty of 
tribunal) 
(b) the tribunal exceeding its powers (otherwise than by exceeding its 
substantive jurisdiction; see section 67); 
(c) failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in accordance with 
the procedure agreed by the parties 
(d) failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues that were put to it; 
(e) any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the parties with 
powers in relation to the proceedings or the award exceeding its 
powers; 
(f) uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the award; 
(g) the award being obtained by fraud or the award or the way in which 
it was procured being contrary to public policy; 
(h) failure to comply with the requirements as to the form of the awards; 
or 
(i) any irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings or in the award 
which is admitted by the tribunal or by any arbitral or other 
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institution or person vested by the parties with powers in relation to 
the proceedings or the award. 
(3) If there is shown to be serious irregularity affecting the tribunal, the 
proceedings or the award, the court may –  
(a) remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or in part, for 
reconsideration, 
(b) set the award aside in whole or in part, or 
(c) declare the award to be of no effect, in whole or in part. 
The court shall not exercise its power to set aside or to declare an award 
to be of no effect, in whole or in part, unless it is satisfied that it would 
be inappropriate to remit the matters in question to the tribunal for 
reconsideration. 
(4) The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of 
the court under this section. 
A challenge of irregularity can relate to the arbitrator, the arbitral proceedings or to 
the arbitral award. Accordingly, the presence of any one or more of the grounds set 
out in section 68 (2) (a) to (i) of the Act will be deemed to have given rise to serious 
irregularity, provided that they caused or will cause substantial injustice to the 
applicant. The grounds as spelt out under section 68 (2) of the AA 1996 are 
exhaustive and materially the same with section 103 grounds for refusing 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in England. These grounds, at least in 
principle, mirror article 34 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law grounds for setting 
aside arbitral awards. The sections 68 (2) (a) to (i) and 103 grounds are examined in 
detail under chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Under section 68 (2) there are high evidentiary hurdles in the way of a party seeking 
to set aside an award to satisfy.
47
 The DAC in its report set out the threshold on how 
to overcome the hurdles and the approach to be adopted by the courts to application 
pursuant to section 68. The report stated that: 
The test of ‘substantial injustice’ is intended to be applied by way of 
support for the arbitral process, not by way of interference with that 
process. Thus, it is only in those cases where it can be said that what has 
happened is so far removed from what could reasonably be expected of 
the arbitral process that we would expect the court to take action. The 
test is not what would have happened had the matter been litigated. To 
                                                             
47. Harris, B, et al, (2014) The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 5th edn., Wiley Blackwell, 
Oxford, pp. 336 – 337. 
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apply such, a test would be to ignore the fact that the parties have agreed 
to arbitrate, not litigate. Having chosen arbitration, the parties cannot 
validly complain of substantial injustice unless what has happen simply 
cannot on any view be defended as an acceptable consequence of that 
choice. In short [section 68] is really designed as a long stop, only 
available in extreme cases where the tribunal has gone so wrong in its 
conduct of the arbitration that justice calls out for it to be corrected.
48
 
In Lesotho Highlands v Impregilo SpA
49
 Lord Steyn remarked that the requirement 
of ‘serious irregularity’ imposes a high threshold and it must be established that the 
irregularity caused or would cause substantial injustice to the claimant. He pointed 
out that these requirements were “designed to eliminate technical and unmeritorious 
challenges”. Thus, the irregularity complained of must fall within the closed list of 
categories in section 68 (2) of the Act. A recent court decision in The Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v Raytheon Systems Ltd.
50
 demonstrates English 
courts attitudes towards annulment of arbitral award pursuant to section 68 of the 
AA 1996. It also contains helpful guidance on the high evidentiary tests which a 
party seeking to set aside an award will need to satisfy in order for a challenge under 
section 68 to succeed. 
 In The Secretary of State for the Home Department v Raytheon Systems Ltd, the 
defendant was engaged by the claimant to design, develop and deliver a new e-
border technology equipment to reform border control in the UK. The contract 
contained arbitration clause. When the claimant terminated the contract, a dispute 
arose concerning the liability for the termination of the contract. The dispute was 
referred to arbitration by the claimant. The arbitral tribunal rendered a partial award 
and subsequently corrected the award twice by a memorandum. The tribunal found 
that the claimant had unlawfully terminated the contract between the parties and 
thus, awarded damages in excess of £126 million plus approximately £60 million as 
interest in favour of the defendant. 
The claimant challenged the partial award and moved the court to set aside the 
award. The claimant relied on section 68 (2) (d) of the AA 1996, and argued that the 
arbitral tribunal had failed to deal with two issues of liability and three issues of 
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quantum in respect of the £126 million awarded. It further argued that those issues 
had been put to the tribunal and were critical to the determination of the arbitration. 
The court in The Secretary of State for the Home Department quoting with approval 
the House of Lords case of Lesotho Highlands v Impregilo SpA
51
 noted that section 
68 of the AA 1996 reflects “internationally accepted view that the court should be 
able to correct serious failures to comply with the due process of arbitral 
proceedings.” The court further remarked that courts should strive to uphold arbitral 
awards and should not approach awards “with a meticulous legal eye endeavouring 
to pick holes, inconsistencies and faults on award with the objective of upsetting or 
frustrating the process of arbitration.”52 
However, on what will constitute substantial injustice under section 68 of the Act, 
the court in The Secretary of State for the Home Department reiterated that there was 
a ‘high threshold’ to be met to establish that a failure to address an issue amounts to 
a serious irregularity causing substantial injustice to the applicant. The court 
reasoned that there would be a failure to deal with an issue where the determination 
of that issue is essential to the decision reached in the award. The court then added 
that: 
An essential issue arises in this context where the 
decision cannot be justified as a particular key issue 
has not been decided which is critical to the result and 
there has not been a decision on all the issues 
necessary to resolve the dispute or disputes.
53
 
Relying on Vee Network Ltd v Econet Wireless International,
54
 the court held that in 
order to satisfy the substantial injustice test, a claimant do not need to demonstrate 
that it would have succeeded on the issue which the tribunal failed to deal with. 
Nonetheless, it is necessary for the claimant to show that, “…[its] position was 
reasonably arguable; and had the tribunal found in [its] favour, the tribunal might 
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well have reached a different conclusion in its award.”55 In the final analysis, the 
court found in favour of the claimant. 
5.4.3. Appeal on point of law 
An award may also be set aside by the court if satisfied that the decision of the 
arbitrator on a legal point is evidently wrong. In this context according to the 
decision in London Underground Ltd v City Link Telecommunications Ltd,
56
 the test 
is not based on the probable conclusion of a court but on the expected decision of a 
reasonable arbitrator. Challenging the award on point of law is stipulated in section 
69 of the AA 1996, thus: 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to arbitral proceedings 
may (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) appeal to 
the court on a question of law arising out of an award made in the 
proceedings. 
An agreement to dispense with reasons for the tribunal’s award shall be 
considered an agreement to exclude the court’s jurisdiction under this 
section. 
(2) An appeal shall not be brought under this section except –  
(a) with the agreement of all the other parties to the proceedings, or 
(b) with the leave of the court 
The right to appeal is also subject to the restrictions in section 70 (2) and 
(3) 
(3) Leave to appeal shall be given only if the court is satisfied –  
(a) that the determination of the question will substantially affect the 
rights of one or more of the parties 
(b) that the question is one which the tribunal was asked to determine, 
(c) that, on the basis of the findings of fact in the award –  
i. the decision of the tribunal on the question is obviously wrong, 
or 
ii. the question is one of general public importance and the 
decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt, and 
(d) that, despite the agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by 
arbitration, it is just and proper in all circumstances for the court to 
determine the question. 
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(4) An application for leave to appeal under this section shall identify the 
question of law to be determined and state the grounds on which it is 
alleged that leave to appeal should be granted. 
(5) The court shall determine an application for leave to appeal under the 
section without a hearing unless it appears to the court that a hearing 
is required. 
(6) The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of 
the court under this section to grant or refuse leave to appeal 
(7) On an appeal under this section the court may by order –  
(a) confirm the award 
(b) vary the award 
(c) remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or in part, for 
reconsideration in the light of the court’s determination, or 
(d) set aside the award in whole or in part 
The court shall not exercise its power to set aside an award, in whole or 
in part, unless it is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit the 
matters in question to the tribunal for reconsideration. 
(8) The decision of the court on an appeal under this section shall be 
treated as a judgement of the court for the purposes of further appeal. 
But to such appeal lies without the leave of the court which shall not be 
given unless the court considers that the question is one of general 
importance or is one which for some other special reason should be 
considered by the Court of Appeal. 
The effect of section 69 of the Act is that an appeal to the court on point of law can 
be brought if the parties agree or with the leave of the court. Where parties do not 
agree, the court will not grant leave for an appeal unless all of the following are 
established. First, the question will significantly affect the rights of one or more 
parties. Secondly, the question is one that the arbitrator was asked to determine. 
Thirdly, premise on the arbitrator’s finding of fact, the arbitrator’s decision is 
evidently wrong. In the alternative, the question is one of general public importance 
and the decision of the arbitrator is open to doubt. Lastly, it is just and proper in all 
the circumstances for the court to hear the appeal. 
Where the appeal is allowed, the court has the power to confirm the award, or vary 
the terms of the award, or remit the award in whole or in part to the arbitrator for 
reconsideration, or set aside the award in whole or in part. Nonetheless, the court 
shall only set aside an award in whole or in part, where remission would be 
inappropriate. To this end, it seems that there is an obvious bias in favour of 
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remission than other remedies available to the party challenging the award. 
However, remission may be inappropriate where, for example, following the appeal, 
the outcome of the case, if remitted, is obvious and to remit the award would merely 
increase the cost.
57
 In Vrinera Marine Co. Ltd v Eastern Rich Operations Inc.
58
 the 
court gave indication that remission is preferred over setting aside, thus: 
… the drafting of subsection (7) discloses a bias in 
favour of remission of an award no doubt on the well-
established principle enshrined in section 1 of the Act 
that it is for the parties’ chosen tribunal to determine 
its disputes and section 69 gives the court the limited 
jurisdiction to address questions of law not fact. On the 
other hand, the matter remains one for my discretion 
provided I am satisfied that to remit the award would 
be “inappropriate”. Section 1 of the Act also, of 
course, entitles the court to take account of delay and 
expense.
59
 
English courts will not set aside, or remit, or vary the terms of an award on the basis 
of entirely hypothetical matter in regard of which the court has no evidence before it. 
In MRI Trading AG v Erdenet Mining Corp. LLC,
60
 the claimant challenged the 
award on point of law pursuant to section 69 of the AA 1996. The defendant in its 
submission urged the court to remit the award to the arbitrators because the 
conclusion reached by the arbitrators is, or might be, justified by reasons not set out 
in the award. The court in setting aside the award stated that: 
… a party who wishes to contend that an award should 
be upheld for reasons not expressed (or not fully 
expressed) in such award is required to file a 
respondent’s notice at the stage of the application for 
permission to appeal in accordance with CPR PD 62 
para 12.6 … it would be wrong in principle and 
certainly “inappropriate” … to order remission on the 
basis of entirely speculative matters in respect of 
which the court has no material before it and which, if 
such matters were to be relied upon to seek to uphold 
the award, should have been included in a respondent’s 
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notice served in accordance with the rules and within 
the appropriate time limits in opposition to the original 
application for leave to appeal.
61
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court and took the 
view that the arbitrator’s decision on the issue was such that no reasonable tribunal 
could reach.
62
  
MRI Trading AG highlights the attitude of the court as to whether a court will set 
aside or remit an award to the arbitrator when it finds that the decision of the 
arbitrator on a question of law was manifestly wrong. First, it demonstrates that the 
CPR PD as rules of court are made to be obeyed and no favour would be shown for 
not obeying same. The respondent’s notice in accordance with the CPR PD 62 para 
12.6 is a key factor as to how the court will exercise its discretion on the issue of 
remission or annulment of an award. 
5.5. Nigerian courts approach 
The grounds for setting aside arbitral awards are stipulated under sections 29, 30 and 
48 of the ACA. Under section 29 (2), a party may apply to court to set aside an 
award where the award is beyond the scope of matters submitted or referred to 
arbitration. Under section 30 (1), an award may also be set aside on the application 
of a party where the arbitrator has misconducted himself, or where the arbitral 
proceedings, or award, has been improperly procured. Other grounds which ranges 
from incapacity of a party to the arbitration agreement, to the award been against 
public policy of Nigeria are listed under section 48 of the Act. The section 48 
grounds are substantially the same with article 34 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. These grounds are also similar to section 52 and article V of the Second 
Schedule to the ACA grounds for resisting enforcement of international arbitral 
awards in Nigeria. The sections 48 and 52 grounds are examined in-depth under 
chapter six. 
Opinion differs as to whether sections 29 and 30 of the ACA can be relied upon by a 
party seeking to set aside an international arbitral award rendered in Nigeria. 
According to Akpata, sections 29 and 30 of the Act pertain solely to domestic 
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commercial arbitration.
63
 He based his argument on the fact that the ACA is divided 
into four parts and sections 29 and 30 are within Part I which regulates domestic 
arbitration only.
64
 However, Idornigie contends that although the provisions of Part 
III of the Act relates to international commercial arbitration, the import of section 43 
is that Part III provisions are in addition to Part I provisions which regulate domestic 
arbitration.
65
 From the provisions of section 43 of the Act, Part III applies solely to 
international commercial arbitration and conciliation in addition to the other 
provisions of the Act. While Part III of the Act cannot apply to other provisions of 
the Act, other provisions of the Act can apply to matters relating to Part III. 
Therefore, the better view is that sections 29 and 30 are applicable, in an appropriate 
case, to an application to set aside an international arbitral award rendered in 
Nigeria. 
To have an insight of the attitudes of Nigerian courts towards setting aside an award, 
section 30 of the ACA poses two questions, first, what is misconduct? Secondly, 
what will amount to improper procurement of arbitral proceedings or award?  
5.5.1. Misconduct  
The first limb of section 30 (1) of the ACA stipulates that the court may set aside an 
award where an arbitrator has misconducted him. However, the problem with the 
section is that it lacks clarity on how ‘misconduct’ should be interpreted or what 
constitutes ‘misconduct’ for purposes of setting aside an award in Nigeria. As a 
result of this gap, courts have resorted to the definition of ‘misconduct’ under 
common law and have given the term a wide meaning. The Supreme Court in Taylor 
Woodrow (Nig.) Ltd. v Suddeutch Etna-Werk GmbH
66
 stated: 
The word misconduct is not defined in law nor is it 
stated therein what would amount to misconduct on 
the part of an arbitrator to necessitate the setting aside 
of his award. It will be necessary therefore, to fall back 
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on the common law to determine what constitutes 
misconduct.
67
 
The Supreme Court in Taylor Woodrow Ltd relied on the reasoning of the authors of 
the Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th edition, and gave an exhaustive definition of 
misconduct. In A. Savoia Ltd v A. O. Sonubi
68
 the Supreme Court followed its 
decision in Taylor Woodrow Ltd. and stated that misconduct may be said to have 
arisen: 
(a) Where the arbitrator fails to comply with the 
terms, express or implied, in the arbitration 
agreement 
(b) Where, even if the arbitrator complies with the 
terms of the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator 
makes an award which on grounds of public policy 
ought not be enforced; 
(c) Where the arbitrator has been bribed or corrupted; 
(d) Technical misconduct, such as where the arbitrator 
makes a mistake as to scope of the authority 
conferred by the agreement of reference. This, 
however, does not mean that every irregularity of 
procedure amounts to misconduct; 
(e) Where the arbitrator fails to decide all the matters 
which were referred to him; 
(f) Where the arbitrator or umpire has breached the 
rules of natural justice; 
(g) If the arbitrator or umpire has failed to act fairly 
towards both parties, as for example: 
i. By hearing one party but refusing to hear the 
other; or 
ii. By deciding the case n a point not put by the 
parties.
69
 
 
5.5.2. Improper procurement of arbitral proceedings or award 
With regards to the second limb of section 30(1), ACA is also silent on what will 
amount to improper procurement of arbitral proceedings or award. In Aye-Fenus Ent. 
Ltd. v Saipem (Nig) Ltd.,
70 the appellant entered into a contract to supply skilled and 
                                                             
67. Taylor Woodrow [1993]. 
68. [2000] 12 NWLR (Pt. 682) 539. 
69. A. Savoia Ltd [2000]. 
70. [2009] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1126) 483. 
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unskilled workers to the respondent for a drilling project on Perro Negro Rig V. 
Dispute arose when the appellant alleged a breach of contract resulting from the 
respondent’s failure to pay the appellant a total debt of N24, 473,070.47. The 
respondent counter claimed the sum of $672,546.00 alleging that it was loss incurred 
by them as a result of the strike action and hostage taking embarked upon by the 
workers supplied by the appellant. The dispute was referred to arbitration and the 
arbitrators rendered their award in favour of the appellant. Dissatisfied, the 
respondent applied to the High Court to set aside the award on grounds that the 
arbitral proceedings and the award were improperly procured. The High Court 
granted the application and the award was set aside. On appeal, the Court of Appeal 
in construing the text “arbitral proceedings or award … improperly procured…” held 
that: 
An arbitral award will be set aside where the 
arbitration has been improperly procured, e.g. where 
the arbitrator has been deceived or material evidence 
has been fraudulently concealed.
71
 
From case law on the meaning of misconduct of the arbitrator, improper 
procurement of arbitral proceedings or award under section 30 of the ACA, it is clear 
that Nigerian courts have wide powers to set aside an award. Notwithstanding this 
wide power, Nigerian courts have demonstrated a readiness to support arbitration by 
refusing to set aside awards on mere allegations of misconduct, or arbitral 
proceedings or award been improperly procured. 
In Arbico (Nig.) Ltd. v Nigeria Machine Tools Ltd.
72
 dispute arose between the 
parties from a construction contract, and the dispute was referred to arbitration. The 
respondent and the appellant made various claims and counter claims respectively. 
The arbitrator incorporated the appellant’s counterclaim in his determination of the 
respondent’s claim. The arbitrator reasoned that the counter claim was based on 
whether there was a breach of the termination clause in the contract, which was also 
an issue in the main claim. The arbitrator rendered his award in favour of the 
respondent. 
                                                             
71. Aye-Fenus [2009]. 
72. [2002] 15 NWLR (Pt. 789) 24. 
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Dissatisfied, the appellant applied to the High Court of Lagos State to have the 
award set aside. The appellant argued that the arbitrator’s refusal to determine its 
counter claim separately amounted to misconduct, alternatively, that the arbitral 
proceedings or the award was improperly procured. The respondent also applied to 
the same court for the enforcement of the award. The High Court rejected the 
appellant argument and dismissed its case. On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld 
the decision of the High Court and unanimously dismissed the appellant’s appeal on 
all grounds. The court reasoned that misconduct does not necessarily mean wilful 
misconduct or an act of wickedness, but rather conduct in the sense of mistaken 
conduct. The court reaffirmed the principles of misconduct as laid down by the 
Supreme Court in Taylor Woodrow Ltd., and stressed that, aside the courts’ wide 
powers, courts would be reluctant to interfere with an arbitrator’s jurisdiction as the 
sole judge of law and facts, except it is compelling to do so. Eneh JCA stated that: 
The court in spite of its wide powers has to bear in 
mind that the parties before it have provided in their 
agreement to have their dispute or difference referred 
to the arbitrator against the regular courts… and it has 
to show reluctance to interfere with the arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction as the sole judge of law and facts unless it 
is compelled to do so… the stridency of this position is 
also cognisable from the letter and spirit of the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 
The attitude of Nigerian courts towards setting aside arbitral awards can therefore be 
summarised as pragmatic. It can be argued that this is because the arbitration 
agreement demonstrates the parties’ intent to comply with the terms of the award as 
final and binding on them. This is evident from Ogundare JCA remark in Clement C. 
Ebokan v Ekwenibe & Sons Trading Co.,
73
 thus:  
I would observe that we must not be over ready to set 
aside awards where parties have agreed to abide by the 
decision of a tribunal of their selection, unless we see 
that there has been something radically wrong and 
vicious in the proceedings.
74
 
                                                             
73. [2001] 2 NWLR (Pt. 696) 32. 
74. Clement Ebokan [2001]; In Guinness Nigeria Plc. v Nibol Properties Ltd. [2015] 5 CLRN, 
Candide-Johnson J of the High Court of Lagos State remarked that: “I am in total 
agreement… that there is a live judicial policy of ascribing priority to the upholding of 
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5.6. Summary  
This chapter examined the conditions under which an award will be set aside 
in England and Nigeria and the attitude of their courts to the issue. The next 
chapter will examine the attitude of courts of both jurisdictions towards the 
challenge of transnational commercial arbitral awards. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
arbitral awards, by the regular courts, as a mainstream ADR procedure in the administration 
of justice for resolving disputes and that there is a narrow compass that attracts the courts to 
override this policy by setting aside an award. This argument is valid and is pivotal for a 
court to keep in mind in these types of matters for the reasons espoused in the case law…”  
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Chapter six 
Courts attitude towards refusing enforcement of awards 
6.0. Introduction  
Article V of the NYC stipulates grounds on which enforcement of awards may be 
refused by courts. The texts of section 103 of the AA 1996 and article V of the 
Second Schedule to the ACA follow closely the provisions of article V of the NYC.
1
 
Article V of the NYC provides for two groups of grounds for refusing enforcement 
of awards. The first group are grounds which must be raised and proved by the 
resisting party for the court to exercise its discretion.
2
 The second group are grounds 
which may be raised by the court ex officio.
3
 
This chapter examines the manner in which the courts in England and Nigeria 
engage with the article V NYC ground. It also examines whether the grounds for the 
refusal of enforcement of awards in England and Nigeria are effective. Furthermore, 
it analyses whether case law in both countries have provided a consistent rule which 
future parties can follow when relying on the article V grounds. The first five 
grounds of article V which are procedural are discussed under the caption, 
‘procedural grounds’ (6.1). The last two which are substantive defences are 
examined under the heading, ‘substantive grounds’ (6.2).  
6.1. Procedural grounds  
The party who challenges enforcement an award on any of the articles V (1) 
grounds, bears the burden of establishing the ground or of proof.
4
 These grounds are: 
incapacity of either party (6.1.1), invalidity of the arbitration agreement (6.1.2), 
improper notice or lack of due process in arbitral proceedings (6.1.3), arbitral 
tribunal exceeded its competence or jurisdiction (6.1.4), improper appointment of the 
arbitral tribunal or incorrect arbitral procedure (6.1.5) and, arbitral award not yet 
binding or set aside or suspended (6.1.6). The challenging party is only required to 
                                                             
1. Section 52 of the ACA relates to refusal of both domestic and non-NYC awards. The section is 
also based on article V of the NYC. 
2. Article V (1) of the NYC. 
3. Article V (2) of the NYC. 
4. Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, UN DOC 
E/2704, E/AC.42/4/Rev.1. 
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establish any one of these procedural grounds to have the court exercise its discretion 
in its favour.
5
  
6.1.1. Incapacity of either party   
To succeed under the first limb of this ground, the challenging party must plead and 
prove that one of the parties in the arbitration was under some incapacity at the time 
the arbitration agreement was made. This section examines the extent of incapacity 
(6.1.1.1) and the law that regulates the issue of capacity (6.1.1.2) 
6.1.1.1. Extent of the incapacity 
Article V (1) (a) of the NYC refers to, “under some incapacity.” This text is also 
contained in the relevant sections of the AA 1996 and the ACA.
6
 According to 
Bantekas, the interpretation of the text covers a wide range of legal incapacity, such 
as age, mental capacity, and diminished capacity.
7
 Nonetheless, it is questionable 
whether the incapacity must relate to the time of concluding the arbitration 
agreement or the time of commencement of the enforcement proceedings. Though, 
there is no reported English or Nigerian case on the issue, it seems the incapacity 
will relate to the time of concluding the arbitration agreement and not at the time of 
enforcing the arbitral award.
8
 This is because capacity of a party to enter into 
contract in both jurisdictions is determined at the time of concluding the contract.
9
  
6.1.1.2. The law applicable to parties’ incapacity  
The second question relates to the law under which a party’s (in)capacity will be 
determined. The NYC, the AA 1996 and the ACA respectively refer to the law 
applicable to “them” or “him” without more. Opinion is divided on the issue. Born 
and other commentators have argued that the law applicable to the question of 
                                                             
5. Smith, S. L. (2007) “Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards under the NYC” in Rufus 
von Thulen Rhoades, et al (eds.) Practitioner’s Handbook on International Arbitration and 
Mediation, Juris Publishing, New York, p. 318. 
6. Section 103 (2) (a) of the AA 1996 and article V (1) (a) of the Second Schedule to the ACA. 
7. Banktekas, I. (2015) An Introduction to International Arbitration, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, pp. 84 – 86. 
8. Merkin, R. (2004) Arbitration Law, LLP, London, pp. 820 – 821. 
9. Tweeddale, A. and Tweeddale, K (2005) Arbitration of Commercial Dispute: International and 
English Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 127 – 133; Ajogwu, F. (2009) 
Commercial Arbitration in Nigeria: Law and Practice, Mbeyi and Associates Nig. Ltd., Lagos, 
pp.51 – 52. 
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(in)capacity of a party  is the law of the enforcing court,
10
 while Merkin and 
Flannery suggest the law of the place of the unsuccessful party’s (the defendant’s) 
domicile.
11
 This thesis agrees with Tweeddale and Tweeddale that the applicable law 
ought to be the personal law of the party alleged to lack capacity.
12
 In effect, it must 
not be the defendant’s capacity that is questioned. It would appear to be sufficient 
from the text of the NYC that any party to the agreement is under some incapacity, 
and not necessarily the defendant.  
All three laws refer to the word “party” without any indication as to the nature of the 
party, whether a natural person or a juristic person. Nevertheless, according to van 
den Berg, a “party” in the text refers to both natural and juristic persons.13 The 
conflict of law rules to determine the law applicable to a party vary from country to 
country. Generally, a natural person’s personal law is either the law of his or her 
habitual residence (domicile) or of his or her nationality. For a juristic person, it is 
the law of the country under whose law it is incorporated or where its headquarters is 
located.
14
 In England and Nigeria, the personal law of a natural person are 
determined by reference to their domicile. While that of a juristic person is 
determined by reference to its place of incorporation.
15
 
 
 
                                                             
10. Born, G. B. (2014) International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd edn., Vol. III, Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherland, pp. 3488 - 3492; Di Pietro, D. and Platte, M. (2001) Enforcement 
of International Arbitration Awards: The NYC of 1958, Cameron May, London, at p. 144; 
Gaillard, E. and Savage, J. (eds.) (1999) Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, para. 1695; van den Berg, A. J. 
(1981) The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation, Kluwer Law International, The Hague at p. 276; Redfern, A. and Hunter, M. 
(2004) Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 4th edn., Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, at para 3.25; Poundret, J. and Besson, S. (2007) Comparative Law of International 
Arbitration, Sweet and Maxwell, London, p. 831; Anzorena, I. (2008) “The Incapacity Defence 
under the NYC” in Gaillard, E. and Di Pietro, D. (eds.), Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements 
and International Arbitral Awards: The NYC in Practice, Cameron May, London, p.632. 
11. Merkin, R. and Flannery, L. (2014) Arbitration Act 1996, 5th edn., Informa Law from Routledge, 
Oxon, p. 397. 
12. Tweeddale, A. and Tweeddale, K. (2005), p. 130. 
13. van den Berg (1981), p. 14. 
14. Lew, J. D. M., et al, (2003) Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, para 6-51; van den Berg, A. J. (1981) supra at pp. 276-277 
15. Briggs, A. (2013) The Conflict of Laws, 3rd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 64-66 
and 367-373; Omoruyi, I. O. (2001) “The Determination of Applicable Law in International 
Contracts: A Nigerian Perspective”, Modern Practice Journal of Finance and Investment Law, 
Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 582 – 594. 
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6.1.2. Invalidity of the arbitration agreement 
The second limb of article V (1) (a) of the NYC relates to the invalidity of the 
arbitration agreement as a ground for refusing the enforcement of an award. This 
ground is provided for under section 103 (2) (b) of the AA 1996 and Article V (1) (a) 
of the Second Schedule to the ACA. Two issues may arise for analysis in respect of 
this ground. Firstly, the meaning of invalidity of the arbitration agreement (6.1.2.1); 
and identifying the applicable law (6.1.2.2).  
6.1.2.1. The meaning of invalidity of an arbitration agreement 
In the context of article V (1) (a) of the NYC, an arbitration agreement is “not valid” 
where there is lack of legal consent.
16
 According to van den Berg, lack of legal 
consent to arbitrate may arise as a result of misrepresentation, duress, fraud, or undue 
influence.
17
 Thus, an arbitration agreement will not be valid where the initial consent 
to arbitrate dispute is lacking and the party resisting enforcement proves that it is not 
a party to the arbitration agreement. This point is illustrated in Dallah Real Estate 
and Tourism Holding co. v Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan.
18
  
Dallah’s case relates to the enforcement of an ICC award rendered in Paris against 
the Government of Pakistan (GoP). The principal contract containing the arbitration 
agreement had been signed by the GoP owned Awami Hajj Trust which 
subsequently ceased to exist. When dispute arose, Dallah sought arbitration against 
GoP. One of the issues before the arbitrators was whether there was a valid 
arbitration agreement between Dallah and GoP. The agreement between Dallah and 
the trust did not stipulate an express choice of law. In a partial award on jurisdiction, 
the arbitrators applied “transnational principles” and held that GoP could be deemed 
a party to the arbitration agreement even though the principal contract was signed 
with a legally separate entity, Awami Hajj Trust. Eventually, the arbitrators awarded 
US $20 Million to Dallah in a final award. Dallah sought to enforce the award in 
England against GoP. The court of first instance refused enforcement pursuant to 
article V (I) (a) of the NYC on the ground that the arbitration agreement was not 
valid. GoP successfully argued that it had not been a party to the arbitration 
agreement. Dallah's appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal upholding the 
                                                             
16. Anzorena, I. (2008), p. 632. 
17. van den Berg (1981), p. 276. 
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decision of the lower court. Further dissatisfied, Dallah appealed to the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and unanimously upheld the 
decision of the Court of Appeal. In reaching its judgment, the Court reasoned that on 
the proper application of French Law (as the law of the seat of the arbitration), GoP 
was not a party to the arbitration agreement and so was not bound by it. Thus, since 
there was no initial consent between Dallah and GoP, the alleged agreement is was 
held invalid. 
6.1.2.2. Law applicable to the arbitration agreement 
Under article V (1) (a) of the NYC, there are two ways by which the invalidity of an 
arbitration agreement may be determined. Firstly, the invalidity of the arbitration 
agreement may be determined under the law which has been elected by the parties. 
Second, if parties have not elected any particular law, the invalidity may be 
determined by the law of the place where the award was rendered. Particularly so 
because the issue of whether “the law to which the parties have subjected it” only 
permits for an express choice, or includes implied choices. And if parties have 
determined the law applicable to the principal contract, does that constitute an 
implied choice of the law applicable to the arbitration agreement? Or does electing a 
seat for the arbitration constitute an implied choice of the law applicable to the 
arbitration agreement? Opinion is divided on the issue.  
For example, Lord Collins, et al, contend that the applicable law is the law which 
governs the principal contract, save the parties agree otherwise.
19
 According to 
Davidson, the phrase “any indication” in the text of article V (I) (a) of the NYC 
suggests that the text imply, in the absence of an express choice of law, the law 
which regulates the principal contract.
20
 Therefore, if the parties expressly elect the 
law that governs the principal contract as a whole and are silent on the applicable 
law to the arbitration agreement, it would be unusual to apply another law to regulate 
the arbitration agreement. This may be the case especially in respect of an arbitration 
clause, as it is only one clause of the many clauses in the contract. It therefore makes 
sense for the arbitration agreement to be regulated by the same law as the rest of the 
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contract. Nonetheless, this is the presumption except the parties have contracted 
otherwise. Thus, Lew stated that:  
There is a very strong presumption in favour of the law 
governing the substantive agreement which contains 
the arbitration agreement. This principle has been 
followed in many cases. This could even be implied as 
an agreement of the parties as to the law applicable to 
the arbitration clause.
21
  
In England, this presumption was applied in the case of Sonatrach Petroleum Corp. 
(BVI) v Ferrell Int’l. Ltd.22 where the court held inter alia that: 
…where the substantive contract contains an express 
choice of law, but the agreement contains no separate 
choice of law, the latter agreement will normally be 
governed by the body of law expressly chosen to 
govern the substantive contract.
23
 
This thesis supports the view that in the absence of an express choice of law, the 
arbitration agreement should be regulated by the same law as the principal contract. 
This underscores the point that if the arbitration agreement is considered as simply 
one of rights and obligations assumed by the parties in their contract, then it should 
be construed as the parties’ common intention to make the law applicable to the 
principal contract, the law which should govern the arbitration agreement.
24
  
For a contrary view, Pietro and Platte contend that the applicable law is either the 
proper law of the principal contract or the law of the place where the arbitral award 
was rendered.
 25
 In effect, in the absence of a law agreed by the parties, the law of the 
country where the award was rendered will apply. Against this view, is the fact that 
sometimes the link between the law which regulates the arbitration agreement and 
the seat of arbitration may be unconnected.
26
 In Practice, it is often the case that 
parties in international commercial arbitration have no connection with the seat of 
                                                             
21. Lew, J. D. M. (1998) “The Law Applicable to the Form and Substance of the Arbitration 
Clause”, ICCA Congress Series, No. 14, para. 136. 
22. [2002] 1 All E. R. (Comm) 627  
23. Sonatrach Petroleum Corp. (BVI) v Ferrell International Ltd. [2002] 1 All E. R. (Comm) 627 at 
628. 
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25. Di Pietro, D. and Platte, M. (2001), p. 144. 
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the arbitration. Parties sometimes elect a seat because it is neutral or for reasons of 
convenience, while in some cases the seat of arbitration may not even be selected by 
the parties themselves.
27
 Thus in West Tankers v Ras Riunione Adriatica Di Sicurata 
Spa (The Front Comor), Lord Hoffman observed that: 
…the situs and governing law are generally chosen by 
the parties on grounds of neutrality, availability of 
legal services and the unobtrusive effectiveness of the 
supervisory jurisdiction.
28
 
This can be safely implied to mean that the law regulating the arbitration may 
generally differ from the law of the seat of the arbitration. However, this poses the 
question whether these views negate the principle of separability of the arbitration 
agreement discussed above. This disconnectedness of the arbitration agreement from 
the principal contract raises the issue, whether the law applicable to the arbitration 
agreement may be different from the law that governs the principal contract. Article 
V (1) (a) of the NYC points towards this conclusion thus: 
The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II 
were under the law applicable to them … or the said 
agreement is not valid under the law to which the 
parties have subjected to…  
Nonetheless, the argument that since the arbitration agreement is independent of the 
principal contract, the law applicable to the arbitration agreement may be different 
from the principal contract has been opposed. According to Derains: 
The autonomy of the arbitration clause and of the 
principal contract does not mean that they are totally 
independent one from the other, as evidenced by the 
fact that acceptance of the contract entails acceptance 
of the clause, without any other formality.
29
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Also, Pietro and Platte argue in opposition that the doctrine of separability is mainly 
important in circumstances where the principal contract is held invalid.
30
 In effect, 
the invalidity of the principal contract has nothing to do with the arbitration 
agreement as a separate entity from the principal contract. For purposes of 
determining the applicable law of the arbitration agreement, reference can be made 
to the applicable law to the principal contract.  
However, van den Berg has suggested that the invalidity of an arbitration agreement 
is not governed by the rules stipulated by article V (I) (a) but by those contained in 
article II of the NYC.
31
 This thesis disagrees with this view and argues that article II 
of the NYC relates to the making of an arbitration agreement. To that effect, article 
II concerns the recognition of the arbitration agreement in writing, while article V (1) 
(a) relates to the validity of the arbitration agreement.
32
 If the unsuccessful party 
wants to challenge the enforcement of the award on the basis of article II (2), it has 
to do so, on the argument of an existing arbitration agreement. On the other hand, if 
the challenge is on the basis of article V (I) (a), it has to do so, on the strength of the 
invalidity of the arbitration agreement. In the former instance, the arbitration 
agreement is deemed to exist pursuant to article II (2) of the NYC, whereas, in the 
later instance, the agreement is deemed valid.
33
 Nonetheless, for the agreement to be 
held invalid, the unsuccessful party will need to establish lack of consent. Consent 
may be implied or express in form and scope as determined by the ordinary 
principles of contract law.
34
 Moreover, the grounds for refusing enforcement of 
awards as contained in article V are exhaustive and are meant to be construed 
narrowly.
35
  
In England, the text of Section 103 (1) AA 1996 makes it all the more exclusive that, 
“recognition and enforcement of a NYC award shall not be refused except in the 
following cases…” In effect, the invalidity of the arbitration agreement cannot be 
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determined by Part 1 of the AA 1996. However, where the parties have elected 
English law or failing any indication thereon and the arbitral award was rendered in 
England then, English law will determine the (in)validity of the arbitration 
agreement. This approach in the opinion of Lord Mustill is irresistible because,  
“… there may sometimes be an express choice of 
curial law which is not the law of the place where the 
arbitration is to be held but in the absence of an 
explicit choice of this kind, or at least some very 
strong pointer in the agreement to show that a choice 
was intended, the inference that the parties when 
contracting to arbitrate in a particular place consented 
to having the arbitral process governed by the law of 
that place…”36  
In XL Insurance Ltd v Owens Corning
37
 the Commercial Court stated that since the 
parties choose to conduct their arbitration in London under the AA 1996, the 
arbitration agreement would be determined by English law in the absence of an 
express choice of law chosen by the parties. Also in Dallah
38
 though not an English 
arbitration, the Supreme Court applied the same principle when it concluded that 
pursuant to French law, as the law of the country where the award was rendered, the 
arbitration agreement was invalid. 
39
 
From the analyses of the authorities, it is appears that once the law regulating the 
invalidity of an arbitration agreement becomes questionable, English law will 
determine the invalidity, if expressly elected by parties, and in the absence of parties’ 
express choice of law, it may be determined according to transnational rules or the 
law of the place where the award was rendered.  
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6.1.3. Lack or violation of due process 
The second ground for refusing enforcement of an award under the NYC is lack of 
due process in the arbitration proceedings.
40
 This ground is also contained in section 
103 (2) (c) of the AA 1996 and article V (1) (b) of the Second Schedule to the ACA. 
According to Scherer, the article V (1) (b) ground guarantees minimum requirements 
for a fair arbitral procedure and also integrates elementary concepts of due process 
into the NYC.
41
 
Lack of due process refers to factual circumstances where the unsuccessful party in 
the arbitration was denied the minimum standard of fairness during the arbitration 
proceedings.
42
 The essence of this fundamental requirement under the NYC is to 
give parties the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.
43
 Thus, for van den Berg due process “concerns the fundamental principle 
of procedures, that of fair hearing and adversary proceedings, also referred to as audi 
alteram partem”44 Due process violations are instances where the unsuccessful party 
was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration 
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present its case.  
Under this ground, five issues will be examined: the law governing lack of due 
process (6.1.3.1), what constitutes lack of proper notice (6.1.3.2), when is a party 
considered ‘unable to present its case’ (6.1.3.3), default of a party to present its case 
(6.1.3.4) and, the severity of due process violation on the application for enforcement 
(6.1.3.5). 
6.1.3.1. The law governing due process. 
The standard of due process in England and Nigeria may differ from the law of the 
seat of arbitration or the law governing the arbitration agreement. Thus, where 
                                                             
40. Article V (I) (b) of the NYC. 
41. Scherer, M. (2012) “NYC: Violation of Due Process, Article V (1) (b)”, in Wolff, R. (ed.), NYC 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Commentary, C. H. 
Beck/Hart Publishing, pp. 279 – 309.  
42. Bernardini, P. (2004) “The Role of the International Arbitrator”, Arbitration International, Vol. 
20, No. 2, pp. 113 – 122. 
43. Inoue, O. (2000) “The Due Process Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards in the United States Federal Courts: A Proposal for a Standard”, America Review of 
International Arbitration, Vol. 11, Nos. 1 – 2, pp. 247 – 286; Kleinleisterkamp, J. (2005) 
International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America, Oceana Publications Inc., New York, 
pp. 30 – 32. 
44. van den Berg, A. J. (1981) at p. 297. 
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violation of due process is alleged as a ground for challenging the enforcement of an 
award, the question may arise as to which law the English or the Nigerian court 
should apply. Article V (I) (b) of the NYC is silent or at least unclear as to the law 
that will apply.
45
  
It has been argued that article V (1) (b) of the NYC should be interpreted 
independently of any rules of national law.
46
 Consequently, the proponents of this 
view reason that article V (1) (b) contemplates an autonomous substantive rule 
which is sufficient in itself as a standard of due process. All the more so, an 
autonomous interpretation of article V (1) (b) resonates with the overall objectives of 
the Convention. It establishes a uniform set of transnational standards that enables 
the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards and also prevent the application of 
parochial rules that would render ineffective or even hinder the arbitral process. In 
effect according to this view, due process by virtue of article V (1) (b) should apply 
uniformly across Contracting States. 
This view has been criticised on the grounds that article V (1) (b) would then impose 
a rather vague transnational substantive rule of due process.
47
 It is also argued that 
there are possible choices as to the law governing the standard of due process. These 
choices include, the law elected by the parties to regulate the arbitration process, or 
in the absence thereof, the law of the place where the award was rendered.
48
 Another 
view is that the law of the enforcing court should govern issues of violation of due 
process.
49
 In addition, this view takes into consideration the law chosen by the 
parties as well as the law of the enforcing court.
50
  
                                                             
45. Section 103 (2) (c) of the AA 1996 and Article V (I) (b) of the Second Schedule to the ACA are 
also not clear which law should govern the issue. 
46. Mantilla-Serrano, F. (2004) “Towards a Transnational Procedural Public Policy”, Arbitration 
International, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 333 – 363; Kaufman-Kohler, G. (2003) “Globalisation of 
Arbitral Procedure”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 1313 – 1333; 
Gaillard, E. and Savage, J. (eds.) (1999) at p. 1696; Lew, J. D. M., et al (2003 ) at para 26 – 81; 
van den Berg, A. J. (1981) p. 298. 
47. von Mehren, R. B. (1998) “Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States” 
International Arbitration Law Review, vol. 1, No. 6, pp. 198 – 225; Inoue, O. (2000); Lu, M. 
(2006) “The NYC on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Analysis of 
the Seven Defences to Oppose Enforcement in the United States and England”, Arizona Journal 
of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 747 – 785. 
48. Garnett, R. (2002) “International Arbitration Law: Progress towards Harmonisation”, Melbourne 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, pp. 400 – 414. 
49. Di Pietro, D. and Platte, M. (2001) at p. 147. 
50. Hebei Import and Export Corp. (PR China) v Polytek Engineering Co. Ltd (Hong Kong) [1999] 
1 HKLRD 665 (Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal). 
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In England, an enforcing court will refuse enforcement of arbitral award where there 
is a violation of due process in accordance with English Laws. In Irvani v Irvani,
51
 
after the termination of a partnership business between two brothers Bahman Irvani 
and Ali Irvani, disputes arose over the distribution of the partnership assets. Parties 
agreed to submit the dispute to a sole arbitrator. The arbitrator rendered her award in 
favour of Bahman. Ali filed an application in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia to dissolve the partnership and distribute assets. While 
the case was pending, Bahman brought an application before English Court to obtain 
a definitive statement on the arbitral award to use in his motion to dismiss the United 
States proceedings. The English Court treated Bahman’s application as a request to 
recognise and enforce the arbitral award under the NYC. As one of his defences, Ali 
contended that he was unable to present his case before the arbitrator because the 
arbitrator was bias. The Court of Appeal noted that the meaning of the text 
“otherwise unable to present his case” in the NYC should have an international 
meaning since it is contained in an international document. Nonetheless, the court 
found that the award was neither based on reason nor on information available to 
Ali. Thus, instead of construing the due process defence narrowly, the court 
interpreted the defence liberally, applying the English principle of natural justice, to 
ensure that the arbitrator did not breach Ali’s due process rights.52 
In Nigeria, there is no reported case that deals with this issue. The ACA is also silent 
as to whether an enforcing court should apply the procedural law chosen by the 
parties, or the law of the seat of arbitration, or Nigerian law as the enforcing State. 
However, it is a constitutional requirement in Nigeria to observe due process in the 
determination of any matter affecting the rights and obligations of individuals.
53
  
This thesis suggests that such issue will be determined in accordance with Nigerian 
constitutional standard of due process and the provisions of the ACA. This view is 
based on the notion that any proceeding conducted in violation of due process is a 
                                                             
51. [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 412. 
52. Lu, M. (2006) at pp. 767 – 769. 
53. Bellview Airlines Ltd v Aluminium City Ltd [2008]All FWLR 1599; Section 36(1) of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides that: 
In determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or 
determination by or against by or against any government or authority, a person shall be 
entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal 
established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and 
impartiality. 
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breach of the constitutional principle of fair hearing.
54
 Also, Section 14 of the ACA 
provides that “in any arbitral proceedings, the arbitral tribunal shall ensure that the 
parties are accorded equal treatment and that each party is given full opportunity to 
present his case.” 
6.1.3.2. Lack of proper notice 
As noted above, an enforcing court in England and Nigeria will apply its own 
national law to determine a breach of due process. This sub-section examines the 
provisions of the law in relation to (in)proper notice in both countries.   
Generally, a notice of the appointment of an arbitrator(s) need not be in any 
particular form. The UNCITRAL Model Law requires, if the parties do not agree on 
a procedure, notice will be deemed proper if it is made by any written 
correspondence and delivered by ordinary post or registered letter or any other 
means which provides a record of delivery or attempt to deliver.
55
 The standard of 
proper notice primarily depends on the parties’ agreement. But where there is no 
agreement regarding the proper notice to issue, the standard of notice would be 
judged according to the law determined to govern the arbitration.
56
 
In England, the procedure for the appointment of the arbitrator is determined by 
parties’ agreement. Where parties have not agreed on a procedure, section 16 of the 
AA 1996 applies.
57
 However, in the event that both parties are to appoint a sole 
                                                             
54. Section 36 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), In 
P.D.P. v K.S.I.C. [2005] 15 NWLR (Pt. 948) at p. 240, the court held that fair hearing is in most 
cases synonymous to due process is an issue which clearly is at the threshold of our legal system. 
Once there has been a denial of due process, the whole proceedings automatically become 
vitiated with a basic and fundamental irregularity, which renders any outcome of such 
proceedings null and void. Also in Alsthom v Saraki [2005] MJSC, Vol. 3 at p. 128, the Supreme 
Court stated that the principle of due process is fundamental to all judicial or quasi-judicial 
proceedings and like jurisdiction, the absence of it will vitiate any proceedings however well 
conducted. 
55. Article 3 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. A similar standard is stipulated under Article 2(1) of 
the UNCITRAL Rules and Article 3 (2) of the ICC Rules; Lew, J. D. M., et al (2003) at para 
26.84. 
56. van den Berg, A. J. (1981) at p. 303. 
57. Section 16 of AA 1996 provides thus: 
1. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the place of the arbitral proceedings shall 
be determined by the arbitral tribunal having regard to the circumstances of the 
case, including the convenience of the parties 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may meet at any place it 
considers appropriate for consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses, 
experts or the parties, or for the inspection of documents, goods or other property. 
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arbitrator but one party refuses or fails to do so within the time specified, the other 
party, having duly appointed its arbitrator, may in writing notify the party in default 
that it proposes to appoint its arbitrator to act as the sole arbitrator.
58
 The provisions 
of sections 16 and 17 of the AA 1996 did not stipulate the form and content of notice 
required for a party to be deemed to have been properly notified of the appointment 
of the arbitrator and the commencement of the arbitration proceedings. 
It is sufficient if on the face of a notice a reasonable person will construe the content 
as providing sufficient information that dispute has arisen and that the other party 
should take steps to appoint its arbitrator and defend the case against it. This was the 
decision in Allianz Versicherungs Aktiengesellschaft & Ors.v Fortuna Co. Inc. (the 
Baltic Universal)
59
. The case concerned the carriage of a cargo of fruit in the vessel 
Baltic Universal. The cargo was carried under three bills of lading in similar, but not 
identical form. The bills of lading incorporated arbitration clauses and also contained 
a general paramount clause which incorporated as appropriate Hague or Hague-
Visby Rules. When dispute arose, the applicants through their London solicitors 
wrote the respondent refereeing the matter to arbitration. The applicants also in the 
same letter notified the respondent the appointment of their arbitrator. The 
respondent appointed its arbitrator and also notified that applicant of the 
appointment. However, after about ten months, the respondent wrote the applicants 
stating that they considered the applicant’s letter ineffective to commence arbitration 
proceedings so as to satisfy the requirement of the Hague, or Hague-Visby Rules. 
One of the issues before the court was whether the letter satisfied the requirement of 
proper notice of appointment of arbitrator and commencement of arbitration 
proceedings. The court held thus; 
…a notice, in writing which, read in its context, makes 
it clear by whatever language that the sender was 
invoking the arbitration agreement and was requiring 
the recipient to take steps in response to enable the 
tribunal to be constituted, was sufficient to commence 
the arbitration, and was not necessary for the claimant 
                                                             
58. Section 17 of the AA 1996 provides thus: 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular 
dispute shall commence on the date the request to refer the dispute to arbitration is 
received by the other party. 
59. [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 497; [1999] 2 All ER 625. 
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to expressly call on the respondent to appoint his 
arbitrator in order to do so…60 
In Kanoria v Guinness
61
 the English Court of Appeal refused to enforce an arbitral 
award against the respondent, the majority shareholder of the company, who had 
been summoned jointly with the company to arbitration in India. The notice of 
arbitration issued by the claimant did not, at least, contain sufficient information 
regarding the allegation against the respondent. During the oral hearing, the claimant 
accused the respondent of fraud. The respondent did not attend the oral hearing 
because of illness. Apparently, the arbitrators on the basis of the fraud allegations 
lifted the corporate veil and personally found the respondent liable. An award was 
rendered in favour of the claimant. The claimant sought to enforce the award against 
the respondent in England. The trial court refused enforcement of the award because 
the respondent was unable to present his case due to ill health. On appeal, the Court 
of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision and further held that the refusal was 
reasonable because the respondent was not given proper notice of the fraud 
accusations made against him in his personal capacity.  
In Nigeria, parties are free to agree on the number of arbitrators and the procedure 
for their appointment. But where parties do not agree on the number of arbitrator to 
be appointment, the number of arbitrators will be deemed to be three.
62
 As to the 
arbitration proceedings, except otherwise agreed by parties, arbitration proceedings 
are begun by written notice by one of the parties to the contract. The proceeding is 
then governed by default provisions of the Arbitration Rules of the First Schedule to 
the ACA (Arbitration Rules). Unlike the English AA 1996, the ACA is not silent on 
                                                             
60. Allianz Versicherungs Aktiengesellschaft [1999] pp. 625 – 626. 
61. [2006] EWCA Civ 222. 
62. Section 6 of ACA. However, the combined effect of sections 7 and 44 of the ACA is that the 
method of selecting arbitrators is determined by the terms of parties’ arbitration agreement. 
Section 7 applies to domestic arbitration while section 44 applies to international. However, 
where no mode is determined by the parties, the provisions of the ACA will apply by default. 
Under sections 7(2) and 44(5) of the ACA, if the arbitration proceedings are to be conducted by 
three arbitrators, each party to the arbitration must appoint one arbitrator and the two arbitrators 
appointed must then appoint the third arbitrator. If a party fails to appoint an arbitrator or the two 
arbitrators appointed by the parties fail to appoint the third arbitrator, within thirty days of being 
required to do so in a domestic arbitration, the appointment will be made by the court on 
application of any party to the arbitration agreement. If it is an international arbitration, the 
appointment would be made by an appointing authority designated by the parties to make the 
appointment. Adekoya, O. and Emagun, D. (2012) Arbitration Guide: Nigeria, IBA Arbitration 
Committee, AELEX, Nigeria, pp. 1 – 17. 
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the form and content of a proper notice of appointment of the arbitrator(s) and the 
arbitration proceedings. Article 3 (3) and (4) of the Arbitration Rules provide that.
63
 
3.  The notice of arbitration shall include the 
following: 
(a)  a demand that the dispute be referred to 
arbitration 
(b) the names and address of the parties 
(c) a reference to the arbitration clause or the 
separate arbitration agreement that is invoked 
(d) a reference to the contract out of or in relation 
to which the disputes     arises, 
(e)  the general nature of the claim and an 
indication of the amount involved, if any; 
(f)  the relief or remedy sought 
(g) a proposal as to the number of arbitrators (i.e. 
one or three), if the parties have not 
previously agreed thereon 
4.  The notice of arbitration may also include: 
(a) the proposals for the appointment of a sole 
arbitrator 
(b) the notification of the appointment of an 
arbitrator referred to in Article 7; 
(c) the statement of claim referred to Article 18. 
 
However, given that an enforcing party is required under the Arbitration Rules to 
stipulate certain information in the notice of arbitration, the question that then arises 
is whether insufficient or otherwise improper notice of arbitration is capable of 
nullifying an award. It seems fairly settled that notice must be given according to the 
parties’ agreement and where there is no such agreement, according to the provisions 
of the ACA. In Compaigne Général de Geophysique v. Dr Jackson Etuk,
64
 the 
appellant refused to participate in the appointment of a sole arbitrator as agreed by 
the parties, the respondent unilaterally appointed a sole arbitrator without an 
application to the court for such appointment as stipulated under section 7(2)(b) of 
the ACA. The arbitrator proceeded to hear the respondent's case without the 
appellant. An award was rendered in favour of the respondent. The High Court 
recognised the award and ordered enforcement. On appeal, the Court of Appeal 
                                                             
63. The Arbitration Rules attached to the ACA is a re-enactment of the UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules 
1976. 
64. [2004] 1 N.W.L.R. (Part 853) 20 at p.52. 
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reserved the trial court’s decision and held inter alia that the appointment of the sole 
arbitrator by the respondent was void having been done in breach of the provisions 
of section 7(2)(b) of the ACA. The Court of Appeal further reasoned that the award 
was void having been vitiated by failure to put the appellant on notice of the 
proceedings of the arbitrator thus, a breach of the appellant's right to fair hearing 
which rendered the arbitral proceedings a nullity. 
Clearly, article 3(3) of the Arbitration Rules stipulates mandatory information which 
must be contained in a valid notice of arbitration. By expressly stipulating the 
contents of a proper notice of arbitration the ACA, like the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, ensures that the respondent will receive information “sufficient to apprise the 
respondent of the general context of the claim asserted against him”. Such 
information will enable the responding party to decide on its future course of 
action.
65
 In this regard, improper notice is capable of preventing a party from 
presenting its case. This arguably constitutes a clear breach of due process, and a 
failure to protect the parties’ rights to equality and procedural fairness.66 
6.1.3.3. Inability of a party to present its case  
According to di Pietro and Platte the text “unable to present his case” of article V (I) 
(b) of the NYC covers any serious irregularity in the arbitration proceedings that may 
lead a party to miss an opportunity to present its case.
67
 For Born, the NYC “also 
suggests that the exception may extend to cases in which extra-ordinary 
circumstances, akin to force majeure, prevented a party from presenting its case”.68 
In Generica Ltd v Pharmaceuticals Basics Inc.,
69
 a United States of America Court 
of Appeal considered the phrase and thus stated that: 
The defence basically corresponds to the due process 
defence that a party was not given the opportunity to 
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner … Therefore, an arbitral award should be 
                                                             
65. Report of the Secretary-General on the Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 8th 
Session, UN DOC A/CN.9/97 (1974); Report of the Secretary-General on the Revised Draft Set 
of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL 9th Session, Addendum 1 (Commentary) UN DOC 
A/CN.9/122/Add. 1 (1975). 
66. Caron, D. D. & Caplan, L. M. (ed.) (2013) The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Commentary, 
2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 363 – 365. 
67. Di Pietro, D. and Platte, M. (2001)  at p. 15. 
68. Born, G. B. (2001) International Commercial Arbitration: Commentary and Materials, 2nd edn., 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, p. 832. 
69. (1998) XXIII YBCA 1076. 
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denied or vacated if the party challenging the award 
proves that the due process jurisprudence defines it … 
It is clear that an arbitrator must provide a fundamental 
fair hearing … A fundamental fair hearing is one that 
meets the minimal requirements of fairness – adequate 
notice, a hearing on the evidence, and an impartial 
decision by the arbitrator.
70
 
Article 24(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law also shed light on when a party is 
considered “unable to present its case”. Generally speaking, it demonstrates that 
equality of information between the parties is vital as any other procedural 
requirement.
71
 Karrer asserts that equal treatment of the parties may be ensured 
through guaranteeing parties’ right to be heard.72 Therefore, where one party is given 
the right to put forward its case and another denied the right to defend itself, then the 
arbitral award becomes a product of injustice.  
In Kanoria v Guinness
73
 allegations of fraud and dishonesty were made against the 
respondent. The respondent was not notified of the allegations, and could not attend 
hearing in India, apparently because of matters outside his control (serious illness). 
The arbitrators based their decision on the allegations without affording the 
respondent an opportunity to defend himself. The English Court of Appeal upheld 
the lower courts’ decision and refused enforcement. The court held that the 
respondent had not been afforded the chance to present his case when allegations of 
fraud and dishonesty were made against him by the claimant at the hearing. The 
court reasoned that such denial of the right to be heard and the unequal treatment 
melted against the respondent amounted to “… an extreme case of potential 
injustice”.74  
                                                             
70. Generica Ltd (1988) at pp. 1078 – 1079. 
71. Article 24(3) of UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration provides:  
“All statements documents or other informational supplied to the arbitral tribunal by 
one party shall be communicated to the other party. Also any expert report or 
evidentiary document on which the arbitral tribunal may rely in making its decision 
shall be communicated to the parties.” 
72. Karrer, P. A. (2005) “Must an Arbitral Tribunal Really Ensure that its Award is Enforceable?” in 
Aksen, G., et al (ed.) Global Reflections on International Law, Commerce and Dispute 
Resolution, Liber Amicorum in Honour of Robert Briner, ICC Publishing, London, pp. 429 – 
435. 
73. Kanoria v Guinness [2006]. 
74. Kanoria v Guinness [2006]; In OGH (2005) YCA XXXXI, pp. 583 – 585, Australian Supreme 
Court held that a defendant’s arguments that the arbitrators did not accept certain evidence 
brought forward by the defendant did not amount to a violation of due process; however, if the 
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Thus, it is argued in this thesis that in England and Nigeria, a party will be 
considered unable to present its case where it is shown that the arbitrator was biased, 
or a measure was taken of which one or both parties were unaware, or the 
unsuccessful party was not accorded an opportunity to contest facts and evidence put 
forward by the successful party which the arbitrator considered as the reason(s) for 
the award.
75
 
6.1.3.4. Default of the unsuccessful party to present its case 
The defence of “unable to present its case” cannot result from the unsuccessful 
party’s own conduct.76 Consequently, where the unsuccessful party declines to 
appear, or neglects to respond to the evidence before the arbitral tribunal after being 
accorded a fair opportunity to do so, it cannot subsequently plead that it was unable 
to present its case. In such situation, courts will be unsympathetic to allegations of 
breach of due process. Thus, a party alleging lack of opportunity to present its case, 
as a ground to resist enforcement of an award, must show that such lack of 
opportunity did not result from its own conduct.
77
 
In England, this view is illustrated in the case of Minmetals Germany GmbH v Ferco 
Steel Ltd.
78
In Minmetals, an award rendered in China was on the application of the 
defendants remitted by the Beijing Court to the arbitrators for a resumed hearing. The 
reason for the court’s order of resumed hearing was that the arbitrators had rendered 
their award on the basis of evidence not put to them by the parties. The relevant 
arbitration rule allowed the arbitrators to make reference to materials not put to them 
by the parties.  But in relying on such evidence, the arbitrators were required to 
disclose to both parties the evidence from which they reached their conclusion. At the 
resumed hearing, the defendants proceeded on the basis that the evidence relied upon 
by the arbitrators in rendering their initial award was no longer relevant and 
submission were made on other grounds. The arbitrators nevertheless took the view 
that the defendants had said nothing to alter their earlier factual conclusions, and thus 
                                                                                                                                                                            
arbitrators had based their decision on facts and evidence that the defendant had no opportunity 
to challenge, such omission would have been a violation of due process. 
75. Kanoria v Guinness [2006]; Irvani v Irvani [2000].  
76. Joseph, D. (2010) Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and their Enforcement, 2nd edn., 
Sweet and Maxwell, p. 440. 
77. Garnett, R., et al, (2000) A Practical Guide to International Committee Arbitration, Oceana 
Publications, New York, p. 105. 
78. [1999] CLC 647. 
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affirmed their award. Colman, J held that the award was enforceable by the claimant 
and thus stated that: 
…the inability to present a case to arbitrators within s. 
103(2) (c) contemplates at least that the enforcer has 
been prevented from presenting his case by matters 
outside his control. This will normally cover the case 
where the procedure adopted has been operated in a 
manner contrary to the rules of natural justice. Where, 
however, the enforcer has, due to matters within his 
control, not provided himself with means of taking 
advantage of an opportunity to present his case, he 
does not … bring himself within that exception to 
enforcement under the Convention.
79
 
The court in arriving at its decision reasoned that the defendant was eventually 
accorded a fair opportunity to request for the disclosure, but declined to utilise it. It 
is observed that the court’s interpretation of the text “otherwise unable to present his 
case” is restrictive. It precludes circumstances where the resisting party fails to take 
advantage of any opportunity to present or defend its case. 
In Nigeria, Article 28 of the First Schedule to the ACA provides: 
1. If within the period of time fixed by the arbitral 
tribunal, the claimant has failed to communicate 
his claim without showing sufficient cause for such 
failure, the arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for 
the termination of the arbitral proceedings. If, 
within the period of time fixed by the arbitral 
tribunal, the respondent has failed to communicate 
his statement of defence without showing 
sufficient cause for such failure, the arbitral 
tribunal shall order that the proceedings continue. 
2. If one of the parties, duly notified under the Rules, 
fails to appear at a hearing, without showing 
sufficient cause for failure, the arbitral tribunal 
may proceed with the arbitration. 
3. If one the parties, duly invited to produce 
documentary evidence, fails to do so within the 
established period of time, without showing 
sufficient cause for such failure, the arbitral 
                                                             
79. Minmetals Germany GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd [1999] at pp. 658 – 659.  
221 
 
tribunal may make the award on the evidence 
before it. 
Consequently, it seems that if the resisting party declines to appear before the arbitral 
tribunal after being correctly served with the notice of arbitration, or fails to produce 
its defence on a date fixed for hearing, any award rendered against it cannot be 
denied enforcement on grounds of inability to present its case.
80
  
6.1.3.5. The impact of due process violation on an award 
According to Gaillard and Savage, breach of due process without the need to show 
that it caused actual injury to the resisting party, justifies non-enforcement of an 
arbitral award.
81
 Gaillard and Savage argued that their proposition is premised on the 
NYC which disapproves a breach of due process, without making refusal of 
enforcement subject to the resisting party establishing injury suffered as a result of 
the violation. They further submitted that any other interpretation would be 
considered to add a gloss to the article V (I) (b) of the NYC, and detract from its 
intended dissuasive effect.
82
 
Conversely, van den Berg and other authors have argued that a violation of due 
process might not result in a refusal of enforcement, provided the alleged violation of 
due process has no effect on the arbitral award.
83
 In effect, where the violation of due 
process is insignificant, enforcement of the arbitral award will not be denied.
84
 This 
view seems more representative of the intentions of the NYC, especially, where the 
outcome of the arbitration will not be different regardless of the breach of due 
process.
85
 
In England, the court will not refuse enforcement of the arbitral award where 
violation of due process has no severe effect on the award. In Ominium de Traitement 
                                                             
80. This rule is also stipulated under article 25 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and article 21 of the 
ICC Rules. 
81. Gaillard, E. and Savage, J. (eds.) (1999) at para. 1699. This view is also evident in Rice Trading 
Ltd. v Nidera Handelscompagnie  BV (1998) XXIII YBCA 731 (Gerechtshof Court of Appeal). 
82. Gaillard, E. and Savage, J. (eds.) (1999), para. 1699.  
83. van den Berg, A. J. (1981) at pp. 301 – 302; Kroll, S. M. (2002) “Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Germany” International Arbitration Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 5, 
pp. 160 – 169; Tweeddale, A. and Tweeddale, K. (2010) at p. 145. 
84. Merkin, R. and Flannery, L. (2014) at p. 399. 
85. Yu, H-L. (1999) “Minmetals Germany GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd.: A Step Further than 
Localisation”, International Arbitration Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 83 – 89. 
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et de Valorisation SA v Hilmarton Ltd.
86
 The applicant argued inter alia, that it was 
unable to present its case within the meaning of section 103 (2) (c) of the AA 1996. 
The applicant based its argument on two facts: that the second arbitrator who took 
over following the resignation of the initial arbitrator decided not to hear the oral 
evidence of parties and, that the second arbitrator held only a short hearing to take 
closing submissions before rendering the award. The court found that there was 
nothing in the applicant’s argument to hold that section 103 (2) (c) of the AA 1996 
applied or was violated. Thus, the applicant’s submission that it was unable to present 
its case was rejected. The court reasoned that the initial arbitrator heard all the 
witnesses and took notes of the evidence. Secondly, neither the applicant nor the 
respondent requested to supplement its evidence. Thirdly, neither the applicant not 
the respondent alleged new facts after the appointment of the second arbitrator. 
Lastly, the second arbitrator premised his decisions on the need for procedural 
economy and efficiency rule that characterises arbitral process. The court observed 
that with defence of this kind, “a careful reading of the award itself” would suggest 
whether a breach of due process affected the arbitral award.
87
  
Thus, looking at the arbitrator’s reasoning for the arbitral award, the court will 
determine if either fact or law supported the award. If the award is supported by 
either fact or law, it is unlikely that a court will hold that one of the parties was 
otherwise unable to present its case. Therefore, when a party alleges that it could not 
present its case, it seems that the English and the Nigerian courts will examine if the 
exception impacted on the award.
88
 
6.1.4. The arbitrator acted ultra vires 
An enforcing court may refuse the enforcement of an award if it is satisfied that the 
award was rendered beyond the arbitrator’s authority. This ground of refusal is 
stipulated under article V (1) (c) of the NYC, section 103 (2) (d) of the AA 1996 and 
article V (I) (c) of the Second Schedule to the ACA.  
In a consensual arbitration parties’ agreement to submit or refer their dispute to 
arbitration is pivotal to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. According to Park, the 
                                                             
86. [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 222. 
87. Ominium de Traitement et de Valorisation SA v Hilmarton Ltd [1999] at p. 225. 
88. Though there is no Nigerian decided case on this point however, it can be said that the authority 
can be cited or relied upon as a persuasive precedent. 
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arbitration agreement stands as a primary source of the arbitrator’s authority to 
resolve the dispute submitted or referred to it by the parties.
89
 The arbitration 
agreement not only gives content and sets limits to the arbitrator’s authority, it also 
defines the essence of the power been deployed. Thus, a valid arbitration agreement 
is the standard upon which the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is determined. Lord Hope 
of Craighead in Fiona Trust considered this as firmly embedded in “the law of 
international commerce.”90 
There are two ways the arbitrator may exceed its jurisdiction. Under article V (1) (c) 
of the NYC, the first instance is where the arbitrator renders an award that deals with 
a matter not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the arbitration 
agreement. The second is where the arbitrator renders an award on matters beyond 
the scope of the arbitration agreement.
91
 Merkin and Flannery observe that it is not 
easy to distinguish any material difference between the two instances, and thus 
stated: 
If the award ‘deals’ with a difference, it usually 
implies that it ‘contains decisions on matters; and 
(leaving aside any difference in the expressions ‘terms 
of the submission’ and ‘scope of the submission’) 
something that does not fall within the scope must be 
beyond it.
92
 
However, it can be argued that a difference exist between the two circumstances. In 
the first situation, the arbitrator acts extra petita by dealing with matters not 
contemplated by or not falling within the ambit of the parties’ agreement.93 It also 
replicates cases where the arbitrator awards remedies not contained in the contract 
between the parties.
94
 The second instance is where the arbitrator acts ultra petita by 
rendering an award on matters beyond the scope of the reference or submission to 
                                                             
89. Park, W. W. (2006) “The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction” in van den Berg, A. 
J. (eds.) International Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics? ICCA International Arbitration 
Congress, Vol. 13, Series 55, pp. 1 – 156. 
90. Fiona Trust and Holding Corp. v Privalov [2007] 4 All ER 951 at 963. 
91. Section 103 (2) (d) of AA 1996, and Section 52 (2) (iv) (v) and article V (1) (c) of the Second 
Schedule to the ACA. 
92. Merkin, R. and Flannery, L. (2014) at p. 399. 
93. The first limb of Article V (I) (c) of the NYC indicates that an arbitrator may exceed its 
jurisdiction if “the award deals with a difference not contemplated by, or not falling within the 
terms of the submission to arbitration.” 
94. Mistelis, L. A. and Di Pietro, D. (2010) “Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (NYC), 1958” in Mistelis, L. A. (ed.), Concise International 
Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, The Netherland, pp. 1 – 32. 
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arbitration.
95
 It also reflects instances where the arbitrator issued an award containing 
broader relief than specifically requested by a party.
96
 
Opinion varies as to whether enforcement of an award should be refused if 
arbitrators exceed their authority by awarding more than or something different 
from, what a party claimed. For example, Gaillard and Savage argue that so long as 
an arbitrator acts within the purview of its authority, article V (1) (c) precludes 
courts from refusing enforcement even if it is established that the arbitrator acted 
extra petita or ultra petita.
97
 On the other hand, van den Berg contends that unlike 
article V (1) (a), article V (1) (c) is not intended to refer to arbitration agreement in 
general. It refers to the arbitrator’s mandate as may be expressly or impliedly 
deduced from the parties’ submission to arbitration.98 This thesis agrees with van den 
Berg’s position and further argue that article V (1) (c) gives an enforcing court the 
power to refuse enforcement if the resisting party alleges and proves that the 
arbitrator acted extra petita or ultra petita. However, in the absence of any proof, it 
should be taken that the arbitrator acted within the limit of its mandate.
99
 
In England, refusal of enforcement under section 103 (2) (d) of the AA 1996 relates 
to lack of substantive jurisdiction of the arbitrator. The determination of whether an 
arbitrator lacked substantive jurisdiction is provided for under section 66 (3) of the 
AA 1996: 
Leave to enforce an award shall not be given where, or 
to the extent that, the person against whom it is sought 
to be enforced shows that the tribunal lacked 
substantive jurisdiction to make the award …100 
                                                             
95. The second limb of Article V (I) (c) of the NYC indicates that an arbitrator exceeds its 
jurisdiction if the award “contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to 
arbitration.”  
96. da Silveira, M. A. and Levy, L. (2008) “Transgression of the Arbitrator’s Authority: Article V (I) 
(c) of the NYC”, in Gaillard, E. and Di Pietro, D. (eds.), Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements 
and International Arbitral Awards: The NYC in Practice, Cameron May, pp. 639 – 678. 
97. Gaillard, E. and Savage, J. (eds.) (1999) at p. 988. 
98. van den Berg, A. J. (1996) “The NYC: Summary of Court Decisions” in Blessing, M. (ed.), The 
NYC of 1958, ASA Special Services 9, Swiss Arbitration Association, Basel, pp. 85 – 86; van 
den Berg, A.J. (1981) at  pp. 312 – 315. 
99. Lew, J. D. M., et al, (2003) at pp. 713 – 714. 
100. Provided the resisting party has not lost the right to raise such an objection. Where an arbitrator 
is acting extra petita or ultra petita, and a party nonetheless participates in the proceedings 
without objection, in circumstances where the party is or ought to be aware of the jurisdictional 
defect, the combined effect of sections 31 and 73 of the AA 1996 is that the party has waived the 
jurisdictional defect; Merkin, R. and Flannery, L. (2014) at p. 288. 
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The text “lack of substantive jurisdiction” can be said to cover instances where an 
arbitrator has acted extra petita and ultra petita. In effect, section 66 (3) applies 
where the resisting party alleges and proves that the arbitrator either determined 
matters outside the arbitration agreement (extra petita), or the award contained 
broader relief than was asked for by a party (ultra petita). In Minmetals Germany 
GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd, the court stated inter alia that: 
The function of this exception [section 103 (2) (d)] is 
to exclude from enforcement awards made on issues 
falling outside those which were referred for decision 
to the arbitrators.
101
 
With respect to Nigeria, ‘the lack of arbitrator’s jurisdiction’ ground is stipulated 
under article V (1) (c) of the Second Schedule to the ACA. Though, there is no 
reported case regarding this ground, other common law countries have considered 
the applicability of this ground and Nigerian courts may rely on such precedence as 
persuasive authority.
102
 
This thesis argues that article V (1) (c) of the Second Schedule to the ACA should be 
interpreted narrowly to align with the pro-enforcement bias of the NYC.
103
 A narrow 
interpretation means, firstly, that the arbitrator’s jurisdiction should be interpreted 
broadly to comport with the enforcement facilitating thrust of the NYC and the 
policy favouring arbitration.
104
 And secondly, the ground ‘the arbitrator has 
exceeded its jurisdiction’ should only be accepted in obvious cases.105 In this regard, 
if parties in their arbitration agreement assert that ‘any dispute arising’ out of their 
                                                             
101. Minmetals Germany GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd [1999] at pp. 658 – 659.  
102. In Canada for example, the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is determined by the text or wording of 
each arbitration agreement. This point is illustrated in Dunhill Personal System Inc. v Dunhill 
Temps Edmonton Ltd. [13 Alta LR (2d) 241, 144 AR 272 (1993)] In Dunhill, a franchisor who 
obtained a New York arbitration award in its favour sought enforcement against the franchisee in 
Canada. The franchisee argued, inter alia, that the arbitrators had gone beyond the scope of the 
submission to arbitration in awarding damages for trademark infringement and passing off. The 
court held that the scope of the arbitrators’ jurisdiction is to be determined by the wording of the 
arbitration agreement. The court reasoned that where an arbitration agreement stipulates that 
disputes between parties are to be determined by arbitration, such provision is broad enough to 
include claims not expressly mentioned in the agreement. 
103. Ezejiofor, G. (1997) The Law of Arbitration in Nigeria, Longman Nigeria Plc., Lagos, pp. 180 – 
181; Idornigie, P. O. (2015) Commercial Arbitration Law and Practice in Nigeria, LawLords 
Publications, Abuja, pp. 301 – 308. 
104. de Silveira, M. A. and Levy, L. (2008) at pp. 641 – 642.  
105. van den Berg, A. J. (1981), p. 208. 
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contract will be resolved by arbitration, it is only fair to construe such text broadly 
and give effect to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.106 
6.1.4.1. The possibility of partial enforcement 
The proviso to article V (1) (c) of the NYC relates to the possibility of enforcing an 
award if the arbitrator’s decision is ultra petita. This possibility exists only when 
part of the arbitral award exceeds the arbitrator’s authority. Article V (1) (c) provides 
that the award may be recognised and enforced in part: 
…provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted 
to arbitration can be separated from those not so 
submitted, that part of the award which contains 
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be 
recognised and enforced…  
From the text of article V (1) (c) partial enforcement of an award is permissive on 
the condition that decisions on issues agreed to be arbitrated are separated from those 
not agreed. According to Redfern et al, “if the partial excess of authority is proved, 
that part of the award that concerns matters submitted to arbitration may be saved 
and enforcement ordered.”107 However, what remains to be determined is how 
enforcing courts’ discretions are exercised. van den Berg drawing from the travaux 
preparatories to the NYC suggests a guideline on how the court’s power can be 
exercised, thus: 
Partial enforcement may be granted if the matter in 
excess of arbitrator’s authority is of a very incidental 
nature and the refusal of enforcement would lead to 
unjustified hardship for the party seeking 
enforcement.
108
 
However, it is argued in thesis that the text of article V (1) (c) of the NYC does not 
stipulate such limitation regarding partial enforcement of arbitral awards.
109
 Rather, 
article V (1) (c) strikes a balance between the interests of the parties. On the one 
hand, it protects the unsuccessful party’s right to resist the enforcement of an award 
where the arbitrator exceeds its authority, whether incidental or not; and on the other 
                                                             
106. van den Berg, A. J. (1981), p. 319. 
107. Redfern, A. and Hunter, M. (2004) Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 
4th edn., Sweet and Maxwell, pp. 450 – 451. 
108. van den Berg, A. J. (1981) at p. 319. 
109. de Silveira, M. A. and Levy, L. (2008) at p. 676. 
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hand, it ensures that the successful party reaps the benefits of the arbitration within 
the scope of the arbitration agreement.
110
 An example of a partial enforcement of 
arbitral award under article V (I) (c) can be seen in the Turkish Court of Cassation 
ruling; 
…As a rule, there is no legal obstacle to partial 
enforcement of arbitral awards. Hence, in the decision 
of our chamber dated 3.6.2012 and numbered 
9357/4209, it is decided that in case the arbitral award 
is made based on a matter not included in the 
arbitration agreement or clause or goes beyond the 
scope of the arbitration agreement or clause, the court 
may reject the enforcement (concerning this part of the 
award) and therefore, the partial enforcement is 
possible.
111
 
In England, the possibility of partial enforcement is clearly provided for under 
section 103 (4) of the AA 1996. The section refers to award on issues beyond the 
scope of the arbitration agreement which can be separated from those within its 
scope. It sets out in terms that an enforcing court may grant partial enforcement of a 
NYC award untouched by any other part, in which awards on issues not submitted to 
arbitration are made. In IPCO (Nig.) Ltd. v NNPC
112
 the court questioned whether 
this express stipulation for partial enforcement of award regarding the arbitrator’s 
excess jurisdiction could be construed as meaning that the intention was to preclude 
it in other cases. The court was referred to a decision of the Austrian Supreme Court 
where partial enforcement of a NYC award was enforced in terms other than under 
article V (1) (c).
113
 According to Merkin and Flannery, section 103 (4) of the AA 
                                                             
110. King, M. and Meredith, I. (2010) “Partial Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards”, 
Arbitration International, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 381 – 390. 
111. Decision of the 19th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation dated 18/12/2003 and numbered 
2003/7270 E., 2003/1288K. Another example of partial enforcement can be seen in an old Italian 
case of General Organisation of Commerce and Industrialization of Cereals of the Arab Republic 
of Syria v S. p. A. SIMMER, (1983) Y. B. Comm. Arb., VIII, pp. 386-388. In that case, the court 
found that an award rendered in Syria had exceeded the arbitrator’s authority by covering both 
non-technical issues. The arbitration agreement provided for arbitration in Syria concerning 
“non-technical” issues and arbitration according to the ICC Rules in regard to “technical” issues. 
The court separated the arbitrators’ decisions on the “technical” issues and thus granted partial 
enforcement of the “non-technical” issue. 
112. [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 59. 
113. Buyer (Austria) v Seller (Serbia and Wontenegro) (2005) Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration, 
Vol. XXX, p. 421. The Austrian Supreme Court decision is reported anonymously under. The 
decision concerned enforcement of partial award, with the award of interest being overturned. 
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1996 is a strong reference to the likelihood of partial enforcement of an award 
though only where the separation has been initiated by jurisdictional issues.
114
 
In relation to Nigeria, the ACA provides for such partial enforcement. Under article 
V (1) (c)  of the Second Schedule to the ACA, the court may grant partial 
enforcement of an award if the decision on matters submitted to arbitration can be 
separated from those not submitted.
115
  
It is not clear whether partial enforcement can be on other grounds in England and 
Nigeria. Though the AA 1996 and the ACA make no other provision for partial 
enforcement, the court can resort to the principle in accordance with the analogy of 
section 103 (4) of the AA 1996 ad section 52 (2) (v) of the ACA. Furthermore, the 
court can also rely on the pro-enforcement bias of the NYC as implemented by the 
AA 1996 and the ACA. This proposal is made pursuant to the pro-enforcement 
views of the Austrian Supreme Court. 
For example, under the NYC, the Austrian Supreme Court denied enforcement of 
parts of an award on public policy ground, and enforced the other parts not contrary 
to its public policy. In Buyer (Austria) v Seller (Serbia and Wontenegro)
116
 parties 
concluded a supply contract which contained an arbitration clause. When dispute 
arose between the parties, the seller commenced arbitration at the Foreign Trade 
Arbitration at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia. The arbitral 
tribunal rendered an award with interest in favour of the seller. The seller sought 
enforcement of the award in Austria and the buyer objected. The ground of objection 
was that the award violated public policy of Austria because the award was inter alia 
based on a false statement by the sole witness and the rate of interest was excessive. 
The court held that though the interest violated Austrian international public policy, 
it was possible to separate the award on the main sum which was enforceable from 
the award on interest, which was not enforceable.
117
 
 
                                                             
114. Merkin, R. and Flannery, L. (2014) at p. 409. 
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6.1.5. Improper appointment of the arbitrator or incorrect arbitral procedure 
Under the NYC, enforcement of arbitral award may be denied if the unsuccessful 
party satisfies the court that: 
…the composition of the arbitral authority or the 
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the 
agreement of the parties, or failing such agreement, 
was not in accordance with the law of the country 
where the arbitration took place.
118
 
The threshold for determining improper appointment of the arbitrator or 
incorrectness of the arbitral procedure is parties’ agreement. It is only in the absence 
of such agreement that the law of the country where the arbitration took place will be 
considered.
119
 A significant point to note about article V (1) (d) is the priority given 
to party autonomy over the law of the seat of arbitration.
120
 It is irrelevant if such 
agreed rules are contrary to the rules of the seat of arbitration, this of course depends 
on whether such rule is mandatory or not.
121
 
Equally, aside that article V (1) (d) promotes the supremacy of the parties’ 
agreement, the requirements of due process under article V (1) (b) ought to be 
considered. Failing which, enforcement of the award may be denied pursuant to 
article V (1) (b) or article V (2) (b).
122
 This point demonstrates the interface between 
article V (1) (b) and article V (1) (d), as both articles relate to alleged procedural 
irregularities in the arbitration proceedings.
123
 Nevertheless, this thesis question 
whether every violation of the agreed procedure is capable of justifying a denial to 
enforce an award.  
                                                             
118. Article V (I) (d) of the NYC.  
119. Nikiforov, I. (2008) “Interpretation of Article V of the NYC by Russian Courts’, Journal of 
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123. van den Berg, A. J. (1981) at p. 301. 
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Where article V (1) (d) is proved, such proof may result in denial of enforcement, 
however courts rarely grants an objection based thereto.
124
 Nacimiento explains this 
point thus: 
In practice, Article V (1) (d) has rarely been raised 
successfully in enforcement court because parties are 
generally in agreement over the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal and because the tribunal usually 
enjoys wide discretion regarding the arbitration 
procedure.
125
 
Additionally, most parties, arbitration rules and law usually allow arbitrators wide 
powers regarding the conduct of the arbitral procedure and proceedings, thus, 
making it difficult for the resisting party to successfully establish this ground of 
refusal.
126
  Aside from the above explanations other reasons are advanced. These 
explanations include but are not limited to instances where the court views a 
contravention of the parties’ agreement as minor, or applies the doctrine of estoppel, 
or considers that the unsuccessful party have tacitly consented to the composition of 
the arbitral tribunal.
127
  
Generally, an enforcing court may disregard minor contraventions in the 
appointment of the arbitrator or in the arbitral procedure and still enforce an award. 
The question that may arise is: what constitutes minor contravention? The test under 
this question is, whether the award would have been substantially different if not for 
                                                             
124. Di Pietro, D. and Platte, M. (2001) Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards: The NYC 
of 1958, 1st edn., Cameron, London,p. 491; Lew, J D. M., et al (2003) at paras. 26 – 28. 
125. Nacimiento,P. (2010) “Article V (I) (d)” in Kronke, H., et al, Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary on the NYC, Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, pp. 281 – 300. 
126. Bocjstiegel, K., Kroll, S., and Nacimiento, P. (2008) Arbitration in Germany: The Model Law in 
Practice, Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, pp. 547 – 548. 
127. In Minmetals Germany GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd. [1999] CLC 647, the defendant argued that the 
arbitral awards were rendered via a procedure that was not in accordance with parties’ 
agreement. The defendant brought its application inter alia under section 103 (2) (e) of the AA 
1996. The defendant moved the court to set aside the leave to enforce two awards obtained by 
the claimant, the court refused the application and stated at pp. 659 – 660:  
There can be no doubt that Ferco’s representatives were fully aware of 
the arbitrator’s failure to act in accordance with the rules when they 
embarked upon their application to the court to revoke the award and 
when they participated in the resumed hearing. However, they proceeded 
without explicitly raising with the arbitrators their objection as to the non-
compliance …they therefore waived their rights to object to the 
continuing omission of the arbitrators to disclose the award. Indeed, it is 
difficult to envisage a more glaringly obvious waiver of procedural 
irregularity than that found in this case… 
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the minor procedural violation. According to Born, enforcement of an award should 
be refused under article V (1) (d), provided that the violation mentioned under the 
article occasioned substantial prejudice to the resisting party.
128
 This position is 
illustrated in Shenzhen Nan Da Industrial & Trade United Co. Ltd. v FM 
International Ltd.
129
 The unsuccessful party contended that the arbitral tribunal 
which rendered the award was not the tribunal mentioned in the parties’ agreement. 
Thus, enforcement should be refused under article V (1) (d) of the NYC. The court 
rejected the argument and granted enforcement. The court reasoned that the change 
of name of the tribunal from FETAC to CIETAC was a minor departure from what 
was stipulated in the parties’ agreement. It was further stated that both tribunals were 
legally the same entity and the agreed tribunal would not have decided the dispute 
differently.  
In England, a breach of section 103 (2) (e) of the AA1996 may be disregarded if it is 
considered trivial by the enforcing court. This is evidenced in Tongyuan 
International Trading Group v Uni-Clan Ltd.
130
 Parties’ contract contained an 
arbitration clause for settlement of any dispute arising out of their contract. It was 
agreed that the arbitration will take place at the Shenzhen or the Shanghai office of 
CCPIT. When dispute arose, the claimant initiated arbitration. Although the 
defendant was informed of the proceedings, it did not take part in the arbitration, 
except on one occasion when it sought to contact the arbitrator appointed on its 
behalf. The arbitrators conducted the arbitral proceedings in Beijing and rendered its 
award in favour of the claimant. The claimant sought to enforce the award in 
England against the defendant. Leave was granted. The defendant thus, sought to set 
aside the order granting enforcement of the award. The defendant argued that the 
award was a nullity because the arbitral proceeding was conducted in Beijing rather 
than Shenzhen or Shanghai. The defendant particularly relied on section 103 (2) (e) 
of the AA 1999.
131
 The court rejected the defendant’s argument and held that the 
change in the venue was not critical to the validity of the award. Thus, the court inter 
alia stated: 
                                                             
128. Born, G. B. (2014) at pp. 3564 – 3565. 
129. (1993) Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Vol. XVIII, pp. 377 at 379. 
130. [2001] Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Vol. XXVI, p. 886. 
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was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement. 
232 
 
…the importance of a term of this kind can only be assessed by reference 
to the true construction of the contract. It may be that, in many cases, the 
parties will be sufficiently concerned about the place at which the 
arbitration is to be conducted as to make it clear by their agreement that 
it is a matter of fundamental importance. In other cases, a different 
picture may emerge. The contract in the present case does not … point to 
the conclusion that to hold the proceedings in Shenzhen or Shanghai was 
necessarily critical in all cases … those locations may well have been 
chosen for the convenience of the two parties… The extent to which the 
failure to hold the proceedings at one of the chosen locations could have 
a very great, or an entirely insignificant, effect on the parties and their 
ability to deal with the proceedings, depending on the particular 
circumstances of the case. It hardly needs to be said that to conduct the 
proceedings in a country outside that stipulated by the parties could have 
the most serious effects because it might well result in subjecting the 
proceedings to an entirely different crucial law. In the absence of any 
language which makes it clear that … parties regarded the venue for the 
arbitration as a matter of critical importance in all cases,… the right 
construction of this arbitration clause is that it was an intermediate term, 
… the effect of a failure to comply with it must be viewed in the light of 
the nature and gravity of the particular breach.
132
 
The court thus reasoned that the gravity of a breach of parties’ agreed place of 
arbitration cannot simply be assessed in geographical terms. Thus, removing the 
proceedings from Shenzhen or Shanghai to Beijing had no effect on the arbitral 
awards. 
6.1.6. Award not binding, or has been set aside or suspended 
An enforcing court may refuse enforcement of an award if the party resisting 
enforcement proves that the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has 
been set aside or suspended by a competent court at the seat of arbitration.
133
 In 
England and Nigeria, this ground of refusal is stipulated under section 103 (2) (f) of 
the AA 1996, and article V (1) (e) of the Second Schedule to the ACA. According to 
Goode, article V (1) (e) ground of refusal concerns the extent the decision of a court 
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at the seat of arbitration setting aside or suspending an award is applicable to the 
enforcing courts.
134
  
The article V (1) (e) of the NYC sets forth three alternative grounds that may allow 
an enforcing court to refuse enforcement of an arbitral award: an award that has not 
yet become binding on the parties (6.1.6.1), an award set aside at the seat of 
arbitration (6.1.6.2), and an award suspended at the place of arbitration by a 
competent court on enforcement (6.1.6.3). This section will then discuss the 
enforcing court’s discretionary power to stay enforcement proceedings pending the 
outcome of the challenge application (6.1.6.4). 
6.1.6.1. Award not yet binding on parties 
To succeed under this ground, the resisting party must prove that the arbitral award 
has not yet become binding on the parties.
135
 Although, the aim of the term 
“binding” under article V (I) (e) of the NYC is to eliminate the problem of “double 
exequatur”, it is unclear what the term means and the precise point in time when an 
award becomes binding on the parties.
136
 The NYC itself does not provide any 
definition of the term or stipulate any guidance. The ambiguity in the use of the term 
“binding” has generated different interpretation by national courts and 
commentators.  Hence, the question which arises is, when will an award become 
binding on the parties? Conversely, whether an award can only be considered 
“binding” if it is binding under the law of the seat of arbitration? To answer this 
question, two concepts have emerged, namely, the law applicable to the arbitral 
award (i) and the autonomous concepts (ii). 
(i)   The law applicable to the arbitral award concept 
This concept contends that the binding element of an award should be determined by 
the law of the place where the award was rendered.
137
 This view is based on the 
structure of article V (1) (e) of the NYC, to the effect that setting aside or suspension 
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of arbitral award is subject to the law of the place where the award was rendered. 
According to Darwazeh, since the text ‘binding’ in article V (1) (e) is associated to 
setting aside and suspension of the award, it may also be argued that same applies 
when an award becomes binding on the parties.
138
 Similarly, Gaillard and Savage 
argue, firstly, that if the same interpretation is not followed in determining the issue 
of whether an award has become binding, it will result in inconsistency where an 
award becomes binding under a certain law, but enforcement refused because it was 
set aside under another law. Secondly, the binding element of an award cannot exist 
in isolation, not even under the NYC itself, “but must stem from a legal system 
which recognises that binding quality.”139 Also, in support of this view, Paulsson 
observed that when the NYC was drafted the role of the seat of arbitration was more 
substantial. Thus, difficult to imagine that the NYC intended the arbitral award to be 
binding in a delocalised manner independent from the law applicable to the 
arbitration.
140
 This view has also been adopted by some national courts.
141
 
(ii) The autonomous concept 
This concept considers the binding character of an award under the article V (1) (e) 
of the NYC is independent of the law applicable to the award. In support of this 
interpretation, Lew, Mistelis and Kroll and other commentators have argued that the 
phrase, “…the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made,” 
refers only to the setting aside and suspension of the award.
142
 This is because, to 
interpret the text of article V (1) (e) as suggested by the previous concept will lead to 
‘double exequatur’, a mischief the NYC sought to expressly avoid by using the term 
‘binding’ instead of ‘final’.143 Under this interpretation, an award that is 
unenforceable in the country where it was rendered can still be binding for the 
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purposes of enforcement under the NYC.
144
 Therefore, an award should only be 
considered not binding if the arbitral proceedings stipulate that, or the arbitral award 
itself provides that the award is not binding on the parties.
145
 
Furthermore, the autonomous approach suggests that the phase “the award has not 
yet become binding on the parties” does not entail that leave must first be granted to 
enforce an award in a manner depicting double exequatur or other similar means in 
the country of origin.
146
 Rather, it entails that an award will not become binding on 
the parties until steps required by the arbitration agreement, or proceedings or the 
award itself have been taken. Except and until such condition is met, the award will 
not yet become binding and an enforcing court ought not to enforce such award.
147
 
An example of such condition is illustrated in Rosseel NV v Oriental Commercial 
Shipping Co. (UK) Ltd & Ors.
148
 The defendant in Rosseel NV contended that the 
arbitral award has not yet become binding. The defendant based its argument on an 
oral agreement between the parties, where the plaintiff agreed not to seek 
enforcement of the award abroad until after the award has been confirmed by a 
United States’ court. Although, the court rejected the defendant’s argument 
appointing out that such agreement is inconsistent with the fact that the NYC had 
done away with the concept of ‘double exequatur.  
However, it is submitted in this thesis that if such condition formed part of the 
arbitration agreement, an enforcing court ought to give effect to the parties’ 
agreement. Nonetheless, if such requirement was agreed upon after the award has 
been rendered, an enforcing court may give effect to it, as such post arbitration 
agreement or award condition is at best voidable.
149
 Accordingly, the autonomous 
approach considers an award binding on the parties immediately upon delivery or 
publication, regardless of possible or pending judicial, institutional or other 
review.
150
 In essence, such award may continue to bind the parties even after the 
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award has been set aside or suspended by a court of competent authority at the 
country of origin.
151
 This is because the issue of whether such binding effect is valid 
and capable of supporting non-enforcement of an award is at the discretion of the 
enforcing court to decide. 
In England, this ground of refusal is stipulated under section 103 (2) (f) of the AA 
1996. The section is almost taken verbatim from article V (1) (e) of the NYC. On the 
first part of the section which relates to the time on which the award becomes 
binding on the parties, the court have held that an award becomes binding on the 
parties immediately upon its publication and remains so except set aside or 
suspended by the country of origin.
152
  
Regarding the binding character of an award, the English court will consider the 
issue on the basis of whether or not it is in a position to recognise and enforce the 
award. The issue will not be determined on the basis of whether or not a court at the 
seat will consider the award as binding or not binding on the parties. This position is 
evidenced in Dowans Holding SA v Tanzania Electric Supply Co. Ltd.
153
 The 
question that arose for determination inter alia, was whether a Tanzanian award had 
become ‘final and binding’ despite the existence of proceedings in Tanzania to set 
the award aside. Burton J held that whether an award had become ‘binding on 
parties’ was a matter for the English Court to decide. This the court will do on the 
basis of whether it was in a position to enforce a NYC award, rather than a matter of 
evaluating whether the court at the seat would consider that the award was binding. 
In Nigeria, the defence is provided for under article V (1) (e) of the Second Schedule 
to the ACA.
154
 Courts in Nigeria has not so far dealt with the interpretation of the 
phrase “… has not yet become binding on the parties”. However, given the fact that 
English cases are persuasive authorities in Nigeria, it is submitted in this thesis that 
an enforcing court in Nigeria may rely on the Dowans Holding SA
155
 to determine 
the binding element of a NYC award. 
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 6.1.6.2. The arbitral award has been set aside  
Article V (1) (e) of the NYC further provides that an enforcing court may refuse 
enforcement of an award if the party against whom the award is invoked proves that 
the award has been set aside by a competent court in the country where or under the 
law of which, the award was made. Arguably, article V (1) (e) establishes a link 
between the review of the award by a competent court at the seat and its enforcement 
abroad. Nevertheless, the NYC provides no standard by which the enforcing court 
will adhere to, and also no limitation to the grounds upon which an award may be 
annulled at the seat.
156
 Thus, the grounds for annulment of an award are entirely 
regulated by the law of the place where the award was rendered. This creates a 
problem in the application of the NYC concerning the extent an annulled award can 
influence refusal of enforcement at the enforcing state. Therefore, the question, 
whether an annulled award has a binding effect on enforcement application is 
considered below. 
Three approaches have been advanced. The first view holds that an annulled award 
ceases to exist and is unenforceable in any other jurisdiction. This traditional 
approach, which reflects the jurisdictional theory of arbitration discussed in chapter 
three 3.3.1, emphasis the territoriality of the state and in support, van den Berg 
argues that: 
…the fact that the award has been annulled implies 
that the award was legally rooted in the arbitration law 
of the country of the origin. How then is it possible 
that other country can consider the same as still valid? 
Perhaps some theories of legal philosophy may 
provide an answer to this question, but for a legal 
practitioner this phenomenon is inexplicable. It seems 
that only an international treaty can give a special 
status to an award notwithstanding its annulment in the 
country of origin.
157
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One of the advantages of this approach is that it discourages endless forum shopping 
for the enforcement of an annulled award.
158
 On the contrary, the second approach 
presupposes that an enforcing court is at liberty to enforce an award notwithstanding 
that the award has been annulled at the seat.
159
 This approach is based on the 
delocalisation of international arbitration, which reflects the autonomous theory of 
arbitration discussed in chapter three 3.3.4, and is justified on grounds that 
international arbitration “cannot be deemed a manifestation of the state.”160 
Moreover, it is also a fact that the language of article V (1) of the NYC is permissive 
and not mandatory.
161
 Thus, enforcement of an annulled NYC award is at the 
discretion of an enforcing court. Arguably also, enforcement of an annulled award 
can be based on the provision of article VII (1) which permits an interested party in 
an arbitration to rely on a more favourable enforcement regime than the NYC 
itself.
162
 And so, if the enforcing court decides to enforce a set aside award because 
its law permits it, such enforcement decision is favoured under the NYC. 
Nonetheless, it remains unclear as to the test an enforcing court may apply in order 
to enforce an annulled award. Thus, the third approach syntheses the territorial and 
delocalisation approaches to establish its criteria. This approach holds that an 
enforcing court should only refuse enforcement of an annulled award if the reason 
for the annulment is based on ‘international standards.’163 Conversely, where an 
award is annulled on the basis of local standards, an enforcing court may choose to 
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enforce such award.
164
 Therefore, according to Paulsson, an international standard 
annulment has to reflect any of the grounds set out under article V (1) (a) to (d) of 
the NYC.
165
 However, this approach is not flawless. Notably, it makes redundant 
article V (1) (e) of the NYC. Arguably, the intention of the NYC is that article V (1) 
(e) should provide a separate ground for the unsuccessful party to resist enforcement 
of an award that has been annulled.
166
 Given the Paulsson’s international standard 
this separate ground is elusive or at best in abeyance. 
The English court’s approach on enforcement of annulled awards has been 
pragmatic. Though, in principle, English law does not recognise the idea of 
delocalised arbitration, English courts have applied a test to determine whether 
annulled awards should or should not be enforced.
167
 In applying the test, the English 
court may have to decide whether the decision of the annulling court offended basic 
principles of honesty, natural justice and English public policy. In effect, the English 
court have interpreted the text “recognition and enforcement of the award may be 
refused” literally.  
In Yukos Capital SARL v OJSC Rosneft Oil Company,
168
 the defendants failed to 
honour the arbitral award despite the decision of the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam. 
Thus, the claimants commenced legal proceedings in England to enforce the award. 
The preliminary question before the court was whether the common law precludes 
enforcement of awards that have been annulled at the place of origin. The court held 
that the answer was to be found in a “test” asking whether the court can in the 
circumstances treat the award as having legal effect. Thus, Simon J stated: 
In applying this test it would be both unsatisfactory 
and contrary to principle if the court were bound to 
recognise a decision of a foreign court which offended 
against basic principles of honesty, natural justice and 
domestic concepts of public policy.
169
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Similarly, in Dowans and another v Tanzania Electric Supply Co. Ltd
170
 the court 
held that there was no question of an automatic refusal to enforce the award simply 
because one of the grounds for setting the award aside has been satisfied. The court 
further stated that “English Courts still retain the discretion to enforce the award, 
though that jurisdiction will be exercised sparingly.” Similarly also, the recent case 
of IPCO (Nig.) Ltd v NNPC
171
 is consistent with this pragmatic test. This is because 
the court stated in IPCO that, there was no doubt that section 103 of the AA 1996 is 
pre-disposed to the enforcement of the NYC awards. Thus, even when a ground for 
denying enforcement is established, the court still retains its power to enforce the 
award. The court then went on to consider how the discretion would be exercised. 
The court referred to Lord Mance’s ditum in Dallah Estate and Tourism Holding 
Company v The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan,
172
 
paraphrasing the court’s decision, Gross J. held that, the enforcing court could if 
necessary consider the circumstances in which the original award was rendered and 
the circumstances in which it was later annulled. Also, the enforcing court would not 
be precluded from forming its own views on whether the foreign entities involved 
had complied with the appropriate legal rules.  
It can be argued that the above cases demonstrate that English courts will not 
consider that an arbitral award stands or falls with the decision of the court at the 
place where the award was made. The courts have shown that an annulled award 
may survive and be enforced in England if the enforcing party can be shown that the 
annulling court offended basic principles of honesty, natural justice and English 
public policy.
173
 
In Nigeria, there is no reported case law on international commercial arbitration 
dealing with the issue. However, it is arguable that the English jurisprudence in 
Dowan, IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd. and Yukos Capital SARL
 
may be followed as persuasive 
authorities. This submission is based on the fact that English case laws are 
persuasive authorities in Nigeria. However, it remains to be seen when and on what 
premise the Nigerian courts will or will not permit the enforcement of an annulled 
award. 
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6.1.6.3. The arbitral award has been suspended 
Article V (1) (e) of the NYC also provides that enforcement of an award may be 
refused if the resisting party proves that the award has been “suspended” by a 
competent court in the country where, or under the law of which, the award was 
rendered. Furthermore, article VI of the NYC provides that an enforcing court may 
adjourn its decision on enforcement if the resisting party has applied for the 
suspension of the award at the court of the seat. Arguably, articles V (1) (e) and VI 
raises question as to what the drafters of the NYC meant by the suspension of an 
award.
174
 Conversely, when is an arbitral award suspended or deemed to be 
suspended? 
In Apia AS v Fantazia Kereskedelmi KFT,
175
 an English Court considered the 
question whether an arbitral award could be suspended pursuant to article V (1) (e) 
of the NYC and section 103 (2) (f) of the AA 1996. It was held that an English court 
has power under its residual jurisdiction to suspend the enforcement abroad of an 
English award pending the determination of an application to annul the award. The 
court thus stated: 
If an award is suspended, it will be deprived of 
immediate effect. The article and section thus 
presuppose that one court has power to order that an 
award shall have no effect pending an application to 
set it aside and this may be relied upon to resist 
enforcement by a court in another country.
176
 
The court’s dictum in the above case refers presumably to suspension of the 
enforceability or enforcement of the award by the court of the seat until it makes a 
decision on an application to annul the award.
177
 Furthermore, according to Gaillard 
and Savage, a provisional order made by the court of the seat for suspension of the 
award also accords with the requirement of article V (1) (e).
178
 However, a mere 
                                                             
174. van den Berg, A. J. (2007) at pp. 17 - 18; Tweeddale, A. and Tweeddale, K. (2005) at pp. 420 – 
421. 
175. [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 348. 
176. Apia AS v Fantazia Kereskedelmi KFT [2001] at p. 352 
177. van den Berg (2007) at pp. 17 – 18. 
178. Gaillard, E. and Savage, J. (eds.) (1999) at para. 1690. 
242 
 
application to a court at the seat to suspend or set aside the award should not be held 
as a suspension or an annulment of the award.
179
 
Another issue the defence of article V (1) (e) raises is whether an award can be 
suspended or annulled by operation of law at the seat? There are two instances where 
enforcing courts have held that automatic suspension of the award by operation of 
law at the seat meets the requirement of article V (1) (e).
180
 However, Lord Collins, 
et al have criticised such interpretation because the NYC requires the suspension or 
annulment to be ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction and not by automatic 
suspension or annulment by operation of law of the seat.
181
 It is further argued in this 
thesis that suspension or annulment to which reference is made in article V (1) (e) is 
the overt decision of a competent court at the seat and not the laws of that seat. Thus, 
according to van den Berg, to decide whether an award has been suspended or 
annulled, an enforcing court should look to what the courts of the seat have done and 
not to the laws of the seat of arbitration.
182
 
6.1.6.4. Adjournment of enforcement proceedings pending decision on 
annulment 
It is likely that after an award has been rendered the unsuccessful party may seek to 
challenge the award at the seat. Thus the question: what will the English or the 
Nigerian court do in a situation where after an enforcement proceedings have been 
commenced, the unsuccessful party objects that there is an annulment proceeding 
pending at the seat of the arbitration? In this regard, article VI of the NYC, which is 
re-enacted under section 103 (5) of the English AA 1996 and article VI of the 
Second Schedule to the Nigerian ACA, provides that: 
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If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been 
made to a competent authority referred to in Article V paragraph (1) (e), 
the authority before which award is sought to be relied upon may, if it 
considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award 
and may also, on the application of the party claiming enforcement of the 
award, order the other party to give suitable security.  
Apparently, article VI gives an enforcing court discretionary power to adjourn its 
enforcement decision pending a determination of an annulment proceeding in the 
country where the award was rendered. In addition and to protect the rights of the 
enforcing party, the court may on the application of the enforcing party require the 
resisting party to provide suitable security for the duration of the stayed enforcement 
proceedings.
183
 Undoubtedly too, article VI strikes a balance between the pro-
enforcement bias of the NYC and the need to protect unsuccessful parties that have 
genuine claim against the validity of the arbitral award.
184
 In effect, article VI allows 
unsuccessful parties to contest the validity of the award at the seat while at the same 
time requiring an enforcing court to stay enforcement proceeding pending the 
outcome of such contest.
185
 The question which then arises is the standard upon 
which the enforcing court may exercise its discretion. What is the threshold for the 
applicability of article VI of the NYC? 
The NYC, the AA 1996 and the ACA does not provide a clear standard which may 
be followed by an enforcing court in the exercise of this discretionary power. Also, 
there are no internationally accepted standards to be followed by enforcing courts in 
deciding whether or not to stay enforcement proceedings pending annulment 
proceeding at the seat.
186
 However, it has been suggested that enforcing courts 
should generally approach the issue of granting or refusing an application for 
adjournment pending an annulment proceeding, by considering the probable success 
of the annulment proceeding.
187
 Yet, another view has placed substantial weight on 
the time frame within which the annulment proceedings will last. Arguably, 
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nevertheless, courts will adjourn enforcement proceedings if it is likely that the 
decision on annulment of the award will be made without costly delay.
188
  
In England, excessive delay in the determination of a challenge to the award at the 
seat of arbitration may be a reason for enforcement of an award. An English court 
will permit enforcement of an award notwithstanding that such award is been 
challenged at the seat and there is a likelihood of success to such challenge. In the 
recent case of IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd v NNPC (No. 3),
189
 the Court of Appeal ordered 
that IPCO should be entitled to enforce an award rendered against NNPC in October 
2004. The Court of Appeal order was made regardless of NNPC pending challenge 
on the validity of the award in Nigeria the seat of the arbitration.  The court reasoned 
that the lengthy delay in the setting aside proceedings were such that it would be 
inconsistent with the underlying principles of the NYC if IPCO had to wait until the 
outcome of those challenges in the Nigerian courts is out before being able to 
enforce the award.   
This is the first reported English appeal case where delay alone has been held as a 
ground to enforce a NYC award, notwithstanding a challenge at the seat of 
arbitration. Although, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that issues as to the 
validity of an arbitral award were matters for the courts of the seat of arbitration to 
consider, however, the court held that  it was also necessary to give due 
consideration to the underlying principles of the NYC. Thus, the court formed the 
view that the NYC “was intended to foster international trade by ensuring a 
relatively swift enforcement of awards and a degree of insulation from the vagaries 
of local legal systems.”190 Although, the Court of Appeal noted the importance of 
comity and respect for other courts nonetheless, the court decided that the time had 
come when the IPCO award should be enforced, subject to the determination of the 
fraud allegation in the Commercial Court.   
Aside from excessive delay, English courts have considered other factors when 
deciding whether to grant or refuse an application for adjournment on enforcement 
pending an annulment action at the seat of the arbitration. For instance, in IPCO 
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(Nigeria) Ltd v NNPC,
191
 the unsuccessful party relied on section 103 (5) of the AA 
1996 to request for a stay of enforcement of the award pending the outcome of a 
parallel annulment proceedings in Nigeria. In deciding on the adjournment 
application, Gross J considered many factors as relevant to any decision to stay 
enforcement pending the outcome of annulment proceedings at the seat of the 
arbitration. Thus, these factors are: 
 The likelihood that the successful party in the 
arbitration can repay the award if annulment at the 
seat were granted 
 The probability (“realistic” prospect) of success of 
the annulment proceeding at the seat of arbitration 
 The extent of the delay caused by the stay of 
enforcement 
 Whether the annulment proceedings were brought 
in good faith and not used as a delay strategy, and  
 The prejudice to the successful party in the 
arbitration if a stay of enforcement of the award 
were granted. 
Also, in Socadec SA v Pan Afri Impex Co. Ltd
192
 two awards were rendered against 
the defendant. The defendant appealed both awards. While the appeal was pending, 
the claimant secured an order ex parte to enforce the awards. The defendants sought 
to set aside the order granting enforcement of the awards pending the outcome of the 
appeals. The court held that the order to enforce the first award would not be 
suspended because it was not apparent on what grounds it could be challenged. The 
court further held that the order to enforce the second award would be suspended on 
terms that the defendant provides security. The court reasoned that the second award 
was not manifestly invalid and the chances of success on appeal appeared less than 
50 per cent. Relying on the dictum of Staughton L J in Soleh Boneh International v 
Government of the Republic of Uganda,
193
 Mackay J stated: 
The principle I should apply in this application to set 
aside or suspend the order of Morison J are helpfully 
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set out in the decision of … Staughton L J in Soleh 
Boneh International … there are two factors to be 
considered. Firstly, the strength of the argument that 
the award in question was invalid, which could be 
assessed and had to be assessed on what was called a 
‘brief consideration’ only; certainly no mini-trial on 
the merits is either appropriate or possible in an 
application such as this. If it is plainly a valid award, 
then immediate enforcement should follow or at the 
least there should be substantial security. If it is plainly 
not valid, there should be no enforcement and no 
security would be appropriate. In the intermediate 
positions it is a matter for the judgement of the court. 
The second factor which the court has to consider is 
the ease or difficulty of the enforcement of the award, 
and, for example, whether if enforcement was withheld 
or delayed it could become more difficult by the 
movement of assets, problems of trading, the 
disappearance of the defendant and so forth. 
In the light of the above cases, this thesis agrees in principle that the factors stated in 
the cases are relevant in deciding whether or not an enforcing court should grant an 
application for stay of enforcement. However, in applying those factors, an enforcing 
court should be guided by the “pro-enforcement” bias of the NYC.194 Enforcing 
courts should not stay enforcement of awards when a motion for annulment is not 
effective at the seat or is merely pending, or if the annulment or suspension 
application does not accord with the terms of article VI of the NYC. This is because 
enforcement of an award should not be frustrated merely by the making of an 
application to set aside the award at the seat of arbitration.
195
 Conversely, where 
there is an active motion to set aside an award at the seat of arbitration, the enforcing 
court may pursuant to section 103(5) of the AA 1996, which echoes article VI of the 
NYC, adjourn any decision on enforcement of an award, and/or order the party 
resisting enforcement to provide security for the award. 
In Nigeria, there is no reported case law that deals with these issues. However, it is 
contended that the factors relevant to stay of enforcement discussed in this thesis 
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should be considered by Nigerian courts when deciding whether or not to adjourn 
enforcement proceedings. 
6.2. Substantive grounds 
The second class of defences differs from the defences already examined. The 
second class of exceptions are stipulated under article V (2) (a) and (b) of the NYC, 
section 103 (3) of the AA 1996 and article V (2) (a) and (b) of the Second Schedule 
to the ACA. Unlike the article V (1) defences, which only the unsuccessful party 
may raise and establish, either the unsuccessful party or the enforcing court on its 
own volition may raise either of the two article V (2) defences.
196
 This sub-section 
examines the two grounds on which an enforcing court may refuse enforcement suo 
motu in the absence of pleadings by the resisting party. Although, an enforcing court 
may ex officio raise either of the article V (2) defences, the responsibility of 
establishing that such defence exists still remains with the resisting party.
197
 These 
defences are non-arbitrability of the subject matter of arbitration (6.2.1), and 
violation of public policy (6.2.2). 
6.2.1. Non-arbitrability 
Article V (2) (a) of the NYC provides that: 
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may 
also be refused if the competent authority in the 
country where recognition and enforcement is sought 
finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable 
of settlement by arbitration under the law of that 
country… 
Apparently, this ground of refusal concerns the subject matter of the dispute not been 
arbitrable. Nonetheless, the NYC is silent as to matters that are arbitrable and those 
not arbitrable. Thus, the issues to be examined under this sub-heading are: when is a 
dispute considered to be non-arbitrable (6.2.1.1), and by which or what law is non-
arbitrability determined in England and Nigeria (6.2.1.2)? 
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6.2.1.1 When is a dispute considered non-arbitrable? 
Non-arbitrability in the sense it is used in this thesis, concerns whether a dispute may 
or may not be settled by arbitration. However there is no internationally agreed view 
as to when or what disputes are non-arbitrable.
198
 Nevertheless, some disputes 
belong exclusively to the jurisdiction of a national court for resolution.
199
 For 
instance, dispute relating to money laundry contract will not be arbitrable. Arguably, 
where parties elect to settle their dispute by arbitration, the presumption is that the 
arbitration agreement is valid and the subject matter arbitrable.
200
 Thus, in principle, 
any dispute should be capable of settlement by arbitration as by litigation, or other 
dispute resolution mechanisms.
201
 
Due to the fact that the NYC is silent on disputes that are arbitrable and those that 
are not, national laws and courts determine matters which are capable of resolution 
by arbitration in accordance with its own political, economic and social policies.
202
 
According to Otto and Elwan, disputes which are determined non-arbitrable usually 
reflect specific interest of that country, thus such disputes are to be decided by the 
national courts.
203
 Often such disputes have an impact on the wider society or the 
rights of individuals which one way or the other define arbitrability on the basis of 
conditions connected to public policy of a country.
204
 
6.2.1.2. By which or what law is non-arbitrability determined 
Although, arbitration is a private proceeding, it has public consequences, at least in 
the enforcement of the award, therefore, some disputes belong exclusively to the 
jurisdiction of national courts. Hence, if issues of non-arbitrability are raised in an 
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arbitration process, it becomes necessary to have regard to the relevant laws of the 
different countries that are or may be connected to the dispute.
205
 In this sense, the 
relevant laws are likely to include; the personal laws of the parties, the law 
regulating the arbitration agreement, the law of the place of arbitration, and the law 
of the place of enforcement of the award.
206
  
It seems straightforward to hold that under the provisions of article V (2) (a) of the 
NYC, enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if the dispute is not arbitrable 
under the laws of the place of enforcement. However, it is questionable whether the 
law of the place of enforcement will always be relevant to the determination of non-
arbitrability even at the enforcement stage? For Brekoulakis, to determine whether a 
dispute is arbitrable, courts should examine whether the arbitral award did actually 
breach the exclusive jurisdiction of the court.
207
To this effect, the law of the country 
of enforcement will be relevant for the examination of enforceability provided, the 
enforcing court originally had jurisdiction over the dispute determined by the 
arbitrator. Apart from that, there should be no reason for the enforcing court to apply 
its own law to refuse enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.
208
  
In order to restrict enforcing courts’ control of the scope of arbitrability of 
international commercial disputes, there is need to differentiate between domestic 
and international arbitrabilities. This view accords with Gaillard and Savage’s 
submission that such distinction will enable “a dispute to be found non-arbitrable 
under a country’s domestic law, without necessarily preventing the recognition [and 
enforcement] in that country of a foreign award dealing with the same subject 
matter.”209 Consequently, in enforcing foreign arbitral award, the court should not 
exercise its discretion to refuse enforcement on grounds of non-arbitrability, 
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regardless whether the dispute was non-arbitrable under the domestic law of the 
court or otherwise.
210
 
Though, the text of article V (2) (a) is clear that the law applicable to non-
arbitrability is that of the country of enforcement, there is still room for debate as to 
whether a different view of arbitrability should apply to domestic and international 
disputes. This thesis takes the view that distinguishing domestic abitrability from 
international arbitrability is necessary and national courts should subordinate 
domestic arbitrability to international policies favouring commercial arbitration.
211
 
Such differentiation will give effect to the pro enforcement bias of the NYC. 
In England, arbitrability of dispute as a ground for refusing enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award is provided for under section 103 (3) of the AA 1996. The section is 
taken directly from article V (2) (a) of the NYC. No concept has been adopted upon 
which the distinction between disputes which are arbitrable and those which are not 
can be drawn. Also, there is no reported case law on disputes that are capable of 
settlement by arbitration and those that are not capable of resolution by arbitration. 
According to Merkin and Flannery, the reason for such may be attributable to the 
fact that the concept of arbitrability was largely untouched by the drafters of the AA 
1996.
212
 On the other hand, Tweeddale and Tweeddale have suggested that: 
Under English law, matters which would not be 
capable of settlement by arbitration would include: (a) 
decisions affecting the legal status of the parties; (b) 
decision which affects the legal status or rights of non-
parties; and (c) decisions reached which are not quasi-
judicial (e.g. valuations, mediations and 
appraisements).
213
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Although, Tweeddale and Tweeddale’s suggestions are viable grounds for an 
English court to rely on when moved to refuse enforcement of an award pursuant to 
section 103 (3) of the AA 1996. However, it remains to be seen when and on what 
basis the English courts will refuse enforcement of arbitral award on grounds of non-
arbitrability.  
In Nigeria, lack of arbitrability is fatal to the enforcement of arbitral awards and any 
of the parties or even the court may raise the lack of arbitrability as a ground for 
refusing enforcement.
214
 The texts of article V (2) (a) of the Second Schedule to the 
ACA is to the effect that recognition and enforcement of arbitral award may be 
refused if the subject-matter of the arbitration is not arbitrable. Sections 35 and 57 of 
the ACA regulate the scope of disputes that may be referred or submitted to 
arbitration under the ACA. Thus, section 35 provides that: 
This Act shall not affect any other law by virtue of which certain disputes: 
(a) may not be submitted to arbitration; or 
(b) may be submitted to arbitration only in accordance 
with the provisions of that or another law. 
Under section 57 (1) of the ACA, the definition of arbitration is delimited to mean a 
commercial arbitration whether or not administered by a permanent arbitral 
institution.
215
 To this end, Idornigie argued that disputes arising from non-
commercial transactions are not arbitrable under the ACA.
216
 Although section 35 
does not specify what constitutes arbitrable disputes, it is contended that the 
legislative intent of the section is to preclude the resolution of certain dispute under 
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the ACA.
217
 Though, the text of sections 35 and 57 appear seemingly simple and 
clear, yet the interpretation and scope of its application has generated considerable 
debates. For example, Okekeifere argues that intellectual property disputes are not 
arbitrable under the ACA but triable by the Federal High Court only.
218
 On the other 
hand, Asouzu submitted that: 
…as it pertains to section 35 (a) of the Act, under the 
Constitution and certain other statutes in Nigeria, civil 
jurisdiction with respect to certain subjects is vested in 
the Federal High Court ‘to the exclusion of any other 
court’, for example, trademark matters, patents and 
designs, and copyrights. The import of such provisions 
may be that with respect to those matters and the 
courts (i.e. as between courts), the Federal High Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction; not necessarily that, in 
appropriate cases, the relevant subject matters are 
incapable of being submitted to arbitration unless the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act is expressly 
excluded.
219
 
However, Nigerian courts have adopted a pragmatic approach to determine whether 
a dispute is arbitrable or not. The test applied is whether the dispute between the 
parties involves a reasonable matter triable civilly. In United World Ltd. Inc. v M. T. 
S. Ltd
220
 the court held that for a dispute to be arbitrable, “it must consist of a 
justifiable issue triable civilly.” The court went on to state that such dispute must be 
capable of being compromised lawfully by way of accord and satisfaction. 
Nevertheless, in Kano State Urban Development Board v Fanz Constitution Ltd.,
221
 
the Nigerian Supreme Court listed matters which are not arbitrable in Nigeria. Thus, 
disputes relating to, indictment for an offence of a public nature, illegal contract, 
gaming and wagering, change of status such as divorce petition, bankruptcy 
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proceedings, winding up a company, and any agreement that permits the arbitral 
tribunal to give a decision in rem are not arbitrable in Nigeria.
222
  
This thesis argues that under article V (2) (a) of the Second Schedule to the ACA, an 
enforcing court in Nigeria is obliged to consider the arbitrability of dispute in 
accordance with the laws of Nigeria.
223
 In SNEP & 3 ors. v FIRS & anor.
224
 and 
EEPN & anor. v NNPC,
225
 respectively, the Court of Appeal held that disputes 
arising under the Petroleum Tax Act are not arbitrable. The court reasoned that 
disputes relating to the revenue of the Government of Nigeria or its organ and 
matters pertaining to taxation of companies and other bodies carrying on business in 
Nigeria are not arbitrable. 
6.2.2. Public Policy 
The fact that an award offends against English and Nigerian public policy is a 
ground for an enforcing court in England and Nigeria to refuse enforcement under 
the AA 1996 and the ACA, as the case may be. This ground for refusal in England is 
stipulated in the second paragraph of section 103 (3) of the AA 1996. In Nigeria, it is 
provided for under article V (2) (b) of the Second Schedule to the ACA. Both the 
English and the Nigerian public policy grounds of refusal are taken from article V 
(2) (b) of the NYC which provides that: 
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may 
also be refused if the competent authority in the 
country where recognition and enforcement is sought 
finds that: 
(b) The recognition and enforcement of the award 
would be contrary to the public policy of that 
country 
This sub-section examines the concept of public policy (6.2.2.1), the applicable law 
to public policy (6.2.2.2) and, the standard of public policy defence (6.2.2.3) under 
the NYC, the AA 1996 and, the ACA. 
                                                             
222. Kano State Urban Development Board v Fanz Constitution Ltd., [1990] at p. 33. 
223. Ufot, D. (2008) “The Influence of the NYC on the Development of International Arbitration in 
Nigeria”, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 821 – 836. 
224. [2016], Appeal No. CA/A/208/2012, delivered on 31/08/2016. 
225. [2016] Appeal No. CA/A/507/2012, delivered on 22/07/2016. 
254 
 
6.2.2.1The concept of public policy under the New York, AA 1996 and ACA 
Although enforcing courts in England and Nigeria will refuse to enforce an 
international arbitral award which violates English and Nigerian public policy, as the 
case may be, the scope of public policies in both jurisdictions differs. This is because 
the issue of public policy is controversial, and no concept has been adopted to 
determine its scope.
226
 Different countries have different meanings attach to public 
policy. The basis is that each country has its own fundamental interest within which 
it has to decide whether or not to enforce a foreign arbitral award on an objection 
premised on public policy.
227
 Hence, enforcement of an award may be refused 
because of public policy considerations in country A, and the same award enforced 
in country B where such public policy considerations do not apply. Principles which 
are determined fundamentally important to one country’s legal, social, economic, 
political or religious order may be considered less essential in other countries. 
Therefore domestic laws may differ significantly in this regard. 
The controversy surrounding the scope of public policy sometimes finds its way 
even within the territory of a country. For instance, an enforcing court may refuse to 
enforce an award because of public policy elements in one case, and in another case, 
the same court or another court may enforce another award which involves the same 
circumstances. Arguably, considerations of what constitutes public policy are based 
on a case-by-case policy. In England, this controversial approach is manifest in a 
number of cases in which the same court gave different judgements on different 
awards, even though the circumstances were the same.
228
 This is understandable as 
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what is considered public policy in one case is not sacrosanct even within the same 
country.
229
 
To state a precise definition, whether statutory or otherwise, of the concept of public 
policy may be difficult, more so, in the context of enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards under the NYC, the AA 1996 and the ACA. This is because, the above legal 
regimes offer no definition of the concept, nor do they provide guidance as to how 
public policy elements should be applied as a defence for refusing enforcement.
230
 
On the other hand, public policy is relative. It concerns many areas of law in many 
ways, and its content and scope varies from country to country and from time to 
time.
231
 To this end, different commentators have defined public policy according to 
their perception of the concept. For instance, according to van den Berg and Enterria 
respectively, the term public policy concerns the fundamental moral and convictional 
policies of the forum place.
232
 For Tweeddale, public policy is “open-textured and 
encompasses a broad spectrum of different acts.”233 However, Chukwuemerie 
remarked that: 
Public policy like ‘national interest’ to which it is 
inseparably related is a nebulous concept hardly 
capable of precise definition or explanation at any one 
point in time. It is a fluid concept the contents of 
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which are determined by the changing mood of 
society.
234
 
Further to the various attempts to define and describe public policy, the International 
Commercial Arbitration Committee of the International Law Association (ILA) 
published a report and resolution on public policy as a ground for refusing 
enforcement of foreign awards. The report and resolution identified various aspects 
of public policy with examples, but did not provide a definition of the concept.
235
 
Two main levels of public policy were identified, namely, domestic and international 
public policies. The third, transnational public policy was merely mentioned in the 
report and resolution. These levels of public policy are briefly examined later on in 
this sub section. Nevertheless, public policy definitions and descriptions from 
plethora of commentators reflect the protection of fundamental economic, legal, 
moral, political, religious and social values of every country or extra-national 
community.
236
 There is equally no definition of the concept of public policy offered 
by case law in England and Nigeria. However, it has been described as “a very 
unruly horse, and when you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.”237 
Consequently, the concept of public policy is easier to identify or exemplify than it is 
to define.  
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According to Merkin and Flannery the most important aspects of public policy 
defence in England have been identified in circumstances where: 
(a) The award has been obtained by perjury or fraud 
(b) The losing party is at risk of having to make 
payment in some other jurisdiction as well as in 
England 
(c) The award is tainted by illegality 
(d) The award was obtained in breach of the rules of 
natural justice. This is a limited defence, for the 
losing party will normally have a right to seek to 
have the award overturned by the courts of the 
jurisdiction in which the award was given, and if 
losing party sough but failed to obtain relief from 
the curial courts, or has unreasonably not invoked 
the jurisdiction of the curial courts, the award will 
generally be enforced by the English courts; and 
(e) The award is so unclear as to the obligations 
imposed on the losing side as to be incapable of 
enforcement.
238
 
In Nigeria, the Supreme Court in the case of Taylor Wordrow (Nig.) Ltd. v 
Suddentolalie Etna-Werlk GMBH
239
 identified some acts that will constitute 
violation of the public policy of Nigeria, paraphrasing the court, such acts are where: 
(a) the arbitrator fails to comply with the terms, 
express or implied, of the arbitration agreement  
(b) the arbitrator has been bribed or corrupted 
(c) technical misconduct, such as where the arbitrator 
makes a mistake as to the scope of the authority 
conferred by the agreement of reference. This 
however, does not mean that every irregularity of 
procedure amounts to misconduct.   
(d) the arbitrator fails to decide all the matters which 
were referred to him. 
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(e) the arbitrator has breached the rules of natural 
justice. It is against public policy in Nigeria to 
enforce an award which results from arbitral 
proceeding held in breach of the sacred 
constitutional principle of natural justice.
240
 
In addition, it can be argued that enforcement of an award will be against public 
policy in Nigeria, if the subject matter of the arbitration is not arbitrable under 
Nigerian law. In this sense, there is a nexus between arbitrability and public policy 
considerations. Disputes which are non-arbitrable are based on public policy 
considerations.
241
 In effect, Nigerian courts may on grounds of public policy refuse 
enforcement of an arbitral award which subject matter under Nigerian law is not 
capable of settlement by arbitration.
242
 
6.2.2.2. The law applicable to breach of public policy 
This sub-section poses the question: when will the English and the Nigerian courts 
regard an award as contrary to English and Nigerian public policy? According to 
Lew et al, the public policy defence set out in article V (2) (b) of the NYC is an 
acknowledgment of the right of a country and its court to exercise control over 
enforcement proceedings of a foreign award.
243
 As part of this control, an enforcing 
court may refuse to enforce an award where such enforcement will violate the 
enforcing country’s most basic notions of morality and justice.244 This is irrespective 
of whether the award is a domestic award,
245
 a NYC award,
246
 a non- NYC award,
247
 
or foreign award which might otherwise be enforced at common law.
248
 
Consequently, the law applicable to violation of public policy under the NYC, the 
                                                             
240. Chukwuemerie, A. I. (2002) at p. 204. 
241. Okekeifere, A. I. (1999), pp. 70 – 77.  
242. Kano State Urban Development Board v Fanz Construction Ltd [1990] 4 N.W.L.R. (Part 142) 1 
243. Lew, J. D. M., et al (2003) at pp. 720 – 722; International Law Association, New Delhi 
Conference (2002). 
244. Hwang, M. and Chan, A. (2001) “Enforcement and Setting Aside of International Arbitral 
Awards: The Perspective of Common Law Countries,” in van den Berg, A. J. (ed.), ICCA 
Congress Series No. 10 (New Delhi 2000), Kluwer Law International pp. 145 – 164; Scherer, M. 
(2013) “Effects of Foreign Judgement Relating to International Arbitral Awards: Is the Judgment 
Route the Wrong Road?”, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 587 – 
628; Silberman, L. J. and Scherer, M. (2013) “Forum Shopping and Post-Award Judgments,” 
New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 447, pp. 313 – 345. 
245. Section 68 (2) of the AA 1996; section 52 of the ACA. 
246. Section 103 (3) of the AA 1996; article V (2) (b) of the Second Schedule to the ACA. 
247. Section 99 of AA 1996, section 37 of the Arbitration Act 1950 and, section 52 of the ACA (as 
the case may be). 
248. Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd. v National Bank of Pakistan [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 223 
259 
 
AA 1996 and the ACA is the law of the enforcing court.
249
 In this case, it is the 
English and Nigerian law.
250
 In Soleimany v Soleimany,
251
 Lord Justice Waller stated 
this position inter alia: 
An English court exercises control over the enforcement of arbitral 
awards as part of the lex fori, whatever the proper law of the arbitration 
agreement or the place where the arbitration is conducted. If a claimant 
wishes to invoke the executive power in this country to enforce an award 
in his favour, he can only do so subject to our law… (It is now expressly 
provided in section 68 (2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 that an award may 
be challenged on the ground that it is contrary to public policy; and 
section 2 (2) (b) of that Act in effect provides that the enforcement of 
awards shall be governed by English law even if that is not otherwise the 
law applicable to the arbitration.) It follows that an award, whether 
domestic or foreign, will not be enforced by an English court if 
enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of this country.
252
 
Flowing from Lord Justice Waller dictum, the question that then arises is: whether 
the English and the Nigerian courts should apply the same standard of public policy 
to both domestic and foreign arbitral awards? 
6.2.2.3. The standards of application of public policy defence 
The NYC, AA 1996 and ACA provide for the application of public policy of the 
enforcing country without stipulating whether courts should apply the same public 
policy standards they apply in domestic awards to foreign awards. However, some 
countries have attempted to set out a more universally oriented standard 
(transnational public policy) with a view to achieving greater legal certainty, at least 
in the area of international arbitral awards.
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This sub-section examines, three main components of public policy that have been 
suggested by commentators, namely; domestic-international (i), regional (ii) and, 
transnational public policies (iii).
254
 To sum up this sub-section, the English and the 
Nigerian courts approach are examined (iv).  
(i) Domestic- International public policy 
Domestic-international public policy comprises both internal and external public 
policies of a country. Whereas, internal public policy regulates domestic awards, 
external public policy provides for the application of certain rules of national interest 
of the enforcing country to international awards.
255
 According to Lew, domestic 
public policy consists of both national policies recognised in customary law and 
legislations enacted to regulate certain circumstances which cannot be by-passed by 
the parties.
256
 Nonetheless, these policies, principles and laws are only relevant 
where domestic laws are applicable, or deemed applicable. They are irrelevant to 
international situations.
257
 
For Lalive, the external public policy of a country may be tied to the fundamental 
rules and interests of that country and retains a relative or selfish element concerning 
international cases.
258
 Similarly, the ILA described international public policy as that 
part of the public policy of a country which, if breached, would excuse a party from 
relying on foreign law or foreign judgment or foreign arbitral award.
259
 Other 
commentators have either defined or described international public policy in similar 
terms.
260
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National courts have struggled to give a precise definition or description of 
international public policy. For example, the French Court of Appeal described 
international public policy as “an assemblage of rules and values which the French 
legal order cannot disregard, even in situations of an international character.”261 
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Luxembourg remarked that, international public 
policy is only applicable where the arbitral award substantially violates, “at the time 
of application before the court, that court’s fundamental convictions as the law 
applicable to international relationships.”262 
The various attempts at distinguishing between domestic public policy which the 
enforcing court applies to domestic award from those applicable to international 
award, appears to be academic, a distinction without a difference. Thus, the question 
is posed: there is any difference between domestic (internal) public policy and 
international (external) public policy. 
(a) Domestic public policy and international public policy any difference? 
It seems difficult, if not impossible to distinguish between international public policy 
and domestic public policy. The fundamental moral and convictional policies invoke 
as a bar to enforcement of domestic awards are the same as those apply to 
international awards.
263
 Nonetheless, it seems that what distinguishes both levels of 
public policy is the test the enforcing court applies in cases concerning international 
awards and those regarding domestic awards. This raises the issue of whether a 
narrower concept of public policy as applicable to public international law, or a 
broader concept of public policy as applicable to domestic law, should be applied by 
national courts.
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In Hebei Import and Export Corp. v Polytek Engineering Co. Ltd.,
265
 the Court of 
Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region stated that public 
policy defence under article V (2) (b) of the NYC should be interpreted narrowly. 
Firstly, the court considered whether the phrase ‘international public policy’ was 
subject to some level common to all civilised countries. The court then reasoned that 
it would be wrong to attempt to define such a level. Thus, the court held that the test 
should be: whether the issue of public policy violated the country’s own principles 
which were ‘fundamental to its notion of justice.'266 
(ii) Regional or community public policy 
Another level of public policy is what some commentators refer to as regional or 
community public policy.
267
 This standard of public policy holds the essential rules 
of a political or an economic community.
268
 Arguably, majority of these rules 
relevant to arbitration whether domestic or international arbitration, are extracted 
from inter-country agreements establishing the regional or community entity.
269
 
Instances of these levels of public policy can be found in the EU, OHADA, NAFTA, 
Islamic theory of Siyasa and Merlosur agreements or treaties.
270
 According to van 
Houtte and other commentators, the rules of the EU serve as a paradigm of this 
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standard of public policy.
271
 Laws on human rights, competition rules, and free 
movement of people, capital, goods, establishment and services have been identified 
as part of European Public Policy.
272
 
According to Lew, supra-national source of community public policy has a 
regulatory function towards the laws of all member state thus, integrated within the 
concept of transnational public policy
273
. To this end, an evaluation of the usefulness 
or otherwise of community and domestic public policies to international commerce 
may reveal whether transnational public policy rules have emerged under article V 
(2) (b) of the NYC or not.  
(iii) Transnational public policy 
According to Bantekas, the concept of ‘transnational public policy’ or ‘truly 
international public policy’ relates to a standard that is common among many 
countries.
274
 Comparatively, transnational public policy is of even more curtailed 
scope, but of universal application than domestic-international public policy.
275
 
While domestic-international public policy of a country is part of the law or legal 
system of that country, transnational public policy is not necessarily part of any legal 
system. However, both domestic-international public policy and transnational public 
policy transcend nationalities and national frontiers. Accordingly, Gaillard and 
Savage clarify that: 
… not every breach of  a mandatory rule of a host 
country could justify refusing recognition and 
enforcement of a foreign award. Such refusal is only 
                                                             
271. van Houtte, H. (2002) “From a National to an European Public Policy”, in Nafziger, J. A. R. and 
Symeonides, S. C. (eds.) Law and Justice in a Multi-State World: Essays in Honour of Arthur T. 
von Mehren, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, p. 841. 
272. Moitry, J. (1989) “Right to a Fair Trial and the European Convention on Human Rights: Some 
Remarks on Republique de Guinee Case” Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 
115 – 122; Liebscher, C. (1999) “European Public Policy after Eco Swiss”, American Review of 
International Arbitration, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 81 - 94; Liebscher, C. (2000) “European Public 
Policy and the Austrian Supreme Court”, Arbitration International, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 357 – 
366. In Kajo-Erzeugnisse Essenzen GMbH v DO Zdravilisce Radenska (1999) Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration, Vol. XXIV, pp. 919 – 927, the Austrian Supreme Court held inter alia 
that articles 81 and 82 of the European Union Treaty are pillars of the rules and fundamental 
principles of the EU common market. Thus, they are given the principle of supremacy of EC law 
which is part of the public policy of every EU member State. 
273. Lew, J. D. M (1978) at pp. 534 and 538 – 539. 
274. Bantekas, I. (2015) at pp. 242 – 246. 
275. Lalive, P. (1987); Rogers, A. and Kaley, M. (1999) “The Impact of Public Policy in International 
Commercial Arbitration”, Arbitration, Vol. 65, No. 4, pp. 326 – 332. 
264 
 
justified where the award contravenes the principles 
which are considered in the host country as reflecting 
its fundamental convictions, or as having an absolute, 
universal value.
276
 
In the context of the NYC, national courts may rely on transnational public policy 
where one party commences litigation in violation of an arbitration agreement or 
where enforcement of an award will breach the fundamental interests of the 
international community.
277
 To determine those fundamental interests, an enforcing 
court will have to reference a widely held view amongst members of the 
international community. Those fundamental interests may be either substantive or 
procedural transnational public policies.
278
 Examples of violation of substantive 
transnational public policy and procedural transnational public policy include but not 
restricted to bribery, fraud, impartiality of the arbitrator, lack of due process. These 
examples and many more are copiously discussed by Otto and Elvan and other 
commentators.
279
 By applying these transnational public policies, national courts 
directly or indirectly endorses those rules of public policy as to which a broad 
consensus has emerged in the international community.
280
 
(iv) English and Nigerian Courts approach  
As regard English and Nigerian courts approach, two Court of Appeal cases are 
examined in thesis namely; Soleimany v Soleimany and Westcare Investment Inc. v 
Jugoimport-SDPR Holding Co. Ltd. 
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 In Soleimany v Soleimany father and son were involved in an illegal contact and 
when dispute arose, the matter was referred to arbitration in England. An award was 
rendered in favour of the son. The son applied to the High Court to enforce the 
award as a judgement of the court. Leave to enforce the award was granted. The 
father resisted the enforcement of the award on the grounds that the award was based 
on an illegal contract. The father argued that enforcement of the award would be 
contrary to English public policy. The trial court dismissed the father’s application 
on the basis that a contract which is unenforceable for illegality becomes enforceable 
if the procedural law of the arbitration attaches no importance to the illegality. 
Dissatisfied, the father appealed the High Court decision. The Court of Appeal 
overturning the judgment at first instance held that, an award whether domestic or 
foreign will not be enforced in England if enforcement would contravene English 
public policy. The Court of Appeal reasoned that since the principal contract was 
based on an illegal contract, enforcement of the award would be contrary to English 
public policy. Although, the arbitrator determined the illegality to be insignificant 
under the law of the principal contract (Jewish law), nonetheless, enforcement was 
refused pursuant to section 103 (3) of the AA 1996. 
In Westacre Investment Inc. v Jugoimprt-SDPR Holding Co. Ltd, parties entered into 
a consultancy contract governed by Swiss law. The first defendant appointed the 
claimants as consultants for the procurement of contracts for the sale of military 
equipment to Kuwait. The claimants were to receive a substantial percentage of the 
value of the contracts in return for its services. Dispute arose and the claimants 
commenced arbitration in Geneva. The defendant urged the arbitrators to dismiss the 
claimants’ claim because the principal contract was tainted with illegality (fraud and 
bribery) or illicit personal influence of other kinds. The arbitrators found in favour of 
the claimant and award was rendered against the defendant. 
The defendant challenged the award and sought the annulment of the award before 
the Swiss Federal Court. The Swiss Federal Court upheld the arbitrators’ award and 
dismissed the defendant’s application for annulment of the award. Consequently, the 
claimants sought to enforce the award in England and leave was granted. The 
defendants moved to set aside the leave for enforcement on grounds of public policy 
in accordance with section 103 (3) of AA 1996. The trial court held that a foreign 
266 
 
award which was both legal under the proper law of the contract and the procedural 
law of the arbitration (lex arbitri) but illegal in the country of enforcement could still 
be enforced. The court clarified that on the facts of the case the public policy of 
finality of arbitral awards outweighed the public policy of discouraging international 
commercial corruption. Enforcement of the award was granted. On appeal, the Court 
of Appeal agreed with the views of the judge at first instance. Instructively, the Court 
of Appeal referring to Lemenda
281
 stated inter alia that: 
It was difficult to see why outside the field of such 
universally condemned activities such as terrorism, 
drug trafficking, prostitution, paedophilia, anything 
short of corruption or fraud in international commerce 
should invite the attention of English public policy in 
relation to contracts which are not performed within 
the jurisdiction of the English courts … It is legitimate 
to conclude that there is nothing which offends English 
public policy if an arbitral tribunal enforces a contract 
which does not offend the domestic public policy 
under either the proper law of the contract or its crucial 
law, even if English domestic public policy might have 
taken a different view … 282 
In Soleimany, the claimant sought to enforce an English award (domestic award), 
while in Westacre case, the claimants sought to enforce a Swiss award (foreign 
award). However, in both cases, the defendants contended that since the principal 
contracts were based on illegality, the court should refuse enforcement of the awards 
pursuant to English public policy. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in Soleimany 
refused enforcement of the award and in Westacre, enforcement of the award was 
allowed. 
The difference between the two cases is that, in Soleimany, the arbitrator found the 
principal contract illegal under the law of the place of performance (Iran). Also, it 
was apparent on the face of the award that the principal contract was illegal under 
Iranian law. Thus, the Court of Appeal had no difficulty in denying enforcement of 
the award on grounds that enforcement will violate English public policy. 
Conversely, in Westacre, the court decided to enforce the award and not the principal 
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contract, because the arbitrators had found the issue of illegality of the principal 
contract unmeritorious under the law of the place of arbitration (Swiss law). 
Although, the facts of both cases were not same however, a common element to both 
cases remains the illegality of the principal contract. Thus, the different conclusions 
reached by the Court of Appeal in both cases have been applauded at the same time 
criticised.
283
 Nevertheless, this thesis argues that each of the cases had its own merits 
according to which the Court of Appeal decided differently. The decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Soleimany is clear that English courts will excuse enforcement of 
an award “whether domestic or foreign” if the illegality of the principal contract is 
“palpable and indisputable”.284 Furthermore, in Westacre the Court of Appeal 
categorised illegality of the principal contract into two.  Firstly, illegality which 
contravenes rules of public policy based on considerations which are universally 
condemned. For example, an illegality involving conducts such as terrorism and 
armed robbery.  Secondly, illegalities which breach rules of public policy based 
purely on domestic considerations.  
Flowing from the above categorisation, it seems English Courts will refuse 
enforcement of an award if the principal contract contains illegality falling into the 
first category. The fact that the principal contract is enforceable under the proper law 
or the law of the place of performance is irrelevant.
285
 However, where the illegality 
relates to the second category and provided the principal contract is enforceable 
under the proper law or crucial law, English courts may enforce the award. Under the 
second category, English courts may still enforce an award even though it is apparent 
from the face of the award that the principal contract is illegal, English public policy 
notwithstanding.
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This thesis argues that on the strength of Westacre that a foreign arbitral award can 
be enforced in England though the principal contract violates English public policy. 
Provided the illegality of the principal contract is not universally condemned. 
Accordingly, it appears the English court applies transnational public policy with 
respect to refusal of enforcement of foreign arbitral award under section 103 (3) of 
the AA 1996. In the absence of direct authority in Nigeria, it is suggested that 
enforcement of a foreign award should not be refused in Nigeria on grounds of 
illegality if such illegality is not internationally condemned. 
6.3. Summary 
This chapter examined the grounds of challenge of awards and discussed the attitude 
of the courts of England and Nigeria where enforcement of the award is resisted or 
actively challenged.  
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Chapter seven 
Conclusion 
This thesis set out to answer the following research questions: 
i) Legal justification for enforcement of arbitral awards: Whether the same 
standards are applied in determining the validity of the enforcement of 
transnational commercial arbitral awards by the English and Nigerian courts.  
ii) Jurisprudential theories of arbitration: Whether the juridical theory of 
arbitration the law and attitude of the national courts of England and Nigeria 
reflect in enforcing transnational commercial arbitral awards are the same. 
iii) Judicial attitudes to evidential requirements towards the enforcement of 
awards rendered purely on transnational legal principles: Whether arbitral 
awards based purely on transnational rules are enforceable in England and 
Nigeria; and whether the procedures for the enforcement of such arbitral 
awards in England and Nigeria are effective. 
iv) Judicial attitudes to annulment of awards: Whether the English and Nigerian 
courts apply the same conditions in setting aside transnational commercial 
arbitral awards. 
v) Judicial attitudes towards resisting enforcement of awards: Whether the 
English and Nigerian courts apply the same conditions in refusing 
enforcement of transnational commercial arbitral awards; and whether the 
conditions for the refusal of such awards in England and Nigeria are 
effective. 
Throughout this thesis, five areas have been examined in five substantive chapters 
with the aim of addressing the research and other incidental questions.  
The first area concerned the legitimacy of the enforcement of transnational 
commercial arbitral awards. Chapters two of this thesis addressed the issue from a 
historical perspective. The chapter examined the historical development of the legal 
instruments that regulates the enforcement of arbitral awards in England and Nigeria.  
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It was found that in England, arbitration as a non-state dispute settlement evolved out 
of the customs, usages and practices of traders who travelled from fair to fair. The 
Royal courts which were vested with the state’s judicial power lacked jurisdiction to 
adjudicate cross-border commercial disputes. These courts were also ill-equipped to 
resolve cross-border commercial disputes which were not injurious to the King’s 
reign. Thus, courts of the fairs and markets, akin to modern day arbitral tribunals, 
were developed by cross-border traders to resolve their trade disputes. This was 
private and non-litigious. Submission of such disputes was voluntary and the parties 
were bound by the courts’ decision. Perceiving that arbitration will weaken their 
jurisdiction, the common law courts provoked parliament to statutorily regulate 
arbitration. These statutes preserved the principle of party autonomy. 
As it relates to Nigeria, it was found that arbitration as a private dispute mechanism 
is as old as the indigenous communities that make up the entity known as Nigeria. 
Before the indigenous peoples were overpowered and forced into colonial rule by 
Great Britain, customary arbitration was, and is still, prominently used in the 
resolution of various disputes. The Chiefs-in-Council, traditional rulers, elders and 
other trusted third parties arbitrated between disputing parties. Submission to 
customary arbitration is voluntary and the decision of the arbitrator is final and 
binding, provided the parties agreed to be bound by such arbitrator’s decision. The 
chapter also indicates that during the colonial rule, customary legal systems of 
various ethnic nationalities of Nigeria became influenced by the English legal system 
though, customary arbitration and English styled arbitration operated side by side. 
English styled arbitration was only applicable where local jurisdiction and 
circumstances allowed. After independence in 1960, the English Arbitration Act 
1889 continued to be in force in Nigeria as Arbitration Act 1958. Though, the ACA 
1988 impliedly repealed the Arbitration Act 1958, it preserves the spirit and letter of 
the principle of party autonomy. 
 Consequently, this thesis argued in chapter two that the historical progress of 
arbitration in both countries demonstrates that arbitration emerged as an essential 
dispute resolution mechanism, and is based on the principle of party autonomy in 
both jurisdictions.  
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The thesis then examined the features and jurisprudential theories of arbitration in 
chapter three. The chapter also established the policy underpinning of the laws and 
attitude of the English and Nigerian courts towards the enforcement of arbitral 
award. The thesis argued in this chapter that the efficacy of international commercial 
arbitration depends ultimately on the positive attitude of courts towards giving effect 
to the principle of party autonomy. Following an analysis of the decisions of English 
and Nigerian courts, this thesis concludes that the courts in both jurisdictions in 
apposite cases will enforce transnational commercial arbitral awards, primarily 
because of their desire to protect and respect party autonomy to contract. These 
courts are minded of the fact that if they refuse to enforce arbitral awards, such 
refusal may subvert parties’ freedom to contract and thwart their legitimate 
expectations. In determining whether to enforce arbitral awards, the courts consider 
whether parties freely intended to arbitrate the disputes. Parties’ consent to arbitrate 
their dispute is construed from their arbitration agreement independent of the 
principal contract, which is required to be in writing under the New York 
Convention, AA 1996 and the ACA.  
It was further argued that the arbitration process is not an extension of the state 
adjudicatory system, but a private dispute resolution mechanism that requires the 
support of the courts. Thus, the validity of the award is not subject to conversion into 
a court judgement. The award’s validity lies in the contract between the parties to 
resolve their dispute by arbitration and to accept the award as final and binding on 
them. Whether the award is enforceable or not is at the discretion of the enforcing 
court after taking into account the exhaustive grounds for refusal under the New 
York Convention as implemented by the AA 1996 and ACA respectively. 
Chapter three therefore concluded that the reason why the English and Nigerian 
courts are prepared in applicable cases to enforce a transnational commercial arbitral 
award is because of the parties’ consent to submit their dispute to arbitration. This 
reason accounts for the pro-enforcement approaches of these courts. 
This conclusion led to an examination in chapter four of the judicial attitudes in 
England and Nigeria towards the evidential requirements for the enforcement of 
transnational arbitral awards rendered. The thesis also examined whether the 
procedures for enforcement in both jurisdictions are effective. It was finds that a 
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successful party in an international commercial arbitration has different enforcement 
methods under the English and Nigerian regimes, it can adopt. In England, a New 
York Convention award can be enforced either by an action on the award at common 
law or by summary procedures at the High court or County court. In Nigeria, a New 
York Convention award can be enforced by a common law action on the award, or 
by summary procedures, or by registration before a High Court. For the award to be 
enforced in both jurisdictions, the enforcing party must supply the court with the 
evidential documents of: a duly authenticated original or a duly certified copy of the 
award, the original or duly certified copy of the arbitration agreement and if the 
award or agreement is in a language other than that of the court, a translation of it. 
The chapter also examined the question whether an award can be enforced against an 
unsuccessful party in the two jurisdictions. It was concluded in chapter four that both 
the English and Nigerian courts are willing, in appropriate cases, to enforce arbitral 
awards based purely on transnational legal principles and that the enforcement 
procedures in both countries are effective. There are two principal regimes for 
enforcing commercial arbitral awards in England and Nigeria, namely under the 
common law and under statute. The statutory regime can be further divided into New 
York Convention and non-Convention arbitral awards.  
Chapter five continued this enquiry into the attitudes of courts in the two 
jurisdictions. It examined the judicial attitudes towards a challenge to the 
enforcement of arbitral awards where either of the two jurisdictions is the seat of 
arbitration. It was argued in the chapter that both English and Nigerian courts show 
sensitivity in upholding arbitral awards. This it was argued is because the arbitration 
agreement demonstrates the parties’ intention to comply with the decision of the 
arbitrator as final and binding on them.  
To this end, the AA 1996 envisages three grounds for challenging an award namely, 
want of jurisdiction, serious irregularity and error of the law. The Act allows parties 
to contract out of the right to appeal the award for errors of law. However, the AA 
1996 does not allow parties to opt out of the provisions on the challenge of 
arbitration awards rendered on the procedural defects of want of jurisdiction and 
serious irregularity. Under the ACA on the other hand, the grounds for setting aside 
arbitral award in Nigeria are misconduct relating to the arbitrator and improper 
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procurement of the arbitral proceeding or award. Other grounds range from 
incapacity of a party to the arbitration agreement to, the award being against the 
public policy of Nigeria. Although, the Nigerian courts have wide discretion to set 
aside arbitral awards, the chapter contended that, the courts have shown support to 
uphold arbitral awards where prima facie, the award is good on its face. 
This theme of judicial attitudes towards arbitration was continued in chapter six with 
an examination of judicial attitudes towards refusing enforcement of arbitral awards 
in England and Nigeria. This chapter examined whether the grounds for refusal of 
enforcement of arbitral awards in both countries are effective. This thesis found that 
the grounds on which English and Nigerian courts will refuse enforcement are the 
same. These grounds range from incapacity of a party to the arbitration agreement to 
the award being contrary to the public policy of both countries. The chapter argued 
that the grounds of refusal stipulated under the AA 1996 and the ACA are exhaustive 
and that the courts in both jurisdictions interpret them narrowly.  
This narrow interpretation by the courts effectively strikes a balance between the 
finality of awards and the legitimacy of the enforcement of awards. This, it was 
argued is because both the English and Nigerian courts, will not generally refuse the 
enforcement of an award annulled at the seat of arbitration. Both courts will need to 
be satisfied that the award or arbitration offended their own principles of natural 
justice and basic rules of honesty. 
Finally, this thesis argues that the policy considerations of the laws and the judicial 
attitudes of both English and Nigerian courts favour the enforcement of transnational 
commercial arbitral awards. It further argues that this shows their compatibility, 
similarities and differences. In any case, in the absence of a uniform law for the 
enforcement of transnational arbitral awards, this thesis suggests new ideas and legal 
perspectives to both countries that will provide greater efficiency. This thesis also 
provides a useful guide for the process of the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
in England and Nigeria.  
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